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Civil conflict is a complex multi-layered event. As an outcome it represents a product 
of both the structural framework in place and decision-making between the different 
elite groups. From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective, this dissertation will 
provide an answer as to why some illiberal democracies fall into civil conflict while 
others do not. It argues that horizontally unequal elites bargain for (re)distribution of 
political participation, economic assets and social services through formal and informal 
institutions in order to expand the shares of the goods distributed. The presence of 
cleavages and grievances amongst groups are enhanced when exclusion through 
inefficient redistribution takes place; therefore, a bargain failure with the potential to 
activate violent means, implies a disagreement amongst the elites over the allocation 
of resources to different societal groups. Bargain failures occur in the presence of non-
credible commitments and information asymmetries. Inefficiency in the distribution can 
also be captured through informal institutions in the form of patronage networks, a side 
of the transaction spectrum which has been understudied. The contribution of this 
thesis to the general debate stems from this acknowledgement and alleviates this by 
incorporating the full spectrum of institutions which operate effectively within illiberal 
democratic regimes. Patronage networks despite being a fundamental part of how 
politics is conducted in illiberal democratic regimes have surprisingly been neglected 
in the contemporary study of conflict onset. By conducting two-level fsQCA along a 
selection of 21 cases of illiberal democracy across 1980-2012 including cases of 
ethnic conflict onset, the analysis will show that distribution through patronage 
networks does play a role in triggering conflict or in aiding to control violence 
depending on the efficiency of the distribution across grieved groups. Further 
comparative analysis of a most likely and least likely case for cases of conflict 
(Thailand and India Bodo conflict) and peace (Namibia and Bolivia) reveals that the 
effect of the patronage mechanisms when redistributive, plays a larger role as an 
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Civil wars are more prevalent now than ever before, intra-state conflicts seem to be 
flourishing is every part of the world, particularly in the southern hemisphere. Despite 
this increase in intra-state warfare and the utmost importance of these processes we 
still do not fully understand them. Civil disputes are complex events, yet not all such 
disputes become violent. In this regard, why do some groups decide to use violence 
while others do not? Or in the bigger picture, why do some states suffer costly conflict 
onset while others manage to avoid it? Are there any common factors that we can 
identify across peaceful cases or cases of violence? The present dissertation focuses 
on civil conflict onset within illiberal democracies and aims to provide an answer as to 
why do some illiberal democracies avoid civil conflict while others do not. 
 
The academic motivation for undertaking the present research comes from two main 
factors. First, the research programme is saturated with quantitative analysis which 
has been useful in revealing significant variables such as development, type of regime 
or the presence of formal political exclusion. Thus, despite the benefit of revealing 
variables of interest there is still significant disagreement on the relevance and impact 
these variables have on augmenting the possibility of conflict onset. Furthermore, the 
explanatory power of quantitative methods stops there. It does not provide us with 
explanations as to how and why these variables affect the possibility of conflict. In this 
vein, building up from there, more analyses focusing on causality are needed in order 
to, not only provide a better understanding of this phenomenon, but most importantly 
to use it towards particular policy aims. Of course, this will also bring disadvantages 
as the inability of generalising to a large N, thus, digging into causality analysis and 
refraining from the use of quantitative methods will aid to highlight other potential, 
understudied mechanisms that perhaps could help in providing a better understanding 
of such an important event.  
 
Secondly, pertaining explanations associated to the political regime or in general the 
political organisation of societies, I find that, most of these explanations often ignore 
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the reality of how politics is conducted. When it comes to the policy world coming from 
above (International institutions and in general the developed world), the positive 
effects of democracy have been in my opinion overestimated. This has led to a series 
of -sometimes forceful- democratisations or impositions of democratic systems which 
have created a grey zone which we now call illiberal democratic regimes. Extensive 
research on conflict onset and political organisation has pointed towards the relevance 
of this type of regime. In short, according to the evidence, illiberal democracies hold a 
higher chance of conflict onset due to their hybrid nature. This main body of research 
has conceptually defined this hybridisation as: anocracies, illiberal democracies, weak 
democracies and/or semidemocracies; this terminology has been used 
interchangeably across the literature. As with many other significant variables we do 
not know how and why hybrid regimes possess a higher likelihood of conflict onset. 
Likewise, research on illiberal democracies has failed to recognise the relevance of 
informal institutions such as patronage networks and as such has ignored much of 
what drives political behaviour in these societies of interest. Patronage networks 
represent a key channel of distribution that, in many cases, seems to be more 
important that formal ones. In fact, when challenged with modernisation processes 
associated to the formation of the nation-state instead of disappearing, patronage has 
accommodated, and it has been preserved behind the scenes. In this regard and given 
its staggering relevance across the developing world in terms of political participation 
and political support, distribution of public goods and also distribution of economic 
assets the study of patronage as an informal institution has somehow been neglected.  
 
My contribution to the general debate stems from this acknowledgement. Patronage 
networks are a fundamental part of the political spectrum in illiberal democratic 
regimes. Their study is relevant because it does not idealise politics in the third world, 
but instead it recognises the shortcomings and aims to establish ways in which these 
flaws can be used for better results such as aiding to control violence. In general terms, 
I aim to visualise the importance of informal institutions for illiberal democratic regimes 
in particular, and how these institutions can serve as triggers of conflict or as peace 




I narrow the research to ethnic conflicts within illiberal democratic regimes from 1980 
to 2012. From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective, the present dissertation aims 
to provide a structural and agency explanation of ethnic conflict onset which effectively 
incorporates the full spectrum of institutions. Furthermore, I aim to provide an analysis 
which incorporates causal explanations. The justification for this is two-fold. On the 
side of the full spectrum of political institutions I believe that a political analysis of 
conflict onset must contain insights into patronage networks as, within illiberal 
democratic regimes, they represent a legitimate channel of supply which has the 
potential to produce (in)equality in the distribution of political participation, social 
services or economic assets and therefore encourage (or discourage) the use of 
violence. Distribution undertaken informally denotes a hidden side of the transaction 
spectrum that might provide answers as to why some societies rebel while others do 
not. On the other hand, in terms of causal explanations I believe that more research 
that is able to explain why and how is needed within the conflict onset research 
programme. We need not only to better understand these processes but also be more 
accurate in the formulation and recommendation of policy frameworks. I believe there 
has been a disconnection between the policy world and academia. In some instances, 
the positive effects of democracy have been overestimated and the reality of how 
politics is conducted in these regimes is often ignored. Therefore, the analysis 
presented in the present thesis gives room for some policy recommendations.  
 
 A review on the literature on conflict onset reveals that the whole research programme 
can be divided along four main groups of explanations: Inequality, political 
organisation, ethnicity and economic performance (which also includes arguments 
related to resource abundance/scarcity). Each one of these explanations are 
presented in chapter 3. Summarizing, inequality explanations point towards the 
existence of inequality as a potential factor encouraging rebellion. However, the Gini 
coefficient the most used resource to measure inequality has a severe missing data 
problem particularly for the countries of interest which has undermined the results. 
Furthermore, scholars have pointed towards the misleading interpretation of 
attempting to capture collective action through measures focused on the individual. 
The highlight of inequality explanations however, rests on research cemented in 
Frances Stewart’s (2002) ideas of horizontal inequality as opposed to vertical 
inequality. Her research states that inequalities can be captured along different 
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dimensions: political, economic, social and cultural and that they are better interpreted 
across and between groups rather than individuals. From a conflict onset perspective, 
this has sparked significant agreement in regards to potential causes of conflict. In 
particular, research on exclusion as a political dimension of horizontal inequality by 
Cederman et al. (2010) (2011) has found robust conclusions arguing that exclusion is 
a strong determinant of conflict onset. These ideas have also been further explored 
from different angles (dimensions) by other scholars (Baldwin & Huber, 2010) 
(Besacon, 2005) (Gluber & Selway, 2012) (Ostby, 2008) (Ostby, et al., 2009) (Alesina 
& Papaioannou, 2016). The conception of horizontal inequality seems more promising 
in providing robust explanations of conflict onset and as such represents a better 
interpretation of the effect of inequality on the possibility of conflict.  Furthermore, 
taking a look at the studies provided in regards of ethnicity, there has been 
considerable disagreement pertaining the effect of ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic 
salience or ethnic dominance. Thus, when pairing ethnicity with horizontal inequality1 
the results seem to provide robust and compelling explanations. 
 
As for economic performance explanations, they have highlighted a strong effect of 
economic development on conflict onset. I believe that whilst providing a general 
evaluation of economic development across the world countries, it is successful at 
producing relevant results when testing for significance and including Norway and 
Rwanda for example. Thus, I question whether a narrower assessment in which, the 
sample includes only an income group such as only low-income countries will still 
produce relevant results. In this regard, I believe that the degree of economic 
development might not matter but what matters is how those meagre resources are 
redistributed.  Lastly, political organisation explanations as highlighted above do agree 
on the effect of illiberal democracies on conflict onset.  
 
A general evaluation of the research programme and its extent also deserves for 
further questions to be asked and explored. A point of departure can reflect on 
particularly comparisons across those societies of interest. This exercise begs the 
question of why do some of these cases of interest successfully avoid falling into 
                                                      
1 Horizontal inequality has mainly been studied by differentiating groups by ethnicity. However, it can, not only 
be captured across ethnic differentials but also across religions and classes.  
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conflict despite being at risk of it? In particular, I aim to find out why do some illiberal 
democracies fall into conflict while others do not? Chapter 4 presents the theoretical 
framework to answer this question. 
 
The answer is complex and deserves a multi-layered explanation. To begin, I believe 
that outcomes such as a civil war are a product of both structural and agency 
mechanisms which can be tracked historically. I support this idea because focusing 
on one or the other does not provide a holistic evaluation of the social processes taking 
place. Most of the research has done precisely this; focus on -mainly- structural 
explanations or on agency motivations but not incorporating both. In this regard, I aim 
to answer the Research Question from both angles. Secondly, within agency focused 
research, most of the attention has been given to the rebel groups. A growing 
scholarship is now focusing also on the role the elites play in facilitating or preventing 
conflicts. The role of elites is of utmost importance as they hold decision-making power 
and are able to concede or deny demands and they are also able to mobilise 
constituencies if so they wish. Elites therefore, constantly bargain for the redistribution 
of political participation, social services and economic assets and they do so within 
both formal and informal institutions. When redistribution is inefficient across groups 
in either of the institutional frameworks then conflict is more likely to happen. Contrary 
to this, when redistribution is efficient across groups in either of the institutional 
frameworks then conflict is more likely to be avoided. 
 
Following this point, conflict onset can be understood as a product of a bargain failure. 
According to the rationalist explanations of war (Fearon, 1995), bargains tend to fail in 
the presence of information asymmetries and non-credible commitments, resembling 
inefficient distribution which can be captured within both formal and informal channels 
of distribution and applied to the domestic context. Because human beings are both 
rule followers and self-interested beings, bargaining and decision-making depends on 
the structural context (the rules of the game) and on personal interest. Interest is 
understood as an interest in participating or increasing the redistribution of assets, 
privileges and rights. Ethnicity works as the binding factor, elites will campaign and 
bargain for the benefit of their ethnic constituencies. These ideas also depart from the 
assumption that ethnic groups are horizontally unequal amongst each other, thus, the 
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degree as to which this inequality plays and the dimension which is most affected by 
this represent key points of analysis.  
 
Formal exclusion as a dimension of political inequality is able to provide a picture of 
inequality at the elite level in the struggle for worth. It also represents an important 
condition that facilitates conflict onset. Likewise, political inclusion might also provide 
insights into conflict avoidance. However, as conflict is a complex event and political 
(in)equality could also be captured via informal mechanisms of political distribution 
there can be cases in which ethnicities are formally included but nonetheless conflict 
is present. This points out towards the onset of conflicts better to be understood via 
conjunctural causality.  
 
My answer to the Research question therefore can be summarized in the following 
two general hypotheses: (1). when there is inefficiency in the distribution of assets, 
privileges and rights to different ethnic groups via formal or informal institutions, 
conflict is more likely to happen.  As my interest is also to highlight the relevance of 
informal institutions which have been systematically ignored in contemporary conflict 
onset research I hypothesize that; (2). exclusionary and inefficient redistribution 
through patronage networks can increase the possibility of conflict onset.  
 
The methodology selected for evaluating the different hypotheses is a mixed method 
approach which is presented in Chapter 5. As stated before, one of the problematics 
identified is that research methods for conflict onset research has mainly focused on 
quantitative analysis. My belief is that there is a need for pushing a qualitative agenda 
which has the potential also to enable a modest generalization. Furthermore, 
understanding conflict onset as a complex event which is commanded by conjunctural 
causation leads to the selection of a methodology which allows for the analysis of 
different causes, remains on the qualitative side and also is able to provide a modest 
generalization. Qualitative Comparative Analysis offers a good point of start. 
  
Implementing QCA for the theoretical framework has several advantages but also 
constrains. The constrains run along the unit of analysis and time spans, measurement 
and membership and also the fact that it remains as a newly developed methodology. 
Time spans challenges have been resolved by the proposition of different variants of 
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QCA for which I chose to implement Two-level Fuzzy QCA analysis. The two-level 
variant not only solves the problem of temporality but also fits well with the evaluation 
of structural (distant) and agency (proximate) causes. Measurement is perhaps the 
biggest challenge of them all but as such, is also present in other methods. For this 
particular project measuring the degree of distribution through patronage networks 
presented the biggest challenge in comparison to the other conditions / mechanisms 
evaluated. I recognize that the measurement is not by any means perfect, but I believe 
it has the potential to get us started somewhere and to stimulate the discussion.  
Finally, as a newly developed methodology QCA might present alternative criticism, 
however, improvements have come from the need of researchers to adapt the 
framework and/or explore it potential. The present research is not an exception. 
 
Two-level fsQCA analysis therefore, will help in testing and identifying the relevant 
structural and agency conditions that facilitate conflict on the one hand, and by 
negating the outcomes it will also help to identify the effect of opposite mechanisms in 
aiding to control violence. The QCA analysis will also reveal most likely and least likely 
cases of conflict onset and of conflict avoidance. The idea of implementing a mixed 
method approach is to therefore test the conditions previously identified in the QCA 
as mechanisms via case study analysis from a most dissimilar system design 
comparative approach. In this regard, chapter 5 will present the QCA analysis and 
results. 
 
The remaining 4 chapters of the dissertation will present the four case study analyses 
which aim at testing the mechanism of interest which is informal institutions in the form 
of patronage networks2. These 4 chapters are composed of two cases of conflict and 
2 cases of a peaceful trajectory. By using a least and a most likely case the explanatory 
strength of the mechanism increases. A most likely case represents a case in which 
there is confidence the mechanism is operating. Conversely, a least likely case 
represents a case in which the mechanism is thought to be present but to a lower 
extent, or it might not play any role in affecting the outcome. If the study of the most 
likely case reveals the presence of the mechanism, this evidence can further increase 
                                                      
2 Ideally a full evaluation of the theorised mechanisms would be undertaken. However due to time and 
plausibility constrains I focus on the mechanism of interest.  
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our confidence of the role of the mechanism in producing or facilitating the outcome 
Y. Furthermore, if the mechanism fails to be present in the most likely case then cross-
case comparison will determine that the mechanism is likely to not have a significant 
impact across the whole population. The analysis of the least likely cases serves 
another purpose. If it is found on the least likely case it updates the confidence in the 
operation of the mechanism for the rest of the population. This approach also enables 
cross-case inference for the QCA population.  
 
For the cases of conflict, inefficient distribution through patronage networks is found 
in the most likely case (Thailand) and it plays a strong role in producing the outcome. 
Thus, for the least likely case (India Bodo) it is present, but its effect is not as strong. 
Likewise, for the cases of a peaceful trajectory, the mechanism is found in both cases: 
Namibia and Bolivia. These results significantly update the confidence in informal 
redistribution being a key factor is producing a peaceful trajectory in conflict prone 
countries.  
 
In this regard, Chapter 6 analyses the case of Thailand and the conflict in the Southern 
provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat as a most likely case. The Malay Muslims 
historically most associated with neighbouring Malaysia have been denied cultural 
rights such as speaking and teaching their language in schools, furthermore the region 
is highly economically deprived, and the Malays do not have any political participation. 
This represents salient horizontal inequalities. The Thai government in its attempt to 
coopt the region has used a forceful approach and till the 1980s it failed. Upon the 
1980s and till 1988 General Prem Tinsulanonda rises to power and the strategy 
towards the south significantly changes. The region gets granted autonomy over 
security affairs and violence suddenly stops. Research into the causes of violence in 
Thailand has over-emphasized the effect that the creation of two institutions: the 
SBPAC and the CMP-43 had on decreasing violence. However, the effect of 
patronage networks being so important in Thailand has been left unexplained. 
Patronage networks provided a stabilizing effect in controlling the use of violence by 
Malays as a means of achieving demands. The significant change in the patronage 
network between the governments of General Prem Tinsulanonda and Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2001 ultimately meant that the poorest Malay population which is the 
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one holding arms, was not able to receive any redistribution of economic assets, 
political participation or social services. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses India’s Bodoland conflict as a least likely case. It represents a 
least likely case because India has made considerable efforts in the integration of 
different ethnicities in the formal realm. For example, it holds a comprehensive ethnic 
political system and it uses policies such as Affirmative Action programmes to 
guarantee the participation of Scheduled Tribes. Since independence it has attempted 
to acknowledge and integrate the different ethnicities and to recognise the power from 
below. As for informality, patronage has been also present but in the Bodo case it has 
been non-redistributive. The struggle of the Bodo ethnicity in the North-eastern region 
has been a constant battle for the recognition of cultural rights and autonomy. The 
Bodos and Assamese elites within the state of Assam had a series of failed or 
unsatisfactory bargains which progressively led to the use of violence as the only 
means. Local panchayats a unit of decentralised government represented the 
opportunity for Bodos to access assets and to influence decision-making power but 
the low degree of Bodo integration and the ineffectiveness of Panchayats, impeded 
the distribution of patronage to the Bodo community.  
 
Chapter 8 and chapter 9 analyse the cases of conflict avoidance with Namibia as a 
most likely case and Bolivia as a least likely case. Namibia has strong formal and 
informal mechanisms of power sharing and decision-making which recognise the 
authority of chiefs and patrons. The recognition of traditional authority has led to a 
hybridisation of the political system which has enhanced the legitimacy of the nation-
state formal rules. Furthermore, ethnic disputes have been brought forward to the state 
as a product of the recognition of traditional leadership, which in itself remains 
informal. Namibia is a high ethnically fragmented country, the Ovambo ethnicity 
represents the majority and historically it has also been the most powerful group. 
SWAPO the freedom from colonisation force later became the ruling party and to date 
it has not ceased to do so. SWAPO has a Ovambo base, thus, according to 
Afrobarometer data, members of other ethnicities feel commonly treated unequally in 
spite of this, ethnic disputes have not become violent. The brightening point of the 
Namibia case is the process of formalisation which recognised the traditional 
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leadership of chiefs and patrons and incorporated it as a branch of the formal state, 
allowing also for covering and extending the state’s arm.  
 
Chapter 9 posits the discussion on Bolivia which is presented as a least likely case. 
Historically Bolivia has been ruled by the minority Mestizo elite. Mestizos were 
recognised as higher up in their position in the social strata during colonisation, whilst 
black communities and indigenous groups were treated as slaves and labourers. The 
indigenous groups although the majority, up until 2006 had never had political power. 
Furthermore, they represent the working class of the country being ethnicity a mutually 
reinforcing cleavage with class. Both of these criteria put Bolivia in a very vulnerable 
position which favours the proliferation of armed conflict. However, despite this, the 
country has managed to avoid violence. Informal mechanisms of distribution have 
been operating during the exclusive mestizo governments, the indigenous groups 
have been kept content not to fight. Thus, the character of patronage in Bolivia during 
the mestizo rule is inter-ethnic. The use of patronage has been continuously 
condemned by the nascent ethnic parties across the 1990s and by the MAS the 
movement later party which brought Evo Morales to power. Nonetheless, the 
indigenous now ruling elite continues to use patronage networks to informally 
redistribute. 
 
Finally, Chapter 10 presents the conclusions, discussion and future areas of research 
the dissertation has identified. Patronage networks are evidenced to be an important 
channel o redistribution in illiberal democratic regimes. The QCA analysis and the 
further testing of mechanisms in the four cases leads me to conclude that informal 
institutions do matter and have the potential to serve as conflict drivers or as 
instruments to achieve peace. The dissertation further reveals some points of analysis 
and areas in which research needs to be expanded. For example, from a four-way 
case comparison, evidence in the relevance of decentralisation seems to be 
compelling, decentralised patronage networks are more efficient in controlling conflict 
than centralised ones if decision-making power can be accessed by the grieved group. 
Decentralised networks allow for a more efficient and effective redistribution which is 
able to reach the lower ends of the vertical scale. Furthermore, the impact of 
formalisation processes seems to be a promising area of research. Formalisation has 
been studied in the areas of land use and property rights but not to understand the 
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incorporation or recognition of traditional leadership as an instrument of legitimising 
the state and incorporating millennial informal institutions into contemporary formal 
ones. Finally, some insight into a potential balance between institutions which could 
impact the possibility of conflict has also been highlighted in the theoretical framework 
and as such represents another potential area of future research.  
 
The dissertation further gives room to provide some policy recommendations in line 
with the conclusions highlighted above. Firstly, a greater degree of incorporation of 
traditional forms of leadership or ethnic-based organisations in ethnically diverse 
countries can be pursued. It has been shown that instances in which there is a sense 
of recognition, respect and autonomy pertaining traditional leadership or ethnic-based 
organisations show higher possibilities of peaceful conflict resolution. This recognition 
formally incorporates differences and accommodates them in the formal state 
structures, increasing not only trustworthiness in the state, but also extending its arm 
into rural or inaccessible places. A remarkable side effect of the recognition and 
incorporation of traditional leadership is also the targeting and tailoring of policies to 
what is most needed by the community. This can be materialised by implementing 
decentralisation policies. The evidence from the cases shows that decentralisation 
policies do increase the efficiency of informal distribution. Departing from the point that 
within illiberal democratic regimes patronage networks are a reality, it is imperative for 
these channels to be redistributive rather than non-redistributive an exclusionary. 
Decentralisation policies give districts the ability to control their assets and redistribute 
accordingly to their needs, besides, a centralised patronage network favours the 













As stated by Kalyvas (2007), Civil wars are complex multilayered events. It is 
impossible to identify a single unique cause of civil war; rather, violent conflict and in 
general manifestations of violence within a society are better understood as an 
outcome developed through a series of gradual events that when present mingle as 
necessary conditions, enabling the opportunity for producing contentious collective 
action. 
 
Conflict onset research can be divided along 4 different trends: Inequality, Ethnicity, 
Economic performance including arguments of Resource scarcity/abundance and 
political organization. The most robust arguments come from the economic 
performance explanations, from the political organization explanations and recently 
from a new trend concerned with Horizontal Inequalities (Cederman, et al., 2011; 
Ostby, 2008; Cramer, 2003; Gluber & Selway, 2012). The present chapter will review 
the literature on conflict onset, surveying the four trends of explanations. Thus, despite 
this detailed classification of explanations, the general debate, which to some extent 
still dominates the discussion pertains to the division between greed vs grievance 
explanations. The present chapter will firstly discuss this common general debate, and 
secondly will present a review of the four trends of explanations. 
 
Greed vs Grievance explanations of conflict onset  
 
The most common debate within conflict studies depicts the division between greed-
based explanations for conflict onset vs. grievance-based ones. This debate stems 
from the original work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1994). The puzzle in this 
debate refers to the question of whether rebels are more likely to take arms based on 
a greed motivation or a grievance one. In other words, whether civil war breaks out 
where there is opportunity for it to do so or whether it is grievances as a motivation 
what fuels the desire of rebels to take up arms. Thus, essentially the debate aims to 
capture which side of the explanation is predominant or has more explanatory power.  
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On the greed side, research has highlighted the effect of poverty and deprivation, as 
well as the cost/opportunity of rebelling. On the grievance side, incentives such as 
political or social discrimination also foment the decision to rebel. Despite the debate 
aiming at identifying risk factors associated with either side of the debate (see for 
example: (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Cederman, et al., 2010), 
it is understood here that both motivation and opportunity are factors which need to 
be present in order for conflict to erupt. 
 
Across the civil war onset literature, it is agreed that the most robust conclusion is that 
high income is associated with lack of violent conflict, and thus, in other words, that 
poverty is a strong variable in predicting the likelihood of conflict onset. However, it is 
also possible to identify a great variety of cases with upper middle income and where 
conflict still breaks out, and furthermore, cases of very low income in which conflict 
ceases to happen. This clearly demonstrates that the grievance aspect is strongly 
relevant, and that conflict can also be present in wealthy countries. Grievances are 
associated with the discrimination of sectors of the population in social, economic, 
political or cultural aspects, what is now understood as horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 
2002).  
  
Therefore, integrating the grievance aspect into the equation leads the debate into 
thinking that it is not the absolute wealth of a country what matters but how those 
resources are distributed (Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014). If great part of a wealthy nation’s 
population is excluded from the redistribution of assets, opportunities, social services 
and political participation the discontent could drive people into taking up violent forms 
of action. In this regard, both greed and grievance aspects are relevant in explaining 
conflict onset; in fact, dyads of actors, motivation and opportunity are all common 
characteristics across the different theoretical statements to explain civil war; these 
characteristics can be understood as the upper layer of specificity from which one can 








Theories of conflict onset 
 
As mentioned earlier in the text, it is possible to classify theoretical arguments for 
explaining civil war in 4 groups which are not mutually exclusive but rather interlocked:  
 
1. Inequality: explanations range from economic inequality to more recently 
horizontal inequalities amongst different groups. 
2. Economic performance and resource abundance/scarcity: in general, 
explanations in this area refer to the characteristic of the economy in terms of 
income, development and growth. 
3. Ethnicity: refers to the arguments to explain civil war based on the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of the population, contestation amongst groups 
and arguments in terms of polarization and ethnic salience. 
4. Political organization: this group of theories intends to explain civil war 




Inequality refers to the distribution and access to income resources. Inequality in the 
distribution of income state assets might increase the risk of civil war (Jakobsen, et 
al., 2013;  Thies, 2010; Boix, 2008). However, research has been unable to find a 
significant relationship. A possible reason for this is the case of low quality data. The 
most common indicator, the Gini coefficient, has a severe missing data problem. 
Additionally, it is difficult to understand the relationship of inequality to civil war if 
individual data is used. This is because inequality might be there but relying on 
individual data does not reflect collective action. Also, empirically we are able to find 
countries which are highly unequal but nonetheless stable (eg. Brasil), meaning that 
inequality per se is not a reason for civil war to happen. 
 
Inequality is civil war research is a money income variable which disregards access to 
opportunities and possibility of ameliorating the situation, independently from the 
quality of the economy. Taking poverty as an example, one cannot say that being poor 
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is a matter of income or that it can only be measured by income. More sophisticated 
analysis of poverty integrates the perception of multi-dimensionality in which poverty 
in defined not only by income but also by deprivation and vulnerability (Sen, 1992). In 
regards, to inequality something similar happens, it is not possible to define inequality 
just in terms of income, let alone explain a macro phenomenon as civil war just 
justifying the distribution of income; however, if we incorporate other ideas like the 
presence of inequality amongst groups in access to services and opportunities then 
the explanation becomes stronger.  
 
In this vein, the inequality body of literature has incorporated another set of 
explanations that explain civil war through horizontal inequalities instead of focusing 
on vertical inequalities. The presence of social divisions such as religion or ethnicity 
paired with an exclusion from wealth or economic, social and political power is known 
as horizontal inequalities. Inequality results if the distribution of assets or jobs amongst 
contending groups significantly benefits some groups over the others. In fact, 
Horizontal inequalities can take the form of exclusion from political participation, 
economic asset exclusion, income and employment exclusion and/or social aspects 
exclusion -banned cultural practices, for example- (Cramer, 2003; Ostby, 2008).  
 
The theoretical claims behind the horizontal inequality body of literature and its focus 
on inclusion / exclusion and equality of distribution along dimensions (political, social, 
cultural and economic), rather than mainly relying on income per capita, is able to 
provide a better explanation of civil war onset.  Consequently, underlining conditions 
of exclusion from political control or economic asset distribution will create a motive 
for cohesion and will boost group identity (Stewart, 2000); identity and cohesion are 
able to overcome collective action problems.  
 
Cederman et al. (2011) has found that political horizontal inequalities based on 
measures of ethnic group access to executive power are strong predictors of civil war, 
Gluber & Selway, (2012) has shown that ethnicity reinforced with social cleavages can 
make mobilization easier, solving the collective action problem. 
 
Lindeman (2008) has also incorporated the analysis of horizontal inequalities to 
explain civil war onset. In his framework, horizontal inequalities are measured by the 
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degree of exclusion from public jobs. He argues as well that the presence of horizontal 
inequalities amongst the elites is able to reflect the horizontal inequalities amongst the 
contending groups.  
 
In order to measure horizontal inequalities Lindeman takes a look at the distribution of 
public jobs along ethnic lines perceiving than inclusion is determined by the 
diversification of ethnic lineage present in public jobs, therefore, the more diverse the 
allocation of public jobs the more inclusive the elite bargain is.  
 
The highlight of Horizontal inequalities is that it reclaims the importance of inequality 
in a framework which takes into account a much broader perspective of what inequality 
actually means, it considers the fact that inequality through exclusion is the element 
that boosts group identity and cohesion, explaining how inequality affects the 
motivation of actors to engage in violent warfare, therefore partially giving hints to the 
question of collective action, and incorporating grievance arguments into a purely 
economic explanation.  
 
2. Economic Performance 
Economic performance presents one of the most agreed on explanations for civil 
conflict onset. Across findings scholars have come to agree that development is an 
important variable in predicting or understanding civil war. Underdevelopment and a 
resource-based economy are both predictors of proneness to civil conflict.  
 
Underdevelopment and poverty in the third world might be a product of colonization 
(Boix, 2008), a product of merely extractive institutions in place. Extractive institutions 
were built with the solely aim to plunder natural resources needed by the western 
colonial states, in fact, when the process of decolonization happens countries are left 
with a weak skeleton of institutions which in the medium and long term prevents the 
country from diversifying. 
 
Income per capita has been used as a variable to predict civil war with robust results; 
however, literature is divided along the lines of whether income is a proxy for state 
 20 
capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) or a proxy for cost/opportunity (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2002; Boix, 2008). This pertains the debate. 
 
In fact, the robust results drawn from the literature are that, either way, income per 
capita does accurately predict civil war. Hegre (2003) using different databases for 
evaluating the relationship finds that at a threshold of US$ 1350 (1995) there are no 
civil wars happening in the second half of the XX century, a period where most of the 
civil wars are flourishing. 
 
Therefore, in regards of development income per capita proxies the average income 
along the population, but nonetheless it does not reflect an accurate measure of 
poverty. Poverty not solely depends on income but also on opportunities and the 
capacity to achieve desires. This has been pointed out by Amartya Sen (1992)(1999) 
and the understanding of the capability approach. However, income does catch the 
essence of wealth (regardless of distribution) but distribution across classes or other 
socially differentiated groups is what drives conflict. As Koubi & Bohmelt (2014) point 
out, conflict can occur even at high levels of income if some groups are dissatisfied 
with their access to shares (Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014) 
 
Poverty and development measured by income per capita reflect both explanations of 
cost/opportunity and state capacity. Theories that use income per capita as a proxy of 
state capacity evaluate how income is able to affect the decision of rebels to join or 
not a violent group. In this regard, citizens will be less likely to get involved in conflict 
if their income is high. Subsequently, as pointed out by Jakobsen et al. (2013), a low 
income will affect the decision of joining a rebel movement: people will join a fight if 
the benefit is greater than being in a regular job; in other words, increasing the income 
will mean that the utility of rebellion is less. 
 
In terms of opportunity, as stated in (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002)(2004), opportunity is a 
function of greed, it reflects the possibility of acquiring wealth during the conflict mainly 
relying on looting of primary commodities and a subsequent desire to take control over 
the state revenues (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). In this interpretation, the state is seen as 
a price to conquer, as control over the state apparatus will be the ultimate goal (Boix, 
2008). However, individuals who decide to rebel do not necessarily do so based on 
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mere economic greed incentives (Wood, 2003; Fearon, 2003). Pride, frustration, 
feelings of vengeance are all sentiments that rebels feel when deciding to engage in 
violent action. If there is a concentration of wealth in the state (as the price to conquer) 
and there is a lack of formal channels to change the status quo people are able to 
rebel not on grounds of opportunity but out of personal duty or as a need. A good 
example of this is creation and further armed rebellion of the M-19 in Colombia. As 
opposed to commonly inferred, the M-19 was mainly composed of highly educated 
academics. The core circles of the M-19 were recognized academics in diverse 
subjects like economics, journalism etc. The FARC has also been highlighted as an 
example of a guerrilla group which does not fit into the opportunist arguments (see 
(Gutierrez Sanin, 2004). Likewise, the insurgencies created in the Bodo rebellion in 
the state of Assam in India, are also not a product of opportunity.  
  
Furthermore, a country with high income is able to reflect better institutions. These 
institutions are able to address grievances and provide more services to the citizens 
(Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002), solid institutions are also a feature 
of development (Hegre, 2003). This reflects income per capita as a proxy for state 
capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Jakobsen, et al., 2013; Regan & Bell, 2009). In this 
vein, a weak government makes insurgency more feasible as the counterinsurgency 
strategies are less efficient meaning that the military and police are weaker than in a 
high-income state. Income as state capacity is likely to reflect better state 
administration, and higher military and political capability. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
point out, a high income will proxy as well for state penetration in terms of roads and 
a spread and establishment of state institutions that cover basic services like health 
and education across the sovereign territory. Thies (2010), debates this argument as 
when changing the proxy for state capacity to fiscal abilities the relationship 
disappears, he concludes that high income is not an accurate proxy for state capacity. 
Thus, from the individual perspective, income per capita as a proxy of state capacity 
aims to reflect a condition in which the state is able to successfully repress and crush 
any insurrection that might threat the status quo, therefore the cost of rebelling for the 
individual is higher as its expectations in winning will be lower. 
 
State capacity overlaps with the idea of state weakness from an economic perspective. 
However, it also falls short when explaining civil war as one can find many examples 
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of countries which are low income but still manage to avoid violent conflict: Tanzania, 
Burkina Faso, Mongolia. In this regard, the fact that the country reflects a low-income 




Another important variant of the economic performance body of literature describes 
the effect that abundance of natural resources has on triggering civil war. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) greed and grievance model remarks the likelihood of civil war in 
countries dependent on primary commodity exports. However, Fearon (2005) debates 
the model as a further inspection of the data showed that the variables used lacked 
information for diamonds or drugs: both commodities3 highly associated with 
plundering4. Resource literature has solved this problem by avoid using highly 
aggregated data (first generation of resource – civil war literature), likewise, a good 
explosion of research has resulted using fine-grain data and differentiating between 
lootable and non-lootable resources. 
 
Different theories explore the link between resource abundance and conflict onset by 
providing different explanations. Firstly, commodity resources can enhance conflicts 
as they are perceived as a rebel opportunity for finance, making the state an attractive 
target (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Ross, 2006; Jakobsen, et al., 2013). Secondly, 
commodity resources can prevent conflict if the central government uses revenues for 
repressing uprising or armed insurrections: high income from commodities translates 
in an increased ability to repress based on abundance of resource revenue (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Basedau & Lay, 2009). Thirdly, resource revenue can lead to conflict 
based on dependency of commodity goods in regards of trade shocks (Boix, 2008).  
Research has mainly drawn partial conclusions on the exploitation of diamonds and 
oil as they are high profit resources in comparison with possible rents gained from 
other type of products, however, Boix (2008) states that agricultural commodities in 
Latin America and Africa are associated to civil conflicts, in specific to revolutionary 
wars.  
                                                      
3 Also because the range of countries dependent on primary commodity exports which have not suffer a civil 
war is far greater than those who have. 
4 Also the data when used with imputed data severely weaken the relationship. 
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In general terms, dependence and abundance of resources can produce a negative 
effect or a stabilizing effect, depending on how it is analyzed. Literature on the rentier 
state theory suggests that the rentier economy can produce a stabilizing effect in a 
conflict prone country (Smith, 2004). As Basedau & Lay (2009) argue, there are three 
possible mechanisms: firstly, the use of resource revenue operates through 
repression: the state authority invests in national security which enhances the capacity 
to repress; second, the revenues gained from the resource exploitation can be used 
to keep the opposition quiet and in place, this operates in the form of patronage 
networks, clientelism and corruption practices. This distribution is however selective; 
thirdly, the revenues can be used to buy off demands from the society or the opposition 
in the form of investment in public services; and finally, the stability of the regime 
depends on foreign support (Basedau & Lay, 2009). 
 
Conversely, there are negative effects of resource abundance and dependence. The 
resource curse literature (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Humphreys, 2005) argues that the 
availability of lootable resources will stimulate violence. A dispute between the state 
and challenging groups can flourish as a fierce competition for controlling the 
resources. As mentioned earlier, asset specificity plays an important role here. 
Dependence on resources offers limited options to generate revenue from other 
activity (Boix, 2008) therefore; revenue from the exploitation of natural resources is 
the main means of generating income. 
 
Additionally, the type of resource is an important feature in this body of literature: the 
difference between lootable and non lootable resources and also, the resource in itself: 
diamonds and oil being the most commonly resources associated to it. Non-lootable 
resources require a high amount of effort to be extracted whether technological or 
physical, which in turn should impede rebels from plundering as they do not hold 
economic or technological means to do so. Examples range from alluvial diamonds or 
secondary diamonds (Lujala, et al., 2005) to narcotics (Pizarro Leongómez, 2004). 
However, in this case there is also a possibility for plundering by demanding rents from 
private exploitation companies (Fearon, 2005; Pizarro Leongómez, 2004). Lootable 
resources on the other hand, must be easy to access and most of the times are 
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geographically specific meaning that the rebel group would aim to control and isolate 
the chunk of territory.  
 
Despite this classification the body of literature remains inconclusive. (Humphreys 
2005; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005) argue that it is not resources per se but another set 
of interfering variables. Fearon, (2005) have found no relationship, whereas (Smith 
2004; Thies, 2010; Basedau & Lay, 2009; Lujala, et al., 2005; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002) 
have found strong positive relationships, although Lujala finds relationships just for 
incidence but not for onset. 
 
Summing up, the economic performance literature reflects again: highly aggregated 
data but it remains as one of the most robust body of literature. Thus, what remains 




Research on ethnic explanations for civil wars had its peak during the 1990’s. As other 
areas of research on civil war onset ethnic explanations have been inconclusive. 
However, some advancement has been taking place, ranging from the different 
theoretical statements in regards of fractionalization, polarization or dominance 
through to horizontal inequalities. In part, the relevance of this theoretical framework 
relies on the importance of rescuing the significance that grievance explanations 
should have, due to the fact that economic explanations of conflict onset have been 
more explored that the psychological and sociological explanations. 
 
Research is divided amongst primordialist and modernist theories (Blattman & Miguel, 
2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Blimes, 2006; Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008). 
Primordialists stress the importance of cultural biological similarities amongst 
individuals which affect the psychological nature of ethnicity. On the other hand, 
modernists’ arguments highlight the influence economic modernization and the 
development of the modern nation-state have had in shaping identity patterns 
amongst the population (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). As Blimes (2006) points out 
ethnicity can also be understood as cleavages that have been formed due to historical 
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events. Modernists, instrumentalists and constructivists depart from the same idea: 
ethnicity being a product of economic and political change across 200-500 years 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 76). 
 
Horowitz (1985) explains the relation of ethnicity to civil wars by proposing it is a 
monotonic relationship, in which at high degrees of homogeneity civil war is less likely 
as well as in high heterogeneous societies. Homogeneity explains by itself; there are 
no cleavages amongst the population meaning that there is an overall cohesion and 
less chances of grievances amongst groups. On the other hand, heterogeneity 
decreases the likelihood of civil war because high heterogeneity impedes collective 
action.  
 
Civil war literature departs upon this point; the first studies explain civil war causes 
using fractionalization indexes. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that fractionalization 
does not explain civil war; in fact, they conclude that it is the context conditions that 
encourage people to fight not their ethnic lines. Their results show that amongst the 
poorest countries in which civil war is more frequent, ethnicity seems to be not 
predominant as there is a higher degree of homogeneity among these countries. Also, 
they find that moving across per capita income regardless of ethnic heterogeneity is 
the indicator that alters the odds of civil war. Pairing these conclusions, they suggest 
that the production of violence is a result of conditions that favor insurgency rather 
than grievance-wise motivations. In a similar vein Schneider & Wiesehoimeier (2008) 
argue that at high levels of heterogeneity collective action might be hard to achieve. A 
highly fractionalized society will indicate a higher number of veto players; therefore, 
collective action becomes a problem as there is no common ground for agreements 
or a forthcoming coordinated action.  
 
Elligsen (2000) however, argues that heterogeneity substantially increases the 
possibility of conflict, thus results emphasize that the likelihood increases for small 
scale conflicts, and to a lesser degree for civil wars; (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006) also 
conclude this. Additionally, Lujala, et al. (2005) suggests that the looting of secondary 
diamonds as a means of finance for insurgents positively affects the incidence of civil 
war, the diamond effect holds depending on the level of fractionalization, affecting 
more ethnic conflicts.  
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Reynal-Querol (2005) and also Bahvnani & Miodownik (2009), highlight that it is 
polarization as opposed to fractionalization what can transform existing tensions into 
armed actions. Therefore, a second body of literature explores the effect that 
polarization instead of fractionalization can have on civil war.  
 
Reynal-Querol (2005) examines this relation in highly heterogeneous countries in 
respect to religion. She argues that religion as a differentiating feature of heterogeneity 
increases the likelihood of civil wars; this is because religious differences are harder 
to negotiate (Reynal-Querol, 2002, p. 32). Additionally, the relationship holds stronger 
if the tensions are amongst animist religions. Furthermore, Bahvnani & Miodownik 
(2009) develops a model to measure ethnic salience and ethnic polarization, 
concluding that ethnic polarization can explain the incidence of civil war; the effect 
however is dependent or moderated by the degree of ethnic salience.  
 
Other studies have focused instead on ethnic dominance. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
stress that proneness to civil war increases in societies in which there is a particular 
dominance from one group in relation to another. Hegre & Sambanis (2006) sensitivity 
analysis further confirms this. Additionally, Regan & Bell (2009) argue that 
heterogeneity in countries where “the largest ethnic group constitutes half of the 
population” are twice as much vulnerable to civil war. Still there is no agreement 
amongst the literature as (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005) 
contradict this theoretical statement, arguing that dominant groups are able to deter 
political violence, therefore, dominance is expected to lower the chances of civil war 
instead of enhancing them. 
 
Although cleavages among the society seem to be an important predictor of civil war, 
it is not per se the heterogeneity, polarization of fractionalization of the society. I 
believe that it is the relationship that the ethnic groups have with the elite circles and 
the state, and how the state redistributes its wealth amongst them. The inclusion 
through formal  (political institutions) of informal (patronage networks) channels will 
reduce the chances of grievance amongst contending groups as being part of the 
distribution is a better deal than fighting. Nonetheless, if the distribution does not take 
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place or if it is perceived as not trustworthy or real then the population will be affected 
gradually and might escalate into choosing violent means to achieve ends.  
 
Ethnicity can be understood as glue that holds together parts of the society. Single 
individuals are restricted to achieve ends by their own; therefore, clustering into groups 
is a better alternative to claim benefits or privileges. Acting as a group provides higher 
bargaining power and also seems more attractive for the patron or elite to bargain 
with, as the patron or the elite is able to make promises in a broader way (Chandra, 
2007). Therefore, it is a better alternative to bargain in groups as in this way each part 
of the dyad is able to win, thus in an asymmetrical way. The bargain between the 
group and the elite provides the ethnic group with a higher chance of compliance and 
enforcement, if the elite does not deliver then the ethnic group has a lot more power 
to demand than if the negotiation had been taken individually. In the same vein, it is 
easier for the patron or the elite to reward collectively, or it can also punish collectively 
if it wishes to do so.  
 
Consequently, I believe that patterns of inclusion in the redistributive network whether 
formal or informal is the key to understanding violence potential. If contending groups 
manage to find a way to bargain in the distribution network and enjoy the distribution 
of assets and jobs then, the chances of civil war lessen. In the same vein, if elites 
exclude powerful groups from power then the sense of identity present in ethnicity 
paired with the sentiment of grievance derived from being excluded can significantly 
increase the potential for collective action.  
 
4. Political organization and Institutions 
Literature on political organization and institutions and their relationship to civil war 
has mainly focused its attention to democracy. It has tried to embrace causes of civil 
war from the grievance perspective, instead of assuming mainly greed-based 
explanations. It is certainly important to notice that grievances amongst the population 
cannot be taken out of the equation when calculating likelihood of civil war. As 
highlighted above, economic explanations although robust are strongly intertwined 




Political organization explanations range from: first, the type of the regime: being 
democracy, autocracy or a combination of the two (Gleditsch, et al., 2007; Hegre, et 
al., 2001; Goldstone, et al., 2010; Zakaria, 1997; Carothers, 2002). Second, the 
political system: whether proportional or majoritarian, or presidential vs. parliamentary 
(Wegenast, 2013). And third: the quality of institutions, whether strong, stable and 
capable; or weak, unstable and unable to address demands (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  
 
Pertaining the type of the regime, a vast amount of research has associated the 
hybridity of regimes to a higher likelihood of conflict onset. The most cited findings 
refer to the idea that democracies are: highly stable regimes in which the provision of 
public goods is effective, there is a protection of civil rights and freedoms are respected 
(Wegenast, 2013). They generally hold a higher per capita income in which elites do 
not feel threatened because institutions are solid and reliable, guaranteeing 
enforcement of economic and property rights (Snyder & Mansfield, 2004). They also 
facilitate effective bargaining to achieve consensual agreements reducing credible 
commitment problems (Havard, 2013) and facilitating peaceful collective action 
(Vreeland, 2008). All features that decrease the possibility of conflict onset.  
 
On the other hand, autocracies are highly restrictive regimes and highly repressive. 
They are capable of maintain order because high revenue provides them with the 
possibility to repress dissidents; likewise, they are able to buy off opposition in the 
form of redistributing through patronage networks or investment in populist social 
programmes. In these regimes opportunities to organize are also limited; therefore, 
collective action is difficult to achieve (Vreeland, 2008). These features also decrease 
the probability of conflict onset. 
 
The category in the middle appears to be a mixture of both types of regimes, 
commonly referred as: anocracies, illiberal democracies or semi democracies which 
are understood amongst the literature as: open somewhat repressive: a mix of regimes 
which both invites to protest and rebellion but also facilitates repression (Hegre, et al., 
2001). Weak institutions are also present: unable to moderate political debate or offer 
opportunity to channel demands. They gravitate towards zero-sum –winner takes all- 
outcomes (Regan & Bell, 2009). They represent systems in which the executive is 
 29 
elected by popular vote but elections might not be free, competitive or fair (Goldstone, 
et al., 2010); they also represent a mixture of political forces that makes them unable 
to crush opposition (Fearon & Laitin, 2003); they ignore constitutional liberalism and 
deprive basic rights to the citizenry (Zakaria, 1997).  
 
This terminology within the literature is used interchangeably, with no apparent 
different defining characteristics between what an anocracy, an illiberal democracy or 
a semi democracy is (see for example: (Hegre, et al., 2001; Goldstone, et al., 2010; 
Vreeland, 2008). Thus, despite this, within the categorization of this type of regime 
there is a diverse amount of defining characteristics which, each on its own, has its 
own categorical clusters or spectrum. It is understood here that a full democracy, in 
order to be so has to be both electoral and liberal. The liberal aspect of a democracy 
is fundamental. Democracies which lack the liberal aspect are not full democracies 
but rather another type of democracy, what is understood here as illiberal democracy. 
This type of regimes are democracies by law but not in practice, de jure democracies 
but not de facto, democracies in which there are elections, but civil rights might not be 
protected, and competition might not be free and fair. As Larry Diamond (2002) points 
out, this hybrid zone can also present a different balance of the authoritarian and 
democratic aspects across different regimes, ranging from electoral democracy 
through to hegemonic electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002, pp. 6-7). Diamond’s 
classification approach refers to illiberal democracies as simply electoral.  
 
The use of anocracy as the most commonly used terminology to refer to this type of 
regime remains ambiguous in its definition. Although is clearly refers to the same 
common characteristic pertaining the mixture of autocratic and democratic features it 
does so particularly referring to the rules of the game rather than the practice of the 
game within the civil society. Anocracy derives mainly from the Polity IV project which 
codes authority characteristics of regimes. Polity IV project evaluates three main 
aspects of regimes: executive recruitment, executive constrains, and political 
competition (Marshall & Gurr, 2017). However, the only descriptive aspect pertaining 
the implementation of democracy in regards of the civil society is political participation. 
This aspect within the polity IV project evaluates the regulation of participation and the 
extent of government restriction on political competition. Referring to the latter, it 
evaluates whether there is opportunity to ‘pursue alternative preferences for policy and 
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leadership in the political arena.’ (Marshall & Gurr, 2017, p. 26). Thus, once again it 
does so by evaluating the rules of the game. 
 
This therefore ignores regimes in which political competition is allowed by law but in 
practice it is actually not possible to achieve, as for example in South Africa, Colombia 
under the Frente Nacional or Venezuela during the treaty of Punto Fijo. Anocracy 
derived and explained by the Polity IV variables, as a concept is ambiguous in that it 
does not actually recognize the illiberal aspect of a democracy as understood by the 
implementation of democracy in practice. Following this point, despite both terms 
being used interchangeably within the literature, a preference for illiberal democracy 
is strict for the present research. Thus, despite the necessity of a better approach to 
identify illiberal democracies, a great amount of research has associated this type of 
regime to a higher probability of conflict onset.   
 
In regards to this classification, scholars have argued that the relationship between 
civil war onset and democracy is described as an inverted U shape, in which to the 
sides of the spectrum: democracy and autocracy there is less probability of civil war 
onset.  In the middle, were we see the mixture of features from both extremes, is where 
civil war is more likely to happen (Goldstone, et al., 2010; Regan & Bell, 2009; Hegre, 
et al., 2001). This is because illiberal democracies are able and open to competition 
but are unable to guarantee it.  
 
Some other scholars discredit these findings, they argue that there is a positive 
correlation between illiberal democracies and civil war onset because of the data used 
in the econometric models. Most of the studies calculating level of democracy use the 
Polity IV database; however, the characteristics associated to an illiberal democracy 
are classified as a regime in which violence is present. This means that there is a 
tautological relationship in place: civil war is likely where there is civil war (Gleditsch, 
et al., 2007; Cederman, et al., 2010; Vreeland, 2008). 
 
Likewise, using the polity scale to draw conclusions on illiberal democracies seems 
also problematic. A regime to be cataloged as illiberal (or anocratic according to the 
Polity scale) has to achieve a score between -5 and +5 having the polity scale a total 
of 20 points. Therefore, democracy just covers 5 points of the scale (+6 to +10), the 
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same as autocracies (-4 to -10); whereas anocracies cover a full 10 point range of the 
scale. I think this also affects the possibility of identifying illiberal democracies as 
related to civil war. In addition to this, missing data is a problem. There is a great 
chance that cases of missing data in any of the Polity variables will lead to a decrease 
in the general score for the country; consequently, leading to the classification of the 
regime as anocratic.  
 
Nonetheless, these results although badly measured are not necessarily wrong. Hegre 
(2003) points out to the relevance of development as an intervening variable. He 
argues that the stabilizing effect of democracy only holds for high income countries 
and countries with high levels of literacy (p. 3). Likewise, autocracies with a high level 
of GDP per capita have sufficient income to buy off opposition in the form of patronage 
or social investment, or to effectively repress. Therefore, democracies in poor 
countries will tend to be less efficient for conflict resolution as they will need more 
money to maintain stability. Additionally, institutions are weaker in channeling and 
addressing demands, and the opportunity for authoritarian practices as repression is 
likely. Consequently, there is a high probability for a conflict to be triggered. In Hegre’s 
words “low income democracies are unstable because they are poor and this instability 
often leads to armed conflict” (p 21).  
Moreover, the debate along this research framework embodies further questions 
beyond whether it is the type of regime that can trigger a conflict. In this vein, there is 
an interest in understanding if it is transitions (as regime change) that make the state 
vulnerable to uprising, or whether it is the presence of weak institutions which is also 
characteristic of illiberal democracies.  
 
Regan & Bell, (2009) posit the question to analyze if an increasing risk is associated 
to a process of regime change: a transition. Transitions can be from democracy to 
autocracy or vice versa. The authors discard the thesis of being prone to conflict 
because of practicing illiberal democratic practices. They suggest that if that is the 
case, then the more an anocratic regime endures, the more the probability that a civil 
war will take place (Regan & Bell, 2009, p. 5). In this vein, it is a regime change that 
enhances the likelihood of civil war where transitions from anocracy to democracy 
represent a higher risk as opposed to transitions from autocracy to anocracy.  
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Mansfield and Snyder (2005) find that the process of democratization implies a general 
mobilization of demands -institutional or physical- which newly political institutions 
might not be ready to address. Based on this argument, Cederman, et al. (2010) finds 
out that democratization and autocratization both operate at different speeds: 
“democratization requires some time for mobilization to produce civil war; the collapse 
of rule is generally associated with more or instant outbreaks of political violence” (p. 
387). These findings further support regime change as having the ability to increase 
civil war proneness. 
 
Gleditsch, et al., (2007) analyses motivations. Assuming that democratization and 
autocratization operate in the same manner, he points out that in a process of 
democratization existing grievances might become more salient as the opening 
process might not be enough or fast enough to reduce all the relevant group 
motivations. Also, a process of democratization might instigate the elites to organize 
violent action in a quest for recovering the status quo.   
 
In the same vein, Hegre, et al. (2001) argues that the youth of a democracy through a 
transition determines its proneness to conflict. The level of democracy and the 
closeness of a regime change are significant in explain civil war onset. 
Finally, in regards of transitions, Snyder & Mansfield (2004) argue that not all 
democratic transitions are dangerous. However, it is the type of institutions that affect 
the likelihood of civil war. When a transition takes place the lack of strong institutions 
impedes the democratizing process to work. Weak institutional frameworks lack rule 
of law and the guarantee of fair and competitive elections. The authors further argue 
that before institutions of public accountability are in place the risk of cooptation by 
elites is greater, augmenting the chances of violence.  
 
For democratization to work constitutional liberalism has to be guaranteed by the rule 
of law, the separation of powers and the protection of liberties. Brett (2010) suggests 
that in developed nations, as in Western societies, constitutional liberalism was 
achieved before states became democratic. Britain and France both reached 
constitutional liberalism before attaining democracy: first they achieved security; then 
they developed a solid system of tax collection; afterwards, the rule of law commanded 
the relationships within the society and between the society and the state; after that, 
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the state was in capacity to achieve growth policies and finally democracy was 
developed and solidified. What happens in process of democratization into illiberal 
democracies is that the equation goes the other way around (and in the presence of 
weak institutions):  Democracy – Growth policies – Rule of law – Tax collection system 
– Security (Zakaria, 1997; Brett, 2010).  This situation leaves the state in a weak 
position to guarantee an environment in which democracy is able to provide its benefits 
as a political regime. 
 
Consequently, it is weak institutions that determine high probability of civil war in 
illiberal regimes rather than transitions. Blattman & Miguel, (2010) argue that legal 
institutions should supposedly enforce commitments, thus, in the presence of weak 
institutions few check and balances and constrains on the executive are in place, 
allowing commitments to become vulnerable. Therefore, weak state capacity and 
limited legal infrastructure favors conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) further stress that 
it is the conditions that favor insurgency what actually affects the possibility of conflict 
erupting, conditions include a weak government in which there is a lack of resources 
to repress or to address civil society demands. 
 
There are two possible explanations for this to happen. As mentioned earlier illiberal 
democracies are unable to control challenges to the central government as they lack 
state capacity understood as weakness in the institutions; secondly, rebellion would 
be more likely as resource mobilization is allowed but there is not a guarantee for 
peaceful opposition (Regan & Bell, 2009). 
 
Following Snyder (2000), institutional arrangements will reflect a power struggle in 
which exclusion from the power structure and exclusion from the distribution of 
resources alters the option to choose violence over peaceful means. Resource 
mobilization happens with changes in the institutional framework, if groups feel 
excluded or feel and increase in power for another group then violence might erupt as 
there are no other plausible means to achieve demands (Thies, 2010). In regard of 
election as a possibility for changes in the resource distribution, in illiberal democratic 
regimes there might be possibility for an elected incumbent to cancel a subsequent 
election; this might provide strong sentiment to rebel “if the loss is accompanied by a 
high distrust of the winner” (Gleditsch, et al., 2007, p. 10).  In countries in which there 
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is a high sentiment of identity amongst groups the chances of mobilization are higher 
(Jakobsen, et al., 2013), therefore, falling into conflict might be more likely in these 
cases.  
 
Grievances can grow as exclusion from political power will reflect a chosen 
unwillingness to redistribute resources or to integrate society. In addition to this, as 
Jakobsen, et al., (2013) points out: if the size of the excluded groups can approximate 
those in power then the chances of violence are greater as there is an opportunity to 
win.   
 
Analyzing other arguments, poor countries with illiberal democratic regimes will be 
more likely to experience civil war. As Cederman, et al., (2010) points out the state in 
low income countries is all decisive; therefore, exclusion from decision-making in 
regards of government jobs and/or military, police jobs will enhance the probability of 
taking up arms as a product of marginalization. Also, lower capital mobility as 
explained earlier, in the form of dependence from commodities: non-mobile capital will 
also affect the possibility of civil war if exclusion takes place. Poor people as in 
agrarian revolutions will most likely rebel as the only means of survival are coopted by 
a few, thus, this cooptation – and further exclusion- in the form of economic resources 
is paired with exclusion in political power then the chances of civil war are greater 
(Colombia serves as an example of this).  
 
These set of theoretical statements also seem to hold when addressing them from the 
other side of the spectrum: inclusion. In political systems in which strong coalitions are 
in place the likelihood of civil war shows to be lower  (Gleditsch, et al., 2007; Reynal-
Querol, 2002). The level of inclusiveness affects the likeliness of civil war. This also 
holds from the ruler’s perspective. Elites in the central government which hold 
inclusionary agreements in place and act united are better able to avoid conflicts; also 
stable cooperative groups achieve low cost mechanisms for distributing property rights  
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, regimes which are undermined by extreme elite division, no 
cooperation and political conflicts within the state; are more likely to be unable to avoid 
or constrain a revolution. This idea is supported by (Goldstone, et al., 2010) arguing 
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that the opportunity for rebellion increases when politics and participation are plagued 
by factionalism. Factionalism is understood as “a certain kind of relationship among 
political elites in which a polarized politics of exclusive identities or ideologies is in 
conjunction with partial democracy institutions” (p.198). 
 
Furthermore, Boix, (2008) argues that as the concentration of wealth declines, elites 
will have to work together, associate with each other in order to be able to reassert the 
status quo (p. 8). In this vein, if revolution happens then the elites will choose to not 
fight each other even if the costs of repression are low.  
 
Briefly, inclusionary agreements at the elite level will benefit elites keeping power; and 
if the patronage network widens to benefit every interest in the unity of the elites then 
the likelihood of civil war would be lower as inclusionary elite agreements will avoid a 
predatory government which only serves sectional interests.  
 
It is possible to say that inclusion / exclusion factors can be associated to the rules in 
place; consequently, arguments in regards of proportional representation as opposed 
to majoritarian have also provided explanations to this phenomenon.  
 
In this regard, proportional systems tend to avoid civil war more likely that majoritarian 
systems.   Power sharing institutions have the potential to decrease the risk of violent 
uprising in diversified societies (Wegenast, 2013) (Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) 
(Reynal-Querol, 2002), also they encourage coalition politics that might help prevent 
ethnic wars. A case study undertaken by Wilkinson 2004 as cited in (Schneider & 
Wiesehoimeier, 2008) illustrates that the exclusion of powerful groups from power in 
Indian states increased violence and illegal militancy (p. 3).  
 
In this vein, social tensions are lowered when inclusion rules are in place, for 
proportional systems there is –at least by rule- a guarantee that all minority groups will 
be represented. At the level of the elites what matters is that being guaranteed a 
proportional representation will motivate them to work together in order to soften 




 On the other hand, also (Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) points out, that the more 
exclusive the rules of a polity are the more conflict-prone it becomes, this happens 
because excluded groups prefer to use violence as there are not even reasons to 
participate in democracy. Subsequently, majoritarian systems reflect a set of exclusive 
rules and provide a logic of ‘winner takes all’ which with strong tensions in place is 
able to trigger violence (Wegenast, 2013). In addition, both (Wegenast, 2013) and 
(Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) suggest decentralization or federalism will reduce 
the likelihood of civil war. 
 
Summing up, illiberal democratic systems seem to be more prone to civil war, hence, 
the focus of the theoretical frameworks have just focused on the formality of 
institutions, that is: the state and the political system in itself. Indeed, reasons for 
believing illiberal democracies tend to fall into conflict easily than democracies and 
autocracies seems very plausible. However, how do we explain cases of conflict prone 
countries with illiberal democratic regimes that successfully avoid violence? Illiberal 
democratic regimes have a remarkable characteristic associated with the strength of 
informal networks. Most of these regimes operate efficiently informally, through 
patronage networks and personal ties, supplying state services and efficiently 
redistributing wealth throughout groups. This specific characteristic that is less likely 
appreciated in democracies and autocracies (present but to a much lower extent) 
remains a very important feature in studying illiberal democracies and their proneness 
to civil war onset.  
 
In fact, analyzing both formal and informal institutional frameworks and evaluating 
(re)distribution patterns will give us the answer to understand why some illiberal 
democracies do successfully avoid conflict. Inclusion through elite bargaining can also 
be perceived informally, reflecting the importance of the personal social relationships 












As highlighted on the previous chapter, theories of civil war are in need of alternative 
models. Although the research is extensive, the different theoretical frameworks have 
remained elusive in finding systematic causes for this phenomenon. Economic 
performance literature has found that the degree of development significantly affects 
the possibility for civil war to happen, thus, the analysis leaves behind the political 
process through which economic policies are implemented and also how decision-
making can change the course of development or economic growth and the 
distribution across different societal groups.  
 
On the other hand, political organization theoretical frameworks suffer from the same 
syndrome they are mainly focused on structural issues. Again, we can affirm that 
regime type does affect the probability of civil war, as pairing illiberal democratic 
regimes with civil war onset does shows a higher level of incidence. But what is it 
about these regimes that make them prone to conflict? The institutions and structural 
framework are also affected by agents and how these agents change or exercise 
decision-making power. In fact, agents are the ones who shape institutions therefore; 
taking a look solely at structures impedes analyzing patterns of change, whether 
positive or negative in the short term. Furthermore, it is not only the visible part of the 
structural framework what matters. Informal mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion in the 
form of patronage networks represent the hidden part of the spectrum of institutions 
which are likely to be prevalent in illiberal democratic regimes. In this regard, the 
systematic exclusion of these institutions in contemporary research; restricts the 
analysis of what drives political behaviour in such regimes and the societies of interest. 
Furthermore, literature has highlighted the impact of excluding portions of the society 
from political participation or economic assets. Thus, a closer look and an analysis of 
the processes of both formal inclusion and exclusion reveals that there are also 
instances in which formal inclusion is present yet redistribution is restricted; or more 
interestingly, instances in which there is formal exclusion of portions of the society but 
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yet this segments are informally included by their integration in patronage networks, a 
process that mainstream literature has so far ignored. This further reveals an 
interesting point in the argument, the fundamental difference between inclusion and 
redistribution. 
 
In terms of social cleavages, it seems that it is not ethnicity or religious diversity per 
se what increases the possibility of civil war, but the degree of redistribution to  
contending groups whithin the different (re)distribution networks. This is because it is 
possible to find cases in which there is high polarization or salience amongst ethnic or 
religious lines but nonetheless peaceful societies. 
 
As the literature review depicts, there is significant disagreement across the effect of 
different variables; nonetheless, there are some general points of agreement. The 
degree of development for example represents one point of agreement, the type of 
the regime also generates general agreement, and furthermore, the impact of 
horizontal inequality seems also to be one of the highlight points in the literature. Due 
to the perception of the general agreement in the literature across these points, in my 
opinion they represent key factors to be analyzed in more detail; and perhaps also 
detaching from quantitative models that remain elusive on causality.  
 
Departing from this point and delimiting the research it is possible to analyze, as a 
secondary Research Question: how do horizontal inequalities operate in illiberal 
democracies and does the degree of development play any part in this? Thus, as it 
will be shown later in the methodology chapter, attempting to explain causality rather 
than establishing a correlation but still aiming at finding systematic mechanisms drives 
the selection of cases to a narrower approach rather than a large N. When doing this 
(see Chapter 4: Methodology), the effect of income and development loses its 
explanatory power.  
 
The focus on the units of analysis which are of interest also reveals and important 
factor. The theoretical statements seem to systematically ignore the reality of how 
politics are exercised in these states. In this regard, none of the studies considers the 
effect of informal institutions and how these can affect the possibility of conflict. Across 
the 1980s some literature on patrimonialism (Bayart, 2009) (Médard, 1982) (Clapham, 
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1982) (Migdal, 1988) (Allen, 1995)mainly for Africa, developed key arguments as to 
how patronage networks work. Thus, more recent updates on this body of literature 
have produced a clearer insight into the politics of these networks (see for example: 
(Chabal & Daloz, 2010) (Van de Walle, 2001) (Erdmann & Engel, 2007) The relevance 
of this type of institutions is undeniable yet in contemporary research, undermined. In 
this regard, it is the aim of this thesis to explain conflict onset and trajectories of peace 
in illiberal democracies by demonstrating the relevance of this institutional framework 
and its ability to trigger violence as well as aiding to produce peaceful trajectories.  
 
Patronage networks operate as key channels of distribution amongst pre-modern 
societies. It represents the classical form of organization and redistribution which, 
when challenged with modernization through processes of decolonization or the 
formation of a nation-state, instead of disappearing has adapted to accommodate 
changes in the broader political context. This way of organization did not fade but 
instead it was preserved as informal institutions. Its influence over the formal 
structures of the state is staggering in most of the developing world, and thus its 
relevance and study has somehow been neglected. The study of informal institutions 
in the form of patronage networks is of utmost importance as it does not idealize 
politics in the third world5, but instead, it recognizes the shortcomings and aims to 
establish ways in which these flaws can be used for better results, such as aiding to 
control violence. 
 
Adding to the point above and evaluating the nature of informal institutions such as 
patronage networks and their character in relation to formality in the form of illiberal 
democracy, it is imperative to highlight that patronage networks can be regarded as 
both exogenous and endogenous to illiberal democracy. Thus, discerning from the 
main debates strictly differentiating between the exogenous or endogenous nature of 
institutions, it is understood here that institutions if tracked across time can be both 
                                                      
5  Most of the studies and policy recommendations in terms of conflict and development have been to reform 
the state expecting illusory results. However, the reality of how politics is conducted, how resources are 
redistributed has been completely ignored. Furthermore, in terms of corruption policy recommendations and 
reforms expect to achieve results for which the formal structure simply does not have the maturity for. 
Reaching maturity is a process, as Douglas North has pointed out; the gradual passing from Limited Access 
orders to Open Access orders (North, et al., 2009) 
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endogenous and exogenous,  understanding them as either is not contradictory in 
itself (Carey, 2000); the present case of patronage networks is a perfect example. As 
mentioned above, informal institutions in the form of patronage networks date from 
pre-modern time, they represent a response to problems of collective action, they were 
developed independently to formal institutions and were put into practice in response 
to various challenges and needs of organisation pertaining efficiency and the need for 
reduced transactions costs and clear information. The conditions which gave birth to 
these institutions’ pre-date the formal institutional context and in that regard are 
regarded as exogenous.  
 
Examining institutional path in the developing world and the creation of the nation-
state, informal institutions such a patronage networks could have been used as the 
foundations of the new formal institutions or formal institutions might also have been 
created disregarding informal institutions, see: (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) (as per also, 
cases of formalisation vs cases of no formalisation); thus, the nature of a pre-existing 
institutional framework is in itself exogenous. However, upon the moment of creation 
of the nation-state and the design and instauration of a formal political regime, most 
commonly under colonisation but not solely; the nature of the informal institution can 
now be regarded as endogenous as it accommodates itself to the new rules of the 
game. It does not disappear and most commonly it is not absorbed but instead, it 
remains playing behind the scenes. The preservation of these institutions and the 
motivation of the actors to try and alter the formal institutional framework as conditions 
change, within a formal institutional framework entails that informal institutions are also 
endogenous.  
 
Furthermore, the need to substitute or enhance the efficiency of formal institutions can 
be regarded as the reason why actors continue to use informal institutions such as 
patronage networks under formal rules of the game. As Helmke & Levistky (2004) 
point out in their theorisation of informal institutions there are three possible 
motivations why actors choose to continue to follow informal rules: 1. Formal 
institutions might be incomplete, 2. formal institutions might be second best strategy 
for actors who prefer but can’t  achieve a formal institution solution, 3. And, the pursuit 
of goals not  publicly acceptable (Helmke & Levistky, 2004, p. 730) . In this regard, 
pertaining illiberal democracies patronage networks are regarded as endogenous.   
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Despite the existence of formal mechanisms of rule making,  actors still chose to follow 
informal rules in their quest to maximise efficiency, in fact, each actor is free to choose 
which institutions to use, in the case of illiberal democracies the stregth of informality 
is undeniable.   
 
Furthermore, in line with the findings on political organisation, it has been widely 
accepted that illiberal democracies or hybrid regimes are the type of regime with the 
highest rate of conflict onset (Regan & Bell, 2010)(Goldstone, 2010)(Hegre, 2001) 
(Vreeland, 2008), they represent the unit of analysis in the present research. As 
mentioned before, within illiberal democratic regimes there is a great deal of informality 
playing behind the scenes. Because illiberal democracies do not function as full 
democracies, the institutions in place are unable to cope with the demands and 
obligations of a full democracy. This characteristic further allows for alternative 
institutions to persist and evolve, the fragility of rule enforcement further favours the 
proliferation of informal institutions; hence, informal institutions are not always 
operating in conflicting direction to formal ones (Helmke & Levistky, 2004). I 
understand regime types as a spectrum in which there is a differentiated balance 
between formal and informal institutions which is also dependent on the type of the 
regime. In this regard, horizontal inequality as a product is also affected by the degree 
of redistribution undertaken through informal channels of distribution. The present 
theory will focus on ethnic conflict onset within illiberal democracies and how horizontal 
inequality through informal institutions can affect violence being triggered or 
controlled.  
 
From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective I aim to present a theory which can, 
not only explain the impact of informal institutions as a driver of conflict but that can 
also explain institutional paths. This can be achieved by looking at the decisions 
undertaken by the elites in power and how that affects the outcome of choosing 
violence as a potential form of action. Elite bargains represent a very important 
variable in decision-making. In fact, elite bargaining is what determines in the short 
term the evolution of structures. From bargaining amongst influential groups, is how 
the design of institutions is achieved. Decisions taken influence future outcomes, also 
if decisions involve legislation in terms of creation of institutions, modifications to 
existing institutions, or changes in the status quo then those decisions have the 
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potential to create a nodal point from which further institutional evolution will depart. 
Therefore, elite bargaining is a key point in understanding patterns of violence as 
decisions at the level of the elites have the potential to strongly affect the masses in 
terms of agitation or problem solving (Lindemann, 2010) (Lindemann, 2008). In this 
regard, it would be advantageous to provide explanations which also account for the 
failure/success of the process of decision-making. A two-level theory which evaluates 
mechanisms at the structural and agency levels is therefore, presented here. Elites 
are expected to bargain for structural changes, thus, the process of decision-making 
also interferes in the delivery or plausibility of those structural changes.  
 
Conceptual framework:  
 
As stated by (Kalyvas, 2006), armed conflicts are complex multi-layered events. The 
manifestation of violence is better understood as an outcome developed through a 
series of events that when present mingle as sufficient or necessary conditions; 
creating an opportunity for contentious collective action. In an elite bargaining model 
of ethnic conflict onset, the structured outcome results from the process of decision-
making and from the institutional framework in place. This provides us with two levels 
of analysis which are systematically related to each other. The structural level or basic 
level and the agent or secondary level (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005) (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2010). The agency level is linked by a causal relationship to the primary 
– structural- level. The secondary level conditions are causes of causes which explain 
why there is disagreement over the allocation of resources. Furthermore, it is possible 
to understand the agent causes as mechanisms of the structures (Goertz & Mahoney, 
2005). Most explanations of conflict onset rely heavily on structural factors; however, 
these explanations fall short in explaining the causal link between distant structural 
causes and the outcome. 
 
I define elite bargains as: “Elite bargain is a relationship6 of power in which privileges7, 
rights8 and assets are distributed amongst organizations9 in representation of 
                                                      
6 Relationship can be personal or impersonal, that is, in a context in which everyone is treated equally 
(impersonal)(formal) and/or in a context in which the relationship is selective (personal)(informal) 
7 Selective within Limited Access orders (North, et al., 2009) 
8 Equal to everybody as open access orders (North, et al., 2009) 
9 Organizations are the ones who are able to take opportunities. 
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contending groups10”. In an elite bargain model of civil war, the structured outcome 
results from the process of decision-making and also depends on the institutional 
framework in place. In this vein, bargaining and decision-making depend on the 
structural context and on personal interest. In this framework, interest is understood 
as interest in participating or increasing the (re)distribution of assets, privileges and 
rights. Actors therefore, are rule followers (whether of formal or informal rules) and 
self-interested beings (Knight, 1992). Following this idea, I understand institutions as 
(re)distribution instruments (Knight, 1992) (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) which facilitate 
coordination amongst actors (Korf, 2003), they reflect the by-product of substantive 
conflict over the distribution of resources (Knight, 1992, p. 40) and consequently raise 
resource considerations in regards of distributional consequences. In this regard, the 
structural level represents the institutional framework in place which is both formal and 
informal, and the secondary or agency level that represents a bargaining game 
between groups.  
 
Generally, one can find two types of institutional frameworks in place in any given 
regime. Firstly, we can refer to formal institutions. Formal institutions correspond to 
the visible structure of the regime that represents the legal organization of the state 
through which it operates. In concrete, institutions are: constrains that structure 
political, economic and social interactions (North, 1990). Therefore, institutions are 
rules, forms, procedures that have the ability to shape behavior amongst people. 
Formality means legality, accountability and third-party enforcement, the state has the 
capacity and the instrument to produce formal written rules and enforce them. 
However, the way in which rules are imposed and enforced depends on the type of 
the regime. Additionally, the way in which the rules as such function depends too in 
the quality of the regime; within a spectrum from fragile to strong. 
 
Secondly, functioning parallel to formal institutions we have informal institutions. 
Informal institutions emerge from human interaction and customs. Human beings 
before the establishment of the state used to administer and redistribute assets, 
privileges and rights in their own way through and informal network that recognizes 
authority, virtue and hierarchy. Informal institutions are: “socially shared rules, usually 
                                                      
10 Contending groups along: ethnicity, class, religion.  
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unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 3). 
 
Any given regime has informality playing behind the scenes. However, the degree as 
to which it takes part depends on the trust, the scope of access and the capacity of 
enforcement of formal institutions. Nonetheless, not all informal behavior should be 
considered as an institution11 (Erdmann, et al., 2011) (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). 
Informal institutions significantly differ from formal ones, they represent a system in 
which personal relationships are the means of communication; although, channels of 
communication are unstable and information sometimes is difficult to interpret. 
(Re)distribution through informal channels is selective; one has to participate in the 
network in order to receive the benefits; distribution is not by merit but by sympathy 
and interest, although in some cases there is chance of participating without belonging 
when the distribution comes in the form of public goods (schools, parks etc.). The 
impact of the distribution through informal institutions such as patronage networks is 
also dependent on the type of patronage dispensed (see below).  
 
A rigorous political analysis will incorporate both institutional frameworks. Informality 
plays in some instances a more important role than the formal structural framework. 
As a matter of fact, following (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) it is possible to affirm that 
informal institutions have the potential to either complement the formal institutions by 
providing alternative channels of demand and (re)distribution that supplement weak 
functioning of the state or, they can act towards divergent outcomes operating towards 
opposite ends. 
  
Table 1. Formal and informal institutions  
 




Realm universalistic particularistic 
                                                      
11 Helmke & Levitsky use the example of abuse of executive power in presidential regimes in Latin America, 
which is understood not as an informal institution but as a noninstitutional behavior. 
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Distribution Assets and rights Assets and privileges 
Allocation merit sympathy 
Sanction Third party enforcement Public dishonor / expulsion 
from societal 
organization/group 




Competitive, non-selective selective 
Source: Adapter from: (Helmke & Levistky, 2004; Knight, 1992; North, 1990; North, et 
al., 2009) 
 
 In this vein, I argue that the predominance of informality over formal institutions is 
dependent on the type of social order (North, et al., 2009). Limited access orders 
according to North et al. (2009) are characterized by: “1. Slow-growing economies 
vulnerable to shocks, 2. Polities without generalized consent of the governed, 3. 
relatively small number of organizations, 4. Smaller and more centralized 
governments, 5. A predominance of social relationships, organized along personal 
lines (…) laws that are enforced unequally, insecure property rights and a pervasive 
sense that not all individuals were created equal” (North, et al., 2009, p. 12). Limited 
access orders will favor the preference of using informal institutions to achieve ends. 
The reason why this happens is because in limited access orders the public sphere is 
able to support just a few range of organizations and as the concept explicitly 
describes, the access to the state structure is limited to just a few; trust is limited and 
there is a general perception of favoritism12.  Therefore, the inability of the formal 
structures to cope with all the demands and needs results in a preference for informal 
channels of (re)distribution in which loyalty and votes are interchanged for assets or 
privileges.  
 
Conversely, open access orders will favor the predominance of formal institutions over 
informal ones. This is because open access orders, by definition are more complex 
                                                      
12 These perceptions gradually change when passing from basic limited access orders into mature limited 
access orders.  
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and such complexity in economic and political terms implies a more sophisticated 
channel of distribution. In open access orders -OAO-, the state is able to support a 
much ample and diverse range of organizations, therefore, impersonality takes 
prevalence. Open access orders are characterized by:  1. Political and economic 
development, 2. Economies that experience much less negative economic growth, 3. 
Rich and vibrant civil societies with lots of organizations, 4. Bigger, more decentralized 
governments, 5. Widespread impersonal social relationships, including rule of law, 
secure property rights, fairness, and equality – all aspects of treating everyone the 
same.” (North, et al., 2009, p. 11).  
 
Limited access orders therefore, operate as selective regimes in which informality 
flourishes as the state is unable to ample its distribution. Demands over distribution of 
assets and privileges still happen and there is a need to use alternative means to 
channel distribution. The demand for an open access order comes from within the 
gradual development of political and economic formal institutions and from the 
development of society itself.  
 
Another important feature of access orders is the way in which they control violence.  
As North et al. (2009) points out, rent seeking in limited access orders is not just a way 
of spoiling the pockets of elites; it also serves as a way to control violence. Elite group 
members of the dominant coalition restrict access to the state controlling the 
distribution of rents; they agree to respect each other’s privileges and rights in order 
to guarantee the stability of the coalition. Elites know that fighting will reduce their own 
rents; therefore, they prefer to respect and cooperate rather than to fight. (North, et 
al., 2009, p. 18). Thus, the inclusion of other elite organizations seems problematic as 
it entails the distribution of the pie between more parties.  
 
As civil war research has pointed out, illiberal democracies are the regimes which 
embrace the higher rates of civil war onset. Pictured as an inverted U shape, illiberal 
democracies are understood as hybrid regimes being somehow repressive and 
somehow liberal and having the higher incidence of civil war. In fact, illiberal 
democracies represent limited access orders; thus, they are also able to control 
violence through elite concessions given that it is in their interest to maintain the status 
quo and secure further access to rents.  
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In the present framework, illiberal democracies represent the formal institutions and 
are understood as limited access orders. In this vein, illiberal democracies are defined 
as “democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed 
through referenda, that are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and 
depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms” (Zakaria, 1997, p.22). Illiberal 
democracies resemble purely electoral regimes; they restrict and control civil liberties 
such as freedom of speech, freedom to form organizations, free press, (Carothers, 
2002) (Diamond, 2002) (Zakaria, 1997). In fact, a general characteristic of illiberal 
democracies is the lack of constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 1997) (Brett, 2010). 
 
The pressure for democratization and adopting western institutions resulted in 
democracy but without constitutional liberalism. This means that in developed western 
states the process to achieve democracy began by achieving security, then 
developing a system of tax collection, afterwards, the rule of law commanded the 
relationships within the society and between the society and the state after that the 
state was in capacity to achieve growth policies and finally democracy was developed 
and solidified. Hence, when we talk about developing states the equation in held the 
other way around: Democracy – Growth policies – Rule of law – Tax collection system 
– Security (Brett, 2010) (Zakaria, 1997). 
 
Additionally, the pressure to democratize developing states and newly emergent 
states in the seconds half of the XX century, pushed the states into adopting an alien 
set of formal institutions which allowed hybridity to become established. In general, 
and through the colonial era and all the way through decolonization the way in which 
society was organized did not disappear, in fact in was preserved as informal 
institutions. In many African societies for example, informality is more important that 
formal institutions, this can resemble weak states but strong societies, chief politics or 
the politics of the Big Men is still in place (Bayart, 2009; Schatzberg, 2001).  
 
Within informal institutions such as patronage, the recognition of virtue legitimizes the 
hierarchical chain. Dating back to premodern forms of organization and traditional 
tribe/clan organization and administration of power patrons redistribute and make 
decisions based on their recognized knowledge and status. The abrupt transition into 
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a modern state only meant that the natural process onto which societies are meant to 
become open access orders was nothing less than forced. This led to the preservation 
of patronage politics as informal institutions under modern regimes. 
 
Table 2. Definidendum characteristics of illiberal democratic regimes  
 
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
ELECTORAL REGIMES elections take place but might be not periodical, free 
and/or fair 
CIVIL LIBERTIES Restricted rights to associate, express different 
ideas, free press. 
CIVIL RIGHTS Restricted rights in regards of religion and property. 
RULE OF LAW Respect and usage of the rule of law is limited.  
CHECKS AND BALANCES Restricted check and balances, low accountability. 
POLITICAL COMPETITION Controlled 
JUDICIARY Not or partly independent, controlled. 
Source: Adapted from : (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Marshall & Gurr, 2017; 
Zakaria, 1997) 
 
The fact that illiberal democracies do not function as full democracies means that the 
institutions in place are unable to cope with the demands and obligations of a 
democracy. This characteristic further allows for alternative institutions to persist and 
evolve, the fragility of rule enforcement further favors the proliferation of informal 
institutions; nonetheless, informal institutions are not always operating in conflicting 
direction to formal ones. The main interest of the present dissertation is to explain the 
impact informal institutions have in conflict onset. Although informality is also present 
in both full democracies and autocracies and as such also affects the triggering of 
conflicts, the focus remains on illiberal democratic regimes due to the nature of their 
hybridity and as such their character of strong informality.  
 
As Helmke & Levistky (2004) argue, informal institutions can be understood through 
two different categorical dimensions: firstly, whether the institution works towards 
convergent outcomes in regard of formal institutions; or as opposed, informal 
institutions in pursue of divergent outcomes. Secondly, whether informal institutions 
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operate within effective formal institutions or contrary, within ineffective formal 
institutions. This provides us with a classification framework of informal institutions. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the features of illiberal democracies favor an ideal environment 
for informal institutions to proliferate. In this regard, I argue that the patterns of 
dominance can correlate with the type of regime; therefore, within illiberal democracies 
we can easily identify neopatrimonial types of dominance.  
 
As Erdmann & Engel (2007) point out, neopatrimonialism as a type of dominance can 
be understood as a combination of both patrimonial and legal-rational types of 
dominance. In general terms, neopatrimonialism has been a highly contested 
conceptual term, scholars have argued that it has become a catch-all concept or that 
is just explains African politics. For the former some scholars have made the concept 
more rigorous and have solve operationalization problems, for the latter, conceiving 
neopatrimonialism as an African phenomenon is an inaccurate assumption as we can 
also see neopatrimonialism in other regimes which are not African. The essence of 
neopatrimonialism is the same but in practice it is different from region to region. 
Furthermore, neopatrimonialism is also compatible with high levels of legitimacy and 
economic development (Pitcher, et al., 2009).  
 
Neopatrimonialism is understood as: “Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two co-
existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational 
bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and 
ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no 
differentiation between the private and the public realm. However, under 
neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, 
exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction. 
Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-
rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist, 
although in practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always 
observed.” (Erdmann & Engel, 2007, p. 13). 
 
In this type of domination both legal-rational means and patrimonial means coexists 
amongst each other, personal relations through patrimonialism and legal-rational 
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dominance through the bureaucracy.  Both forms permeate each other and are able 
to adequately operate simultaneously. In Erdmann and Engel’s words: “informal 
politics invades formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to 
each other in various ways and by varying degrees; and this mix becomes 
institutionalized. Hypothetically people have a certain degree of choice as to which 
logic they want to employ to achieve their goals and best realize their interests” 
(Erdmann & Engel, 2007, p. 13). 
 
As for (Snyder, 1992) neopatrimonialism means that “political and administrative 
decisions partly follow legal-rational or formal rules but also follow patrimonial or 
informal ones” (Snyder, 1992), Also he further implies that the degree from which 
patronage penetrates the society varies from regime to regime, in some cases the 
institutionalization of informal bargains in the form of patronage significantly 
undermines the growth of opposition or radical groups within the system, undermining 
political competition and in fact democracy. Additionally, as (De Waal, 2009) points 
out, in some locations neopatrimonialism and legal- rational (what he calls state 
institutions) have been harmonized or closely balanced, therefore, creating and 
impression of ‘classic statehood’ (p. 4). 
 
Patronage and clientelism are both part of the Neopatrimonial type of dominance. 
Patronage is defined as “political motivated distribution of favors not to individuals but 
to groups” whereas, clientelism is “an exchange or brokerage of specific services and 
resources for political support often in the form of votes” (Erdmann & Engel, 2007). 
Likewise, patronage can be understood as the ‘buying and selling of loyalties in the 
political market place’ (De Waal, 2009). Regimes with Neopatrimonial type of 
dominance have a mixture of formal and informal institutions through which actors 
chose to redistribute depending on their position and needs. 
 
Patronage implies a patron-client relationship in which an asymmetric exchange takes 
place, a client receives a gift and rewards the patron by supporting his interests and 
rewarding him with loyalty (Sekeris, 2011) Furthermore, the patron also provides 
protection for his patronage line in aspects such as property (North, et al., 2009). A 
patron-client relationship is strategic for both actors (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) 
(Alley, 2010). Is it in a patron’s interest to prevent clients from breaking away (Di John 
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& Putzel, 2009)  as a break away can imply clients associating with warring factions 
which is not in the interest of the patron (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). On the side of 
the clients, bargains are constantly taking place as clients are regularly testing to 
improve their share of the deal (Longley Alley, 2010). 
 
Summing up, I believe that neopatrimonialism represents the type of dominance 
present in illiberal democratic regimes. Therefore, neopatrimonialism as a combination 
of, on one side patrimonial politics and on the other, legal-rational must be understood 
as a dyad between formal and informal institutions as present in illiberal democratic 
regimes.  
 
In this vein, if legal rational dominance represents the formality of institutions in an 
illiberal democracy and neopatrimonialism the informal institutions in place, then there 
must be a balance between institutions which can also display the interaction amongst 
both institutional types. Therefore, what is the degree of penetration of one over the 
other?, what is the institutional framework prevailing? Or preferred by the actors to 
undertake their exchange? These questions represent future areas of research that 
can be explored in order to enrich the input of informal institutions and their conditions 
of prevalence over formality.  
 
The theoretical model 
 
A. The structures 
Firstly, let us part from the empirically observable assumption that illiberal 
democracies have the higher incidence of civil war onset. As (Goldstone, et al., 2010; 
Hegre, et al., 2001) argue, illiberal democracies are more prone to conflict that full 
democracies or full autocracies. Hybrid regimes are prone to conflict because they 
tend to be less accountable and less legitimate (Collier, 2009), and on the other hand, 
autocracies have much higher capacity to repress violence (Davenport, 2007). 
Therefore, illiberal democracies represent a type of regime in which there are civil 
rights by law but they are constantly violated.  
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It is right to say that empirical observation and a simple count gives us information in 
regards of civil war incidence which is higher in illiberal democratic regimes, however, 
one has to ask what is it about illiberal democratic regimes that encourage the 
possibility of civil war onset?. As mentioned earlier in the conflict onset literature 
review, there are different trends to explain this phenomenon. Literature is divided 
between assuming that the weakness of state institutions in a hybrid regime is the 
reason why civil war is more prone or; other body of literature claims, that hybrid 
regimes can be understood as regimes in transition and that specific moment of 
transition and change is what alters the possibility of civil war onset. I thus argue that 
given the relevance of informal institutions such as patronage in the (re)distribution of 
assets, privileges and rights to horizontally unequal groups; they have the potential to 
explain the control or triggering of the use of violence. We can see cases in which the 
formal institutions are weak but yet stable and violence fails to erupt; furthermore, it is 
also highly questionable that hybridity represents a transitional period13.  
 
The type of regime affects the way in which distribution is undertaken, consequently, 
the way in which illiberal democracies operate gives ample room for distribution to be 
inefficient14. This therefore, affects the possibility to trigger violence amongst the 
excluded groups. (Re)distribution takes place through informal and formal channels. 
The formal structure in the present model is represented by the features of illiberal 
democratic regimes.  
 
In respect of explaining ethnic conflict onset as an outcome, arguments pointing 
towards the relevance of Horizontal Inequalities represent a remarkable conclusion. 
Formal political exclusion can be understood as a dimension of horizontal inequality. 
These theories conclude that the onset of conflicts can be explained by the political 
exclusion of relevant ethnic groups from the state structures (Cederman et al. 2010; 
(Wimmer, et al., 2009). Furthermore, within ethnic conflict research it is expected that 
groups will sympathise with their ethnic lineage, they are expected to redistribute 
                                                      
13 According to literature on this matter, how long does a regime has to be hybrid/illiberal to be categorised as 
transitional?  
14 I understand inefficiency in the distribution as exclusion. Efficiency in the distribution would mean capacity 
to control violence.  
 53 
predominantly to their own ethnic line. This will affect (in)equality in the distribution as 
depicted by which of the groups are included or excluded from power. 
 
I agree with the results pointing towards the relevance of formal political exclusion. 
Thus, as Stewart (2011) points out, political exclusion only represents one plausible 
dimension of horizontal inequality. To explain conflict onset in illiberal democratic 
regimes it is important to evaluate not only executive15 political exclusion but also the 
possibility of policy-making and decision-making in the formal political arena. Also, 
getting away from quantitative models allows for exploring with greater depth the 
complexity of these processes. Likewise, with the aim of looking towards policy-
making it is unlikely that solely stimulating executive political inclusion could achieve 
remarkable changes in conflict prone societies. In this regard, there is a fundamental 
difference between political inclusion and formal distribution. Formal distribution 
therefore is able to capture broader dimensions of horizontal inequalities, such as 
social and economic inequality and furthermore, political inclusion can happen as a 
pure formality with no real instance of redistribution.  
 
As the essence of horizontal inequalities can be captured by evaluating the inequality 
of the distribution; a highly unequal distribution of political participation, social services 
and economic assets amongst groups as well as political exclusion is likely to lead to 
conflict onset. However, it is problematic to infer conflict out of just evaluating exclusion 
from formal state structures, or just by looking at the degree of formal distribution. As 
mentioned earlier informal institutions are a core foundation of relationships amongst 
groups in illiberal democratic regimes. Informality and the degree of distribution carried 
though informal channels give us a picture of the cohesion of society, informality 
always plays its role behind the scenes. 
 
In this regard, from the political sphere, the reliance on explaining conflict onset solely 
on the composition of formal coalitions in power can point towards misleading results. 
There can be cases in which groups are formally excluded but yet informally included 
and therefore range towards avoiding war (see Bolivia case study chapter). Or also 
                                                      
15 The EPR dataset on which these results are based measures political inclusion only by evaluating access to 
executive power (see (Vogt, 2014)) 
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cases in which groups are formally included but informally excluded (like Senegal) and 
therefore conflict is also likely to happen. As a matter of fact, informal institutions in 
many contexts can prove to be more important that formal ones (Murshed, 2002);  
putting aside their analysis misses much of what drives political behavior (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004) as actors interact within different institutions (formal/informal) which 
may allow unforeseen changes in the distribution of resources (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010). Additionally, we cannot expect for formal rules to produce the same outcomes 
in different contexts (North, 1990); consequently, informality claims even a bigger role. 
  
In the present model I aim to evaluate the inclusion of contending groups as invited to 
take a share of the distribution through informal and formal elite bargaining, in addition 
to the degree of political inclusion. Formality is understood then as features of the 
illiberal democratic regime (see table 2); informality is understood as 
neopatrimonialsm in the forms of patronage networks and clientelism. I assume that 
the impact of informal institutions is higher in illiberal democratic regimes, as I am 
expecting to find a strong correlation between type of regime and type of dominance.  
Patronage as an informal institution represents a significant part of the institutional 
framework in illberal democratic regimes. I theorise patronage as a form of 
redistribution that can be interpreted along a spectrum ranging from mobile capital to 
non mobile capital patronage. Patronage allocation can also range from private goods 
to public goods. Within the literature different forms of patronage has been identified, 
most remarkably, a classification of patronage has been done by (Le Billon, 2001)  in 
which patronage ranges from the level of the stakes at exchange (routine to 
extraordinary) and the number of suppliers dispensing currupt benefits (from many to 
a few). Thus, what I am interested in is the form patronage takes and its 
characteristics.  
 
Table 3. Patronage classification 
 Type of patronage 














personal personal Personal/impersonal impersonal 
Source: Self made  
 
Table 3. Patronage classification depicts the most common forms of patronage 
distribution, it representes a classification. Clientelistic practices of vote buying are 
thought to be more ephemeral. The transaction is thought to be more personal as it 
requires a face to face transaction, the client also has to seek the patronage16, the 
type of capital is likely to be mobile, in the form of food or money. When the patronage 
dispensed operates in the form of public job provision, in other words nepotism the 
type of good is private as only benefits the particular client. The capital invested in the 
transaction is both mobile and non moblie. Non mobile as the job allocation is fixed 
but the wage or retribution to the client is mobile, the transaction is likely to be 
personal. For the provision of licenses I refer here to the granting of permits and 
licenses for private construction in the form of public tenders. For this type of 
patronage the goods are both private and pubic, private if the construction does not 
benefit the public but public if there are sideline benefits. The trasaction can also be 
personal or impersonal, personal for the bid winner but impersonal for the rest of the 
clients benefited or affected by the license. Finally, the provision of public goods in the 
form of hospitals, roads or schools presupposes an impersonal transaction as the 
clients benefiting from the good do not directly participate in the transaction, the type 
of capital is non mobile. This classification will help identify the way in which patronage 
operates in practice. 
 
 It is remarkable however to highlight that neopatrimonialism is not exclusive to hybrid 
regimes. The patrimonial part of the hybrid domination can take place also under a 
democratic regime, nonetheless, its degree of penetration is expected to be much 
lower that what it would be under a illiberal democratic regime. This is because open 
access orders give priority to the formality of institutions, and bargains are undertaken 
mainly through the state as the perception of trust, commitmment, delivery and 
accountability is much higher that in an illliberal democratic regime. The same can 
happen within an autocracy, autocracies are not just patrimonial in their domination, 
                                                      
16 It is the basic distinction between private and public good. In this case, the client has to attend public rallies 
or meeting in order to receive a portion of the distribution.  
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but the degree of penetration of the legal-rational aspect of domination is lower than 
in an illiberal democracy or a democracy. Therefore, in autocracies for example, public 
jobs are still distributed by formal means but the degree of personalistic relationships 
is expected to be higher than in a illiberal democracy. These stand as assumptions as 
the present research only aims at explaining informal institutions and their impact 
within illiberal democratic regimes.  
 
Having said this,  and focusing on illiberal democratic regimes which conform the unit 
of analysis of the present model; we know that both channels of (re)distribution legal-
rational-formal and patrimonial-informal are operating.  Thus, each society is different 
in the configuration of relationships and also on the degree of strenght and efficiency 
of formal institutions; as a result neopatrimonialism must take different degrees of 
penetration in different societies and will manifest in different forms.  
 
Following this point, informality is thought to penetrate the state in different 
proportions, meaning that in some cases informality will be dominant in terms of 
(re)distribution transactions, and in other cases the balance would turn to formal 
institutions meaning that transaction are mainly taken through the state itself. 
Additionally, we could find cases in which the balance amongst institutions is in 
equillibrium. In this sort of environment it is expected that an increase in the possiblity 
of civil war onset will be present, if the informal institutions are in competence to formal 
ones.  
 
Figure 1. Balance between institutions allows us to picture the possible options of 


























Source: Self made 
 
Thus, it is not however the aim of this dissertation to explain this variation in balances 
between institutional frameworks. The statements come from the general analysis of 
a combination of institutions but represent future areas of research.  
 
Following research on patronage (Chabal & Daloz, 2010; Chandra, 2007; De Waal, 
2009; LeBillon, 2001; Murshed, 2002) it is assumed that it can have a positive or a 
negative effect. If the patronage network is closed and only benefits a few groups in 
power then it is expected to trigger conflict; in other words, groups which are excluded 
and are discriminated in the distribution of assets, privileges and rights through 
patronal distribution are more likely to become violent. A closed patronage line means 
non-sharing of spoils across groups and in some instances non-distribution of spoils 
ethnically, violence can erupt when discriminated groups are aware of the inequality 
in the spoils or when they are denied access to them (Arriola, 2009). As opposed, 
patronage can be beneficial when the spoils are shared and distributed amongst the 
different ethnic groups and within the ethnic group. The patrons have therefore the 
power to either mobilize their constituencies or clienteles if so they wish, as well as, 























Within the present model three structural conditions will be evaluated: exclusion for 
central power, inequality in the formal distribution through legal state means, and 
inequality in the distribution through informal means in the form of patronage networks. 
In this regard, the relationship of formal and informal distribution and exclusion is 
expected to be equifinal and alluding to conjunctural causation (Goertz & Mahoney, 
2005). Some countries do not go to war under favorable conditions (Bolivia, Ghana, 
Paraguay) while others do go to war under unfavorable conditions (Mali, Senegal). 
Inequality in the formal and/or informal distribution operates as SUIN condition17. 
 
Thus, it is imperative to remark that the inequality in formal distribution as well as 
inclusion/exclusion will only be thoroughly evaluated through the QCA model (see 
chapter 4. Methodology) which relies on logical assumptions which need to produce a 
complete model of structural and agency conditions. The focus of this dissertation is 
to demonstrate the relevance of informal institutions in the form of patronage networks, 
therefore, the case study chapters (Thailand, Namibia, Bolivia and India Bodo) will 
focus attention mainly on patronage networks. 
 
B. The agents 
 
Understanding an outcome such as civil war onset would imply a rigorous analysis of 
both the structures and the agents. As mentioned earlier in the text, decisions taken 
by the elites are both influenced by the structural framework in place and by the elite’s 
interests. This is because agents are both rule followers and self-interest beings, 
therefore, the process of decision-making is conditioned by the elite itself and by the 
structural framework in place.  
 
Institutions as (re)distribution instruments favor those actors that create the rules. As 
a matter of fact; institutional frameworks are created in such a way that they will 
maximize utility for the rulers (Knight, 1992). This implies that rules will inevitably have 
unequal implications for resource allocation amongst different organizations. In any 
                                                      
17
 SUIN conditions: Sufficient but unnecessary part of a configuration that is insufficient in itself but necessary for 
the outcome.  
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case, institutions may represent an unintended outcome of conflict or the result of 
compromises or settlements between different actors (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
 
As rules might favor those who create –or benefit from- them then they directly imply 
a relationship of power. If institutions reflect the contest amongst actors to establish 
rules that might increase their power and/or resource allocation, then it will show 
different capacities of organizations to force or convince others to decide upon their 
preferences. As such, institutions are the product of constant bargaining between 
relevant groups in the social arena. 
 
Agents seek (re)distribution through bargaining. The product of elite bargains can 
result in either inclusion of contending groups or exclusion of contending groups from 
the (re)distribution structures, whether formal or informal. This ultimately means the 
exacerbation of horizontal inequalities if exclusion takes place. Ultimately, a 
bargaining game between elites has the potential to generate a macro phenomenon 
such as a civil war. 
 
Therefore, we know that agents bargain for (re)distribution in both formal and informal 
networks, bargaining takes place in order to achieve agreements that both parts prefer 
to fighting. Conflict as an outcome represents a bargain that failed (Korf, 2003; Walter, 
2009; Wucherpfennig, 2009; Powell & Stiefold, 1977). A bargain that failed symbolizes 
the disagreement over resource allocation and/or policy choice (Reiter, 2003) 
However, it is not a simple bargain that fails and invites violence; it is a consecutive 
process which takes into account further steps of renegotiation over not peer agreed 
matters. Furthermore, state institutional arrangements in place will inevitably cause 
various effects on institutional capacity (Bates, et al., forthcoming). A bargain failure 
therefore also represents a rupture in the social contract that is able to highly challenge 
current institutional arrangements. 
 
Within the present model, both exclusion from decision-making at the state level and 
inequality in the formal and informal distribution are a product of a bargain failure; a 
failure which in the bigger picture, drives the desire for using violence as a means of 
action. The presence of information asymmetries or non-credible commitments, 
understood as agency mechanisms explains why bargains fail, working as causes of 
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causes. However, these agent mechanisms may produce the outcome in a given 
context but not in others, signifying that the presence/absence of both information 
asymmetries and credible commitments are expected to be equifinal. 
 
I support the statement that powerful groups will decide to agree or cooperate   
because challenging is more costly than negotiating and exchanging certain benefits 
(Fearon, 1995; North, et al., 2009; Wucherpfennig, 2009). Additionally, it is likely that 
powerful organizations would anyway need to cooperate with other groups to achieve 
greater benefits as they are unable to control, exploit or demand everything just by 
themselves. On the other hand, weak groups will cooperate as well, because for them 
it is “better something than nothing”. Armed conflict as an outcome represents a 
bargain that failed, the presence and physical use of violence is expected to be the 
last resort as its cost and organization are significantly high (Fearon, 1995). 
 
Elite ethnic groups as actors are expected to be self-interested; groups already 
included in the distribution network are expected to favour their ethnic lineage and 
campaign for the needs of their own group. A series of bargains needs to be 
undertaken before the use of violence, thus, the length of the bargains can be different 
from case to case. Summarizing, bargains fail because the parties are unable to agree 
on a settlement that both sides prefer to war. The lack of trust in the promises within 
a bargain or the accuracy in the information received act as conflict enabling conditions 
and causes of causes, working as mechanisms that can explain why, in some 
instances, bargains fail. 
 
Conflict therefore, can be a product of a rational miscalculation of the actors (Fearon, 
1995). Fearon’s model uses information asymmetries and credible commitments to 
explain war onset in the international context. Thus, these same mechanisms might 
be able to explain why bargains fail in the domestic context (Walter, 2009). Following 
work by Barbara Walter, it is expected that the presence of non-credible commitments 
and asymmetries in the information displayed could drive the process to a bargain 
failure. In particular, lack of trust and misleading information will drive groups into 
rejecting or avoiding bargain demands. An evaluation of the agencies’ decision-
making process entails analysing the process of communication of information and 
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also the expectations upon the contender group. This will enable us to understand why 
bargains between elite groups fail in agency terms. 
 
Bargaining outcomes depend on which party makes the first move. Therefore, 
signaling and the forthcoming assessment of trust or information displayed are 
evaluated by the receptor, who forges a judgement and acts accordingly (Lewis & 
Schultz, 2003). In this regard, when evaluating information asymmetries and credible 
commitments it is relevant to take into account the source of the signal, this means 
that both information asymmetries and credible commitments must be evaluated from 
each source. 
 
In terms of credible commitments, the receptor evaluates trust. If the signaling comes 
from the elite to the patrons, then the patrons and their constituencies or clienteles will 
evaluate commitment in terms of reputation, record and past transactions (Walter, 
2006). However, commitment is strategic. Politicians know what kind of promises they 
can make in order to persuade blocks of voters (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007). They know 
which promises will be credible and which can lead to a least credible result. 
Nonetheless, voters and patrons are constantly evaluating commitment and will only 
deliver their part of the deal if they feel they are going to truly be compensated. 
 
On the other hand, if the first move comes from the group claiming (re)distribution 
then it is the elites who evaluate credible commitments. For this matter, elites will 
evaluate past transactions in order to find out if they can trust the group: first, not to 
mobilise if the claim is denied and second, if they are going to deliver promises which 
come in the form of votes, security and political support (Muller, 2007). The absence 
of credible commitments would imply a bigger potential for a bargain failure. 
The forging of trust and mistrust is a dynamic process in which different transactions 
increase or decrease its degree. For example, trust can be bought by proclaiming 
populist policies, hence this moment of trust can also be disabled when the group 
realizes the status quo remains the same. On the other hand, trust coming from the 
groups signifies the provision of security and political support, if the group remains 
dormant or violently inactive for a period of time, this can increase the degree of trust 
 62 
that the elites have, up until violence whether strategically or not is triggered once 
again.  
Information asymmetries within this model are understood not only as the projection 
of misleading or false information in regards of the true will to fight and the capacity 
to do so (Fearon, 1995); but also as the quality of the channels for reproducing that 
information (Schultz, 1999; Lewis & Schultz, 2003). Let us remember that the unit of 
analysis is illiberal democracies. This type of regime is considered to be less informed 
that old or more solid democracies (Hegre, 2003, North, 2009). If patrons and their 
constituencies are unable to be well informed, then they lack means to evaluate 
information affecting their judgement. Also, this variant is important to be taken into 
account in a domestic model of conflict onset, means of communication and language 
policies as a feature of ethnic differences is a significant aspect of potential sources 
of grievance (Borman, et al., 2015). Language and furthermore media in 
local/autochthonous language is key in analyzing information asymmetries as 
captured by the patrons and groups. Furthermore, in some instances it is not only 
whether the language is official or not18, but also whether there is private media in the 
local language to deliver and analyze messages as spoken by the dominant elite. In 
addition to this, most of the population in some instances would not speak the 
national/official language; therefore, the role played by news media (TV, radio and 
newspapers) is crucial in delivering a message to the masses, especially if the 
movement is diffuse and with no visible leadership.  
Therefore, it is not just true will to fight and capacity that matters but also how the 
information reaches the receptor (Lewis & Schultz, 2003). The source of the 
information displayed by the elite to the patrons can be misrepresented due to the 
channel of communication. In this regard, availability of information in the group’s 
language, availability of radio stations and newspapers are all features than can give 
                                                      
18 As (Borman, et al., 2015) point out, some of the reasons for officially not recognising different languages is 
costs. The example given is that of the Europena Union in which significant amounts of money are put towards 
transalations and recognising the totality of the languages spoken within the Union. Additionally, the source of 
linguistic discrimination perpetuates to other areas, having an official language means that ethnic group 
members should learn that language to be able to be part of the bureaucracy jobs. Thus, despite the great 
incidence of this element in perceived grievances the influence of private sources of information is also 
remarkably relevant. 
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a clear picture of the dissemination of information. The less informed the group is, or 
the more difficult the access to information the more asymmetries in the discourse. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND WORKING HYPOTHESES  
 
Core research question: 
 
Why do some illiberal democracies fall into conflict while others do not? 
 
Having explained the way in which structures operate in illiberal democracies I aim to 




H1. When there is inefficiency in the distribution of assets, privileges and rights to 
different ethnic groups via formal or informal institutions, conflict is more likely to 
happen.   
H2. Exclusionary and inefficient redistribution through patronage networks can 
increase the possibility of conflict onset. 
 
 
 In the following section I will explain the proposed mechanisms responding to the 
working hypotheses.  
 
D. THE MECHANISMS  
 
Within the civil war and conflict literature, the constant use of quantitate methods has 
prevented the identification of causal mechanisms. Qualitative research in the form of 
single case studies or comparative cases prevents generalization due to specificity of 
the cases. Within the present dissertation I aim to show that it is possible to identify 
causal mechanisms which allow for a prudent generalization at least for the unit of 
analysis under study if a set-theoretic approach is implemented. The following section 
will describe the causal mechanisms which are theorized to play a relevant role in 
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producing conflict onset as an outcome. As highlighted across the present chapter and 
from a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective of analysis, conflict onset is a product 
of both structural and agency causes. Agency mechanisms work as causes of causes, 
linking the distant factors to the proximate ones by a causal relationship. In other 
words, proximate factors (agency mechanisms) are mechanisms of the structures.  
 
Following this point, we are in light of 5 causal mechanisms: three structural and two 
(double-way) agency ones, following a mechanistic explanation of outcome as: 
 X [(n1)*(n2)*(n3)…] Y. n1, n2, n3: represent the mechanisms, the arrows 
imply force, the force taken from the agency to the action, X is the independent 
variable and Y the dependent variable. 
 
Following this idea: 
 
AGENCY CONDITIONS (double-way, impact from each source): 
 
Context: illiberal democratic regimes, presence of horizontal inequalities amongst 
contending groups. 
 
X exclusionary elite bargains 
 
N1: Credibility of the commitments from the elites to the patrons 
Aims at capturing the degree of trustworthiness the ethnic group has on their elected 
leaders. Bargains will be affected by credible commitment whenever patrons mistrust 
the promises of elected leaders. As mentioned before, credible commitments can be 
evaluated by the patrons via reputation and record of past transactions. 
 
N1.1: Credibility of the commitments from the patron to the elite 
Aims at capturing the likeliness that patrons and their constituencies are to be trusted 
with providing security and political support. Bargains will be affected by lack of 
credible commitment when the elected leaders cannot trust the patrons in the 
compliance of their promises. Elected leaders will mistrust patrons’ promises if they 
mobilize their constituencies and/or do not deliver political support. 
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N2: Information Asymmetries from the elites to the patrons  
Aims at capturing the degree of information asymmetry in terms of language and 
channels of communication. Bargains will tend to fail if there are information 
asymmetries coming from the elites as analysed by the patrons. Elected leaders will 
incur in misleading information if the channels of communication are heavily controlled 
by the state or if there is no source of news in the local language. 
 
N2.1: Information Asymmetries from the patrons to the elite 
 
Aims at capturing the degree of information asymmetry in the information displayed 
by the patrons. Bargains will tend to fail if there are information asymmetries coming 
from the patrons as analysed by the elected leaders. Patrons will incur in information 
asymmetries when there is a display of violence with no intent of fighting a fully-fledged 
war.   
 
These mechanisms are likely to affect the redistribution of political participation, 
economic assets and social services across groups. In other words, when bargains 
are affected by credible commitments and information asymmetries the structural 
context is likely to be inefficient in redistribution and politically exclusionary19, both 
structural conditions that, in turn, affect the possibility of conflict. In light of this: 
 
 
STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS:  
 
N3: Formal distribution 
Aims to capture the scope of distribution along different ethnic groups through formal 
institutions. Elite groups with unequal access to political participation, economic assets 
and social services will bargain within state structures to reach the best redistributive 
deal and to keep in power. Inefficient formal distribution is a product of a bargain 
failure. 
 
N4: Informal distribution 
                                                      
19 The outcome of the bargain is likely to be defection instead of cooperation. 
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Aims to capture the scope of distribution along different ethnic groups through 
patronage networks. Elite groups with unequal access to political participation, 
economic assets and social services will bargain through patronage networks in order 
to reach agreements which will guarantee political support, security and economic 
distribution. Inefficient informal redistribution is a product of a bargain failure. 
 
N5: Political exclusion 
Aims at capturing the de facto inclusion of ethnic groups in the executive power as a 
form of political inclusion/exclusion. Exclusion is also expected to be a product of a 
bargain failure. 
 
These three mechanisms in turn are expected to produce conflict. Cases which 
resemble this institutional framework are likely to present conflict onset. For the 
collection of mechanisms identified it is likely that the causal path is different in each 
case. Furthermore, if a mechanism is able to produce cross-case inference, its 























Civil wars are complex multilayered events. It is implausible to identify a single unique 
cause of civil war; rather, violent conflict and in general manifestations of violence 
within a society are better understood as an outcome developed through a series of 
gradual events that when present mingle as necessary conditions, enabling the 
opportunity for producing contentious collective action. 
 
In respect to civil war onset research, there has been a difficulty in identifying 
mechanisms that would help us explain why civil war happens. In general, the 
characteristic of high aggregation within civil war research has restricted scholars to 
point out causality in explaining civil war (Bennet & Checkel, Forthcoming; Lindemann, 
2008). We know through regression models that economic development holds a 
strong relationship to lower chances of civil war onset (Hegre, 2003) (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004) (Jakobsen, et al., 2013), but we do not know why. In the same vein, 
we know that weak state structures and regime type favor the possibility for civil war 
to happen, but again we do not know why. These constrains have made the study of 
civil war inconclusive. 
  
On the other hand, qualitative research has been restricted mainly to case study 
analysis, and as such has lost the opportunity to claim external validity which allows 
for further testing the theory. Therefore, I believe there is a need to push forward this 
research agenda, and a possible way to solve these flaws is to undertake qualitative 
comparative analysis in a rigorous way. Comparative analysis gives us the advantage 
of counterfactuals which is an ideal model to undertake theory testing (Bennet & 
Checkel, Forthcoming). Finding parsimonious mechanisms will facilitate the possibility 
to generalize, increasing external validity and would eventually enable the opportunity 
to undertake further tests in order to discover, discard, or better understand the 
proposed mechanisms in different settings. 
 
The present dissertation aims to contribute to solving this problem. Part of the solution 
is to produce a framework which enables causal inference; a framework that would 
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allow us to understand and identify a set of necessary conditions that when present 
are likely to produce civil conflict20 and that would open the door towards explaining 
how and why civil war was produced as an outcome within illiberal democratic 
regimes. I aim to identify and test through comparative analysis the previously 
identified systematic mechanisms (Bennet & Checkel, Forthcoming; Beach & Brun 
Pedersen, 2013) that would have the potential to explain conflict onset. Formulating 
systematic mechanisms at least will give us a starting point from which it is possible 
to evaluate how events unfolded in different scenarios. In fact, the importance of 
formulating systematic mechanisms implies higher possibility for generalization – 
external validity- and higher chances of theory testing. This is a big shortcoming in the 
civil war literature as we know correlations amongst variables but not causality at all. 
Digging into causality might also reveal the relevance of other ignored mechanisms in 
contemporary conflict onset research.  
 
In this regard and departing from the identified points that can be improved within the 
research programme, a general objective of the project has relied on formulating and 
testing a new theory on conflict onset that complies with these criteria: 
 
1. Avoid quantitative models or case analysis: Civil war onset literature is highly 
quantitative. There is a need to pass from correlations and incur into causality. 
In the same vein, some research is case based which constrains external 
validity and generalization, therefore the ideal analysis would entail 
microanalysis but achieving adequate levels of parsimony in which one is able 
to generalize, even if it represents only a limited generalization, or a 
generalization for the sample. 
2. The need of formulating a theory in which causality is addressed, explaining 
why certain event happens. Civil wars are complex multilayered events; 
therefore, a set of mechanisms should be formulated in order to explain the 
force of an action causing a result.  
3. Testing and replicating. If we are going to formulate a theory which is able to 
explain causality through mechanistic configurations, then the theory needs to 
be formulated in a way in which it allows testing for falsifying purposes.  
                                                      
20 Absence of X would necessarily mean and absence of Y. 
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According to this set objectives the middle point between case studies and large N 
studies in which it is possible to first, address causality in terms of evaluation of 
mechanisms, and second, in which it is possible to generalize in order to achieve 
external validity is: Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The strength of the methodology 
relies precisely on this, being able to generalize but nonetheless basing arguments on 
mechanistic explanations and combination of conditions which in essence remain 
qualitative. If applied to civil conflict onset we are able to retain the initial complexity of 
what a civil conflict or a civil war is and how it is triggered, therefore we would be taking 
a look at combination of conditions and evaluating their necessity and/or sufficiency. 
This enables the identification and the differentiation between different causal paths 
and also enables the evaluation of mechanisms in different contexts.  
 
There are clear strengths of QCA methodology for the present theoretical framework; 
however, a mixed method approach is preferred. This is because although QCA gives 
opportunity to evaluate the presence and causal force of the chosen mechanisms, an 
extensive analysis of the operation of the mechanisms is still needed to understand 
how the outcome was achieved. Comparative case study analysis is the ideal 
methodology to combine with QCA in the form of Most Dissimilar System Design 
(Landman, 2003). For this aim two comparisons will be undertaken a comparison of 
two cases of conflict and a comparison of two cases of conflict avoidance. Both of the 
comparisons contain a most likely case and a least likely case. Consequently, the first 
step would be to apply QCA methodology and from these results undertake the 
comparative case analysis. In the remaining of the chapter I will highlight advantages 
and constrains of undertaking QCA and of operationalizing the different 
conditions/mechanisms selected, advantages of a mixed method approach and further 
concluding with the outline of the methodology selected. 
 
1. QCA advantages and constrains  
 
Implementing QCA for the theoretical framework has several advantages but also 
constrains. The main advantage is the process of testing the proposed mechanisms 
in a setting which allows comparison amongst a broad amount of cases allowing a 
minimal level of generalization and parsimony. QCA gives priority to the process of 
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explaining causal complexity by detecting different conjunctions of conditions that lead 
to the same outcome, and through this, discovering which conditions are necessary 
and/or sufficient for the outcome to occur (Grofman & Schneider, 2009) pertaining 
conjuctural causation. In this vein, out of the 5 core mechanisms that have been 
identified, it is possible to evalute which of the conditions are seen as sufficient and 
which as necessary if at all. By implementing this method, I expect to find different 
combinations of factors that lead to the outcome of conflict onset, and with further 
analysis explain different situations in which the outcome results as a product of 




Although assuming QCA is the best methodological approach to undertake, there are 
still important constrains which might undermine or mislead the results of the analysis. 
The main disadvantages can be clustered in three groups: firstly, time spans and 
temporality which goes by the hand of defining what the unit of analysis is; secondly, 
measurement constrains and thirdly, the adaptability of the methodology to the needs 
of the theory. 
 
 a). Unit of analysis, time spans and temporality 
 
One constrain of using QCA is the limitation of temporality and time spans. The QCA 
methodology was initially thought as static, resembling an analysis of conditions being 
present or not in the selected cases, disregarding temporality. Conflict onset as an 
outcome needs temporality to be present as the set of conditions change through time. 
As mechanisms are changing through time, they cannot be analyzed statically. 
However, improvements of the QCA methodology present three possible ways of 
including temporality in QCA analysis: these three variants are: temporal QCA (tQCA) 
(Caren & Panofsky, 2005) (Ragin & Strand, 2008), time-series QCA (TS/QCA) (Hino, 
2009) and two step QCA (Schenider & Wagemann, 2006). 
 
Each one of the methodological options which allow for temporality to be included, 
differ significantly from each other. The importance of these variations is the way in 
which it changes the feasibility of the design and the purpose of the design. The first 
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option, temporal QCA, significantly increments the considered observations. It aims to 
capture the sequential mode of the mechanisms, A happens before B and C happens 
after B. However, including this sequential order increases the number of conditions 
or N’s and therefore, for a medium N or large N studies the implementation becomes 
unmanageable. The combination of conditions as represented in Boolean algebra are 
calculated by 2𝑘, being k the number of conditions. In this case, the use of tQCA would 
be: k!*25. Increasing the number of combinations discourages the results as many of 
the cases are likely to appear as logical reminders21. (Ragin & Strand, 2008) address 
this problem proposing further minimization of logical combinations according to the 
logic of Boolean algebra, but they acknowledge that a set k>4 would be very difficult 
to manage. For the present model, this time sequence methodology is impossible to 
undertake.  
 
The second method of addressing temporality: Time-series QCA suggests 
implementing quantitative techniques to address temporality: pooled QCA, Fixed 
effects QCA and time differentiating QCA (Hino, 2009). However, this technique has 
been criticized in the sense that it relies mainly on quantitative techniques and leaves 
behind the conceptions of qualitative analysis for restraining the amount of cases 
(Rihoux & Marx, 2013).  
 
Finally, two step QCA seems to be the most accurate technique to deal with large 
amounts of cases and conditions. Two-step QCA as it name describes, is an approach 
to develop QCA in two stages. Firstly, evaluating remote conditions which act as 
structural conditions such as development, regime type etc.. Secondly, an evaluation 
of proximate conditions which are subject to dynamic changes introduced by the actors 
(Schenider & Wagemann, 2006). The approach relies on the statement that the first 
step of the procedure will produce inconclusive results that only combined with the 
second step will elucidate robust results.  
 
This variant of QCA goes in hand with the theoretical statements described in the 
theoretical chapter as well as with general historical neoinstitutionalist ideas; 
temporarily and also in regards of agency and structural mechanisms to be evaluated. 
                                                      
21 Logical reminders: logical combination of conditions but no empirical evidence. 
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In conclusion, this variant of QCA analysis seems ideal for the first evaluation of the 
theoretical statements presented.  
 
 b). Measurement and membership  
 
Secondly, the set of mechanisms or conditions proposed to be analysed in the QCA 
are restricted to data availability and more importantly to feasibility of measuring. 
Informal institutions in the form of patronage networks represents a particularly 
challenging mechanism to operationalize and measure. However, one plausible way 
to solve this problem is to construct new ways of measuring it. In general terms, it 
remains imperative to give the first step in this direction, it is of course challenging to 
capture the nature of the connections of the patronage network but what is possible to 
capture is whether the patronage is redistributive across groups or if it is exclusionary 
and only benefit a few. Thus, the measures would not be ideal or perfect as in general 
patronage remains as a difficult concept, but the comparative case study analysis, in 
addition to previous knowledge on the selected cases can aid to assess whether the 
measure is capturing what it is supposed to be capturing which is a fundamental part 
of the QCA analysis. 
 
 c). Newly developed methodology 
 
QCA remains a robust but newly explored methodology. As a matter of fact, 
improvements have come from the need of researchers to adapt the framework to 
their theories and needs. The case of the present theoretical framework is likely to not 
be an exception. These innovations have been formulated and put into practice as the 
methodology evolves. Thus, the variant of QCA selected for this dissertation: two-level 
fsQCA has been applied to different studies and has also been used to replicate 
conclusions of seminal studies as Theda Skocpol’s work on revolutions (Goertz & 
Mahoney, 2005).  
 
2. Comparative analysis  
 
QCA will help in identifying events in which countries goes to war under favourable 
conditions and events in which they also go to war but under unfavourable ones. It will 
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help in the recognition of necessary, sufficient, SUIN and INUS conditions whenever 
present.  And allow to understand civil conflict as a complex multilayered event. Thus, 
QCA results in regards of the identification of relevant conditions can also be further 
tested by incorporating another methodology and exercising a mixed-method 
approach. In this regard, in order not only to test the QCA results but also to provide 
better explanations of how and why the mechanisms operate, comparative case 
analysis will be incorporated for two pairs of countries. This will include a pair of 
positive cases and a pair of negative cases drawing each pair from a least likely case 
and a most likely case. This will solidify the results of the QCA or in turn, provide 
evidence for the null hypothesis.  
 
The cases are selected from the results of the fsQCA analysis. An association of the 
conditions has been established but there is still a need for further proof that a causal 
mechanism links the selected X to the outcome Y. A strong approach to this is to 
precisely select a most likely case, in other words, a typical case and also a least likely 
case, in quantitative terminology what is understood as a deviant case. The selection 
of cases departs from the assumption that both X and Y are present and that the 
conditions to be tested also have an impact in producing or facilitating the outcome Y. 
The usefulness of this method is that it enables cross-case inferences if the 
mechanisms are found to be present.  
 
A most likely case represents a case in which there is confidence the mechanism is 
present. Conversely, a least likely case represents a case in which the mechanism is 
thought to be present but to a lower extent given the fuzzy measure scores. The 
function of analyzing a most likely case is to update the confidence in the mechanism 
of interest. If the case study reveals the presence of the mechanism as hypothesized 
in the most likely case, then it is possible to infer with greater confidence that it plays 
a role in producing or facilitating the outcome Y. In  addition to this, if the case study 
fails to reveal the presence of the mechanism of interest then it is possible to establish 
a cross-case inference which determines that the mechanism does not have a 
significant impact across the whole population of comparable cases (Beach & Brun 
Pedersen, 2013, p. 152).  
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The analysis of least likely cases serves another purpose. If the mechanism is found 
in a least likely case, then it updates the confidence in the operation of the selected 
mechanism for the rest of the population. But if the mechanism is not found then it is 
not possible to update the confidence of the operation of the selected mechanism for 
the broader population. The high benefit of a least likely case stems from the 
assumption that it significantly increases the confidence in the mechanism as ‘if it can 
make it here it can make in anywhere’ (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013, p. 152). The 
comparison of cases therefore also enables cross-case inference.   
 
 
3. Conclusion: A mixed-method approach two-level fsQCA + Comparative 
analysis  
 
As mentioned above, the two-level variant of QCA is selected. Furthermore, Among 
the different types of QCA being crisp QCA (csQCA), fuzzy QCA (fsQCA) and 
multivalue QCA (mvQCA) the ideal one to implement is fsQCA. The reason behind 
choosing fsQCA is that the mechanisms or conditions to be evaluated are likely to be 
present in degrees rather than in sharp-cutting categories. Subsequently, positive and 
negatives comparisons will be undertaken basing the selection of the cases on the 

















Two-level fsQCA analysis 
 
 
A bargaining game between elite groups has the potential to explain a macro 
phenomenon such as a civil war. Conflict can be understood as the product of a 
bargain failure between discriminated -powerless, downgraded or underrepresented- 
(Cederman, et al., 2010) elite groups and powerful –monopoly, dominant- elites in 
repetitive bargains for redistribution of political participation, economic assets and 
social services. Political exclusion and economic inequality as dimensions of 
horizontal inequality have been recognized as a robust cause of ethnic conflict onset 
(Cederman, et al., 2010; Ostby, 2008; Ostby, et al., 2009; Besacon, 2005; Baldwin & 
Huber, 2010; Alesina & Papaioannou, 2016; Stewart, 2002). Within these models the 
state is understood as an organisation of organisations (Boix, 2008; North et al., 2009) 
which is captured to different degrees by different ethnic groups (Cederman et al. 
2009). Elite groups within power hold decision-making power to allocate and 
redistribute assets and participation. Thus, as highlighted in previous chapters, 
although these findings remain as strong hypotheses in explaining ethnic conflict 
onset, they fail to recognize the relevance of informal institutions such as patronage 
networks as viable and legitimate channels of redistribution.  
 
The present chapter is an attempt to test the mechanisms proposed in the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter 3 and evaluate whether the conditions are relevant or 
irrelevant in explaining the outcome. It incorporates the full spectrum of institutions, 
evaluates structural and agency mechanisms and in that way, aims at contributing to 
the general debate by highlighting the relevance of informality in either controlling or 
enhancing violence as well as providing an agency –structure two level theory.  
 
Using fsQCA (Fuzzy Qualitative Comparative Analysis), I provide a comparison of 9 
cases of conflict onset vs. 12 cases of conflict avoidance which firstly, shows the 
significance of patronage networks in both: perpetuating economic and political 
exclusion by further restraining patronage distribution only to those included (cases of 
conflict onset) and, controlling violence by keeping the patrons content (cases of 
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conflict avoidance); and secondly, it demonstrates how information asymmetries and 
non-credibility of the commitments between the parties can conduct a bargain into 
failure. For the 21 cases analysed, structural results show that ethnic conflict onset is 
a product of political exclusion and inefficiency in the distribution through either formal 
or informal institutions. Adding to what has been commonly said, informality does play 
a role in creating conflict if the patronage networks are closed to different ethnic 
groups. Additionally, whilst evaluating information asymmetries and credible 
commitments as agency mechanisms, results show that when elites fail to provide 
credible commitments violence is the preferred course of action to achieve ends. 
Furthermore, the presence of information asymmetries as coming from the patrons 
and perceived by the elites in power, affect the willingness of them to redistribute 
informally and encourage them to exclude.  
 
Research question and Hypotheses 
 
As mentioned in the theoretical framework the research question to be answered is as 
follows: 
 
Why do some illiberal democracies fall into conflict while others do not? 
 
The implementation of fsQCA aims at testing whether the conditions identified in the 
theoretical framework are relevant in explaining conflict onset and also, how do they 
play in the negative cases. In this regard, a series of hypotheses to be tested via the 
QCA analysis comes to light: 
 
H1. When there is inefficiency in the redistribution of privileges, rights and assets AND 
there is exclusion from central power, it is likely that violence will erupt.  
 
H2. The lack of trust through the presence of non-credible commitments by the 
bargaining actors will lead to rejection of the demands for the allocation of resources 
and in turn conduct a bargain into failure. 
 
H3. The presence of information asymmetries in a bargain for the allocation of 
resources and assets will lead to a bargain into failure.  
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Methodology brief and Data  
 
As stated in the methodology chapter, set-theoretic methods approach has been 
selected in order to allow causal complexity analysis. fsQCA understands the level of 
membership in each set by scoring degrees of membership between 0 and 1. 
Membership scores over 0.5 reflect presence of the condition being 0.5 the crossover 
point. The aim is to evaluate which cases in the sample show presence of the causal 
condition, and how strong that condition is in explaining the outcome. As the 
theoretical model shows, both structural and agency conditions are evaluated, 
therefore Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) proposed two level fsQCA is the variant 
applied to this model.  
 
Selection of cases 
 
Following research results in regards of type of regime, the universe of cases 
represents all those countries between 1980 and 2012 that classify as illiberal 
democracies using the Varieties of Democracy data22. The strength of this new 
database resides in providing measures of both de facto and de jure level of 
democracy. Most of the civil war and armed conflict onset research which analyse the 
type of regime does so by evaluating the Polity IV scores which only take into account 
de jure indicators of democracy level. Furthermore, the Polity IV scores have proven 
non-robust in the classification of certain regimes23. In this regard, the selection of the 
universe of cases was undertaken by choosing those countries with a measure of 
democracy between 0.25 and 0.75 in the V-dem Liberal democratic index24. 
 
                                                      
22 Variable used; Liberal Democracy index. Available at: https://v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/ . Published 
March 2015. 
23 For example, Colombia for the period from 1953 to 1974 is coded as a democracy Polity2 score of 
7). However, during this period an agreement between the elites representing  the two main parties -
conservatives and liberals- is in place to alternate in power but further excluding the legal participation 
of any other political parties -communist parties for example like PACOCOL-. Therefore, this situation 
does not reflect a democracy as broadly understood. South Africa under apartheid is another example 
of misclassification.  
240.25-0.75 was chosen because differences in regimes tend to be open ended rather than sharp 
cutting edges. 
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A set-theoretic approach implies the selection of a sample of cases rather than the 
use of the universe25. QCA methodology relies in qualitative analysis and in case-
based knowledge, therefore the cases were selected in terms of fitness, data 
availability and suitability for comparison (Goertz & Mahoney, 2004; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2007). As the outcome measures need to be fuzzy the final selection of 
ethnic conflict onset cases are those which have information available for battle related 
deaths26. QCA relies on John Stuart Mill’s comparative method; the selection of the 
cases therefore, relies on both Battle related death data availability and most different 
system design; being random but obeying most different system design rules. I aim 
therefore to understand what was sufficiently common among these cases to produce 
a political event like an armed conflict, which as an outcome is in itself essentially 
similar across cases. I also take into account negative cases which can help to 
understand the causal logic driving the positive cases (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2006). They provide variety and a negative performance towards the outcome of 
interest. The negative cases where chosen by evaluating the plausibility of violence 
erupting in accordance to ethnic cleavages (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005). The final 
sample contains 9 positive cases and 12 negative cases. For the positive cases, I use 
a ten year period pre-conflict baseline in order to evaluate how the conditions played 
before the war began.  
 
Table 1. Selected cases 
 
Positive cases Negative Cases 
Mali 2007 – Northern Mali Tuareg 
Rebellion  
Argentina 1983-2012 
India 1994 – Bodoland ethnic conflict Bolivia 1985 - 2012 
Niger 1995 – First Tuareg Conflict Ghana 1993 - 2012 
India 1997 – Tripura ethnic conflict Madagascar 1992 - 2000 
Niger 2007 – Second Tuareg conflict Namibia 1990 - 2012 
India 2009 – Manipur separatist conflict Nicaragua 1990 - 2008 
                                                      
25 The use of the universe should be avoided because it will increase the number of logical reminders 
in turn affecting the results.  
26 For calculating battle related deaths (BRD) the BRD UCDP database was used for the period 1989-
2010. Thus, for covering period before 1989 I used the US Department of state Human rights reports. 
Avaialable at: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=crhrp  
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India 2000 – Nagaland Separatist conflict Tanzania 1996 - 2006 
Thailand 2003 – Malay Muslim 
insurrection 
Zambia 1992 - 2012 
Senegal 1990 – Casamance Conflict Benin 1992 - 2012 
 Paraguay 1993 - 2012 
 Malawi 1995 - 2003 




Operationalisation and calibration of data 
 
As most of the data is interval-scale data I am able to use the direct method of 
calibration by using the “calibrate” function in the fsQCA software (Ragin & Davey, 
2014). The usage of this direct method improves the quality of the fuzzy measures 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2008). In order to define the degrees of membership in each 
condition it is needed to define the full membership score (1), the full non membership 
score (0) and the crossover point (0.5). The crossover point was selected by using the 
media for the continuous variables. It is important to highlight that it is not 
recommended to use the media for selecting the crossover point, as this selection 
should be done qualitatively. However, the data for the structural conditions and most 
of the agency conditions does not vary very much from case to case. In this regard, 
the most unbiased way of addressing membership and non-membership is to use the 
media. When the upper and lower scores were far from range from the overall sample 
then they were excluded when assessing the media for establishing the crossover 
point. This is done in order to maintain the uniformity of the data. The calibrated scores 









Table 2. Operationalisation of conditions 
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* Executive embezzlement and Public sector theft variables are likely to reflect a bad 
corruption and/or patronage prototype which increases inequality in the distribution. 
** I am using data from both UCPD Battle Related Deaths database (1980-2010) and 
the US Department of State Human Rights Reports. If the data differ then the deaths 
were averaged. 
*** A qualitative assessment of the data was done to include only ethnic related 
protests.   
 
 
I recognize the difficulty of measuring a concept such as patronage. The challenge 
comes not only from the concept per se but also from the invisibility of the transactions 
undertaken through this channel. The proxy used here is by no means perfect, but it 
gives the opportunity to start somewhere. As mentioned in the theoretical framework 
and in the literature review, patronage is often understood as a negative aspect of 
politics. Thus, in reality, patronage can also take a beneficial form, providing another 
channel of distribution for different groups; often this informal channel of distribution is 
more important or remains more active than formal ones. The proxy selected here 
aims at capturing the type of patronage that is likely to bring conflict onset: a patronage 
that remains at the top levels and does not redistribute along the vertical line and also 
excludes different ethnicities from the distribution of spoils.  
 
The aggregation of executive embezzlement and public sector theft attempts to 
capture the negative aspect of patronage. Stating that patronage is present in illiberal 
democratic regimes, it assumes that when assets are coopted and stay at the very top 
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embezzlement can also be trans-ethnic as in the case, for example, of predominant 
single party regimes which need nonetheless the support of other ethnicities to 
maintain themselves in power.  Despite the initial contradiction with statements that 
argue in favor of patrons benefiting only their patronage line, it can also provide the 
advantage of analyzing qualitatively whether patronage also, in some instances, takes 
the form of inter-ethnicity (see conclusions and discussion chapter). In this regard and 
aiming to evaluate redistributive patronage versus non-redistributive patronage and/or 
the presence of multiethnic patronage redistribution it can be justified as a functional 
proxy27.  
 
In this vein, it also highlights the fundamental difference between political inclusion 
and informal redistribution as well as giving a hint in forthcoming analysis as to whether 
the patrons need to be ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the state structures to receive patronage 
distribution. Assuming the difference between political inclusion and redistribution, 
what matters is if assets are redistributed along the vertical patronage line rather than 
solely staying at the top; it is the case that even if there is political inclusion, informal 




Within the analysis of the structures, 8 possible combinations of conditions resulted. 
A frequency cutoff of 1 was used to select the relevant paths and a 0.75 consistency 
threshold was selected. According to these criteria, 8 configurations of conditions 
resulted as sufficient combinations for the outcome. I use the intermediate solution for 
analysing the results. In this regard, the overall configurational analysis presents a 
consistency of 0.73 and a coverage of 0.70, this means that 70% of the selected cases 
are covered within either of the paths28. The solution formula is as follows29:  
                                                      
27 After extensive research and evaluation of other plausible ways of constructing this variable as a 
condition to be evaluated and also taking into account the lack of data for this particular phenomenon; 
it was decided that although not perfect by any means, measuring in this way might be able to provide 
some meaningful answers.  
28 If the measures for onset are changed to just differentiate between civil wars and armed conflicts 
coding: 0.75 armed conflicts and 1 civil wars the results still hold, with an overall coverage of 0.74 and 
consistency of 0.79. 




(1)  ETHNIC CONFLICT ONSET =   EXCLUSION * (formal distribution + informal 
distribution) 
 
Most of the positive cases show a presence of EXCLUSION and either formal or 
informal inequality in the distribution; as a matter of fact, none of the cases reports 
presence of exclusion and absence of both formal and informal distribution. This 
means that as expected, the relationship at the structural level is equifinal in which 
some countries go to war under favourable conditions (Thailand, Niger) but also under 
unfavourable ones (Mali, Senegal). Within the solution EXCLUSION*informal 
distribution the cases with greater than 0.5 membership are Thailand03, Niger07, 
Niger95, India94 and India03. Whereas within the path EXCLUSION*formal 
distribution the cases with more than 0.5 memberships scores are India00, India03, 
India97 and India94. 
 
As most of the cases fall within the path of unequal formal distribution*EXCLUSION 
which resembles inequality in the distribution of social services and political 
participation, the coverage score is 0.65 (65% of the cases) with a consistency of 0.75. 
The informal path which resembles non-redistributive patronage line * EXCLUSION, 
presents a coverage of 63% of the cases and a consistency score of 0.72. 
 
Hereof, the results from the truth table analysis of the structural conditions and the 
solution paths further confirm findings by Cederman et al., (2010); Wimmer, (2009) in 
regards of the significance of political EXCLUSION of ethnic groups and the likelihood 
of conflict onset. These findings support the theoretical claim that when relevant 
groups are excluded from power and decision-making it is likely that a conflict will be 
triggered. As mentioned earlier, it is expected that the degree of informal and formal 
distribution would also affect the possibility of triggering the onset of a conflict. 
According to these results, it is possible to infer that EXCLUSION works as a 
necessary condition but operates as a INUS condition within the structural set, a INUS 
condition is a causal condition that is an insufficient but necessary part of a causal 
recipe which is in itself unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome to happen. For this 
sample of cases, EXCLUSION does not explain conflict on its own because it is not a 
simple cause which causes conflict but a combination of conditions. Conflict onset is 
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likely to resemble conjunctural causation. The event of exclusion and the inequality in 
the distribution in either formal or informal channels jointly together produce conflict 
onset; rather than one single condition in isolation; different conjunctions prove to lead 
to the same outcome.  
 
Structural results should not be interpreted as robust results on their own within a two 
level QCA model (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006). Nonetheless, it is shown here 
that inequality in the distribution to different ethnic lines is relevant when triggering or 
preventing violence. The channels of distribution are relevant too, as opposed to the 
regular arguments which depict formal inequality as a potential cause of conflict, it is 
shown here that inequality as perceived and as reproduced through informal channels 
of distribution is also a significant factor in stimulating the decision to use violence. 
The accumulation of wealth in the hands of the executive and the illegal appropriation 
of public funds by those elites with access to power with no intent of vertical distribution 
is a significant condition in triggering conflict. Conversely, in those instances in which 
appropriation is distributed along the different ethnic elite groups within the state 
(Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania) or in those instances in which although groups are not 
per se included within state power but yet receive funds redistributed informally 
(Bolivia, Argentina, Nicaragua) show proof of conflict avoidance via informal means. 
 
As Horowitz (1985) states, the composition of the power structure and civil service is 
“an important indicator of whom owns the country as well as of how groups are doing 
in the struggle for worth”. It is true that a picture of the public sphere in terms of access 
to (mainly) executive jobs, shows the reality of discrimination and exclusion of groups. 
Although, this is the ultimate effect or the most notorious event or conclusion of such 
discrimination, still the complexity of the processes along the structures implies there 
is much more than that. In this regard, the fact that members of an ethnicity are 
represented in parliament or in government itself can be viewed also as an official 
recognition of this group. However, this does not necessarily mean that resources are 
not reaching discriminated groups through other channels. Yet, even if the groups are 
fully excluded they can still receive distribution via state policies or patronage. This 
exemplifies conjunctural causation. There are cases in which grieved groups are 
excluded yet certain degree of distribution whether formal or informal also influences 
their decision not to fight (Paraguay, Bolivia). It is beyond the single fact of exclusion 
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what drives groups into violence, there are more layers of analysis over that this broad 
but accurate conclusion.  
 
In this regard, it is shown here that the degree of distribution of economic assets, 
political participation and social services is relevant both in the formal and informal 
realm. Hence, stimulating distribution through formal institutions in the form of 
affirmative action policies is a plausible way of controlling violence. The formulation of 
these type of policies can also increase trust in the elites. Additionally, informal 
distribution through patronage networks although from a western point of view is seen 
as detrimental, in young and/or illiberal democracies remains as a valid channel of 
distribution. Therefore, if patronage is redistributive reaching the lower ends of the line, 
and the spoils are shared by the different ethnic groups then this distributive 
relationship serves as an opportunity to further prevent violence. Political inclusion and 
redistributive appropriation of public funds can help to lessen conflict. Contrary, when 
excluded and grieved ethnic groups perceive and/or are aware of the distribution of 
spoils to just some privileged groups then this enhances the potential for violent action. 
The perception of constant appropriation of funds with an intend to redistribute just 
amongst those included and at the top increases the possibility of violent action. A 
clear example of this is the Malay Muslims within the south of Thailand. Analyzing two 
different periods, the Prem Tinsulanonda period in comparison to the Thaksin 
Shinawatra period, the perception of personal appropriation of funds within the 
Shinawatra period with no aim of redistribution pushed the Malay groups into a course 
of violent actions (see Thailand case study chapter).  
 
Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight the importance of conjunctural causality. Mali 
and Senegal illustrate this point. Senegal has made an attempt to include the Diolas 
in the formal distribution of power during both Senghor and Diouf governments, they 
hold political representation and therefore are seen as included within the distribution 
of power. However, the Diolas lack formal distribution as there have been a large 
number of land expropriations in favor of tourism projects, the local economy also is 
in control of people from the north of Senegal.  Informally, the patronage distribution 
does not reach or includes Diola people, the Diolas are also excluded from the spoils 
distributed through patronage. Therefore, although Diolas share some sort of power 
within the government, still distribution is highly unequal.  
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Furthermore, when negating the outcome to evaluate the negative cases I find that 
there are instances in which there is political exclusion but good formal and informal 
distribution and no conflict onset. Thus, the overall results of negating the outcome 
(consistency 0.82, coverage 0.90) show that conflict avoidance is, structurally, a 
product of inclusion (consistency score 0.89, raw coverage 0.79), informal distribution 
(consistency score 0.86, raw coverage 0.60) or formal distribution (consistency score 
0.89, coverage 0.59). A peaceful trajectory can be achieved through any of the three 
paths. Consequently, although political exclusion is a fundamental condition for 
conflict onset, as opposed, political inclusion is not a fundamental condition for 
explaining peaceful trajectories. Peaceful trajectories can be explained by instances 
in which there is no political inclusion but there is redistribution formally or informally, 
or both (Argentina, Nicaragua, Bolivia). Although groups are not included in the 
distribution of public jobs still resources have found their way to the ethnic group 
keeping them content not to fight. The Quechua and Aymara indigenous populations 
have always been excluded up until the rise to power of Evo Morales in 2006, hence 
there has not been incidents of armed violence. This represents a clear example of 
this logic. 
 
Credible commitments and conflict onset 
 
Evaluating the credibility of the commitments, the different paths show that if there is 
a source of mistrust amongst the groups, then it is likely that a bargain failure will 
occur. A bargain failure based on mistrust causes groups to restrict the degree of 
distribution and to exclude the grieved groups from central government power. 
Credible commitments have the potential to affect the rational decision-making of the 
actors when bargaining for redistribution, which in turn affects the possibility of conflict 
onset. The perception of credibility of commitments can be evaluated from each side 
of the bargain. For the side of the patrons and their constituencies whilst evaluating 
elite credibility it is likely that the elite will use populist policies to persuade the masses 
for support. The use of populist policies is strategic however, and leaders will tend to 
promise policies that can be achieved. On the other hand, commitments coming from 
the patrons can be evaluated by their capacity to control the group not to protest or 
fight. Within illiberal democratic regimes this is particularly challenging due to the 
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nature of the regime, the use of force is often a more attractive option when faced with 
a negative response from the counterpart. 
 
The presence of mistrust amongst both parties in the bargain works as a conflict 
enabling condition that can drive the bargain into failure. In instances in which lack of 
trust is present the potential for a bargain failure increases, therefore it is more likely 
that violent conflict can be prevented when there is credibility of the commitments as 
expressed by both or each one of the parties. It is worth noticing here whether, 
depending on the context, there is any difference between the source of the 
commitment. It remains significant to be able to differentiate whether the credibility of 
the commitment in one source would be more relevant than the other. In other words, 
whether the credibility of the commitments, or of the promises as spoken by the elites 
in power is more, or less, significant in producing a bargain failure than the promises 
presented by the patron and its constituency.  
 
It is also likely that the source of the commitment would have different impacts 
depending on the context of distribution: whether formal or informal. In this regard, 
trust is thought to be a fundamental building block of distribution through patronage 
networks. In essence, elites will not be willing to redistribute informally if there is no 
guarantee of receiving political support or security from the patron’s constituencies; 
they would not risk attempting to ‘buy’ if there is no guarantee of receiving support. 
Furthermore, the elites will fear those resources could possibly go to the purchase of 
elements to increase opposition. Also, when patrons do not trust the elites to comply 
with promises, redistribution through patronage will not take place as there is no 
interest for the elites to redistribute if there is a lack of affinity with the excluded group.  
 
 
Credible commitments in the formal context 
 
Analysing the intermediate solution, there is one possible path towards conflict onset. 
The solution covers a total of 69% of the selected cases with a consistency score of 
0.97. The solution formula runs as follows: 
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(2). CONFLICT ONSET =  ccelite-patron * ccpatron-elite * formal distribution * 
EXCLUSION 
 
When bargains are conducted for the distribution of assets, social services and 
political participation and inclusion in public jobs the trustworthiness of the promises 
made by both actors negotiating is relevant. In this regard, within a formal bargain of 
redistribution lack of credible commitments acts as mechanism that conducts a 
bargain into failure, this is illustrated by the cases of India03, India94, india00 and 
India97. The results for the formal context in regards of positive cases is driven by 
India and the conflicts in the Northeast region: Tripura, Bodoland, Nagaland and 
Manipur. Thus, although the unit of analysis reflects the same country, still bargains 
conducted between the state elites and the grieved groups in each case is remarkably 
different. In fact, the case of India is of particular interest. Firstly, it reflects the game 
of different sets of elites: the ethnic elites which are bargaining for inclusion and 
redistribution, the federal elites which control the assets locally and finally the national 
elites which are most likely to support the federal elites to maintain order. Secondly, 
India represents a case in which there has been an attempt to formalize patronage 
networks during the process of decolonization and in general informal politics through 
the constitution of local Panchayats. This is thought to further enhance the impact of 
credible commitments within the formal context. Thus, the question remains as to why 
did this formalization failed to produce results (see India Bodoland Chapter). 
 
Furthermore, the elites in power are expected to treat grieved groups differently, in 
some cases some groups might represent a bigger threat than others or might enjoy 
different degrees of inclusion or exclusion at decision-making within the state30. 
Therefore, the bargains conducted between the elites and the patrons for each group 
is substantially different. For example, comparatively for the case of Assamese elites 
and the Nagas and the Assamese elites and their bargain with the Bodos, the result 
of both bargains is significantly different. The Nagas were granted more concessions 
than the Bodos and in a shorter period of time (first autonomy concession for the 
Nagas 1963 and for the Bodos 2003). Furthermore, the Naga demands were harder 
and yet being the Bodos more of a soft line demand, concessions were not granted 
                                                      
30 Also as some other theories stating that the elites will fight some groups but not others.  
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nor partially conceded. This situation also created moral hazard amongst the Bodos 
which increased their sentiments of discrimination and exclusion product of the 
concessions made to the Nagas but not to themselves. Thus, despite the Naga 
concessions or autonomy conceded initially in 1963, still violence broke out in 1992 
and 2000 product in fact of increased mistrust between the groups.  
 
Furthermore, for these two examples the credibility of the commitments on the patrons 
to not mobilise, in other words to provide political support and security is also 
significant. For example, in the Bodo case, the leadership of the ABSU after repeated 
failures to negotiate their demands with the Assamese elite opted for civil unrest as 
their preferred form of action. The period from 1986 up to 1993 saw increased number 
of protests, hunger strikes, rallies and other sort of repertories of contention which, in 
the eyes of the Assamese elite only undermined their trust in the ABSU movement 
which in turn affected their decision to concede. Conversely, despite the Bodo 
movement being peaceful initially, the Assamese elites decided to repress and 
constrain the movement which also in turn undermined their credibility to dialogue.  
 
In this regard, it is shown here than when bargains for formal redistribution and political 
inclusion take place, the credibility of the commitments in both sides of the bargain is 
a significant condition which can conduct a bargain into failure. If the parties, lack 
reputation on the side of the elites in power; and lack credibility in the provision of 
security and political support on the side of the patrons, then the use of violence is the 
most likely outcome as both sides fail to believe in the credibility of potential deals that 
can come out of the bargain.   
 
Negative cases which present political inclusion in central power and have credibility 
in the commitments from each side are: Ghana, Tanzania, Namibia and Benin. These 
countries therefore, have successfully put into place an agreement in which groups 
are content and trust each other to exchange demands and offers. Inclusion is likely 
to be a product of trust amongst the parties. Elites’ trust the patrons and their 
constituencies because they are delivering political support and provision of security. 
On the other hand, the patrons and their constituencies trust the elite’s promises 
because past transactions have proven successful. 
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However, the negation of the outcome shows that there are two possible paths to 
peaceful trajectories (solution coverage 0.87, consistency 0.96). Firstly, those 
instances in which there is credibility of the commitments as perceived by the elites in 
power and there is political inclusion (CCp-e*INCLUSION: consistency 1, coverage 
0.84). And secondly, another path to a peaceful trajectory which includes those cases 
in which there is trust in the commitments of the elites in power as perceived by the 
patrons, there is formal distribution and political inclusion (CCe-
p*FORMAL*INCLUSION: consistency 0.91, coverage 0.39). Political inclusion within 
the formal context when analyzing trajectories of peace and credibility of the 
commitments operates as a necessary condition (consistency 0.91). For instances of 
political inclusion with no formal distribution trust in the patrons is the connecting link 
(path 1). In Malawi, Argentina, Ghana, Zambia, Paraguay and Nicaragua there is 
credibility of the commitments as communicated by the patrons, these cases are 
examples in which the patrons did not mobilized the masses and consequently, 
provided security and political support. This affected the partial or total inclusion in 
decision-making or power sharing agreements. Secondly, Tanzania, Namibia, Benin 
are cases in which the trust in the elites by the patrons and their constituencies 
permitted arrangements of power-sharing and also allowed those groups to achieve 
certain degree of formal distribution as captured by provision of public goods and equal 
treatment of different groups (path 2).  
 
Despite the lower coverage in this second path, it is remarkable to notice that 
increased degrees of trust in the elites can forbid patrons from refraining to violence, 
increasing in turn the degrees of trustworthiness at the time of dialoguing or eventually 
deciding to give room within the state structures. Conversely, trust in the patrons to 
provide security and political participation can increase the possibilities of political 
inclusion but not of formal distribution. In other words, when the elites trust patrons’ 
promises this can conduct elites in power into politically including but not necessarily 
into formally redistributing.  
 
Thus, ultimately the effect of credibility as projected by each side of the bargain seems 
to affect differently the structural context. Confidence in the patron’s promises affects 
political inclusion but not formal distribution. Additionally, confidence in the elites 
promises do affect formal distribution.  
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Credible commitments in the informal context31 
 
There are 2 possible paths towards conflict onset in the evaluation of credible 
commitments within an informal distribution context. The overall solution covers a total 
of 70% of the cases and an overall consistency of 0.87. The two possible paths are as 
follows: 
 
(3). CONFLICT ONSET =  ccelite-patron * informal distribution * EXCLUSION 
       + 
    ccelite-patron * ccpatron-elite * EXCLUSION 
 
 
The first path reports a coverage of 0.37 and a consistency score of 0.81, the second 
path reports a coverage of 0.61 and has a consistency score of 0.85. 
 
Within the informal context, the decision to constrain patronage and to continue to 
exclude is influenced by the lack of credible commitments coming from the elite. 
However, as the relationship is equifinal, the selected cases fall into one or the other 
path, meaning that both paths are sufficient combination of conditions that lead to the 
same outcome. 
 
It is noticeable here, that within the second combination of conditions towards conflict 
onset, inequality in the informal distribution does not come up as relevant, implying 
that both mechanisms can also solely affect exclusion32, in other words, lack of trust 
works also as an exclusion enabling mechanism. Exclusion as mentioned earlier, 
works as a necessary condition for conflict to erupt, hence the perceived lack of trust 
in the elite promises and, in turn, the lack of commitment of the patrons to control their 
constituencies and to provide security influences the decision at the elite level to 
exclude or to perpetuate exclusion. The cases illustrating this pattern are Thailand03, 
Niger07, India94 and India97. 
                                                      
31 The cases of Senegal90 and Niger85 had to be dropped from this analysis due to data availability for the 
agency conditions.  
32 Causal complexity also implies that the mechanisms can produce the outcome in a given context but not in 
others. However, the procedures of fsQCA also imply that consistent paths are sufficient combinations of 
conditions that lead to the outcome. 
 92 
 
In regards of the first path towards conflict onset within an informal context of 
redistribution, lack of credible commitments in the elites affects both the degree of 
distribution via patronage networks and exclusion from central power. In this respect, 
following the selectorate theory (De Mesquita, 2005) leaders maintain their coalitions 
in power by “taxing and spending in ways that allocate mixes of public and private 
goods” (p. 37). Leaders can sustain loyalty by providing personal and private benefits; 
in other words, patronage. Because the coalition who brought the leader to power is 
exclusive then it is possible to efficiently distribute private goods amongst the few, 
amongst the “included”; thus, resembling a closed patronage line. Leaders buy loyalty 
from their supporters by distributing patronage to those included, hence, when the size 
of the coalition is too big or fully inclusionary, then leaders will emphasize the 
production of public goods because distributing private goods would be too costly.  
Following this point, it is consistent that lack of trust in the elites coming from the 
patrons and their clienteles would affect the degree of informal distribution in the form 
of patronage. 
 
Furthermore, de Mesquita also includes arguments in regards of affinity between the 
different groups that conform both the coalition in power or the possible challenger’s 
coalitions. Affinities reflect idiosyncratic preferences and they matter in the 
consolidation of coalitions. In ethnically heterogeneous countries, the driver of 
coalition formation is indeed ethnicity. From a leader’s perspective and according to 
de Mesquita (2005) affinity can be assessed along three groups. Those about whom 
it can confidently be said that they feel a strong idiosyncratic attachment to the 
incumbent (p.61), those who don’t and a middle indecisive range. The degree of 
informal distribution is affected by trust in the elites because the elites already in power 
will approach to the groups with the more affinity possible. The discriminated groups 
as the case of the Malay muslims in Thailand, the Tuareg in Niger and the Manipuri in 
India will comprise the challengers of the government or the opposition; likewise, those 
who do not trust the elites or have the less affinity will not receive informal distribution 
in the form of patronage or private goods simply because it is a waste of money or 
resources for those already in power.  
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As depicted above, in an informal bargain for redistribution trust in the elite’s promises 
stands out as a more significant condition than trust in the patron’s promises whilst 
affecting conflict onset. Furthermore, decreased credibility can also trigger splintering 
of movements. Lack of trust in the elite’s willingness and capacity to deliver can 
prevent group’s leadership from accepting offers from the elite. Thus, if the leadership 
does accept elite’s proposals yet the movement is not confident in the delivery of 
concessions then this can encourage splintering. Splintering divides the group 
between hard-liners and soft-liners, providing greater chances for the hardliners to 
radicalize an in turn intensify the use of armed violence. A possible example of this is 
India94 and the Bodo movement. In 1977 the leadership of the PTCA (Plain Tribals 
council of Assam) headed by Charan Narzary and Kumar Basumatary accepted 
concessions of the Janata Party which was then in power. The movement mistrusted 
the true intentions of the Assamese elite and thought the demands for a separate 
state, the state of Udayachal were not going to be met. In fact, Basumatary and 
Narzary withdrew the demand for Udayachal once in power, this in turn triggered the 
splintering of the PTCA between the remaining PTCA still in head of Basumatary and 
Narzary and the PTCA-P (progressive) which decided to use a stronger approach 
towards bargaining for their demands. The PTCA-P more radical in their actions 
regarded the soft-line as being effectively bought into the Janata government but with 
no intention of furthering the redistribution along the lower ends of the movement.  
 
The India94 case illustrates how decreased credibility of the commitments, as 
evaluated by the patrons and communicated by the elite has the potential to affect the 
distribution of private goods in an exclusive coalition and also how it can encourage 
the splitering of movements giving rise to more radical movements.   
 
Finally, the negation of the outcomes for the informal context does not provide 
consistent results, the consistency and coverage scores are too low to be considered 
as valid. 
 
Information asymmetries and conflict onset 
 
When analysing asymmetries in the information it is likely that the first move is 
conducted by the groups as a threat display or as a genuine attack. In this regard, the 
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groups are the first to reveal information about capacity and true will to use violence. 
However, asymmetries in the information can also come from public declarations from 
the elites. The elites can reveal their will to fight or willingness to bargain by publicly 
stating their position about the dispute. In this regard, both language policies and 
availability of sources of information in the ethnicity’s native tongue (tv, newspapers 
and radio) are prospects of good quality information which are remarkable in affecting 
the creation and perception of information asymmetries (Schultz, 2003; Schultz, 
1999). Information is cleaner if there are various sources, if newspapers and TV news 
are also distributed in the group’s language, and if there is room for opposing and 
criticising the government. It is expected that conflict will erupt if the perception of the 
grieved groups is one of miscalculation of the true bargaining intentions of the elite. 
Or conflict can erupt also when elites misinterpret the information displayed by the 
groups.   
 
As with credibility of the commitments information asymmetries can also be evaluated 
as coming from each source. However, due to lack of regional data in regards of 
number of newspapers in circulation, or TV news in local language or newspapers in 
local language this mechanism could not be evaluated. Consequently, when testing 
empirically the information asymmetry argument, it is only possible to test the 
asymmetry in the information as displayed by the groups but not by the elite. It can be 
arguable here, that it is possible to use indicators of freedom of speech; thus, it is not 
per se freedom of information what causes information asymmetries coming from the 
elites but the quality of the freedom and its diversity33. In this regard, in order to 
evaluate asymmetries in the information as communicated by the elites in power, it is 
necessary to provide a holistic measure of the media. Some constituencies do not 
know how to read; therefore, they will prefer to analyse the information via radio or TV. 
Contrary, there also could be some constituencies which do not have access to 
electricity, television or radio but perhaps they are able to read. This is only to illustrate 
the relevance of providing a holistic measure of media communication.  
 
                                                      
33 Illiberal democracies will tend to respect to a certain degree freedom of speech as a feature of democracy as 
such, however, apart from this de jure right the quality on which it operates is completely different. Also, the 
measure would have to be regional as freedoms and quality indeed change in respect of the geographical area 
of the country, especially when talking about ethnoregional groups.  
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Information asymmetries in the formal context 
 
The overall solution coverage reports 73% of the cases with a consistency score of 
0.76. The effect of information asymmetries as displayed by the groups when 
bargaining for formal distribution is not significant. In this regard, when groups 
negotiate for acquiring or incrementing distribution through formal institutions, 
information asymmetries are not relevant in the calculation for decision-making.  
 
(4). CONFLICT ONSET = formal distribution * EXCLUSION 
 
The results for this particular sample reflect that out of the 5 cases of conflict onset 
only 3 present information asymmetries coming from the groups (India00, India97 
India09). The remaining two cases Mali07 and India94 were clear in their willingness 
to fight (or not to) but in substantial different ways. On the India94 Bodo case, the use 
of violence was constant and the attacks were sophisticated. The BdSF34 incurred in 
a great variety of repertoires of violence which included bomb attacks, attacks to 
property, raiding of houses and even sexual violence towards non Bodo women 
(Hussain, 2000). Thus, contrary on the Mali Tuareg case; the group did not commit 
attacks during the period of study which in information asymmetry arguments will 
reflect a clear message to the elites of not willingness to fight. Despite this and India00, 
India97 and India09 presenting scattered, disconnected cases of sporadic violence for 
the period of study, which could lead to a misleading interpretation of the true will to 
fight; this did not affect the elites in power in their decision to continue to politically 
exclude or restrain formal distribution, further affecting the likelihood of conflict onset.  
 
The lack of, or the constrained redistribution through formal channels and the 
exclusion from central power are not affected by disruptions in the information. Not is 
the decision to use violence as a course of action. 
 
However, when negating the outcomes to evaluate the relevance of the mechanisms 
for the negative cases clear information does play a role (consistency score 0.91, 
coverage 0.91). A clear peaceful trajectory which refrains from the use of violence to 
                                                      
34 Bodo democratic front. A product of the ABSU. 
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manifest or put forward claims in these cases is rewarded by political inclusion and 
the avoidance of conflict. However, there are some cases which present sporadic 
minor violence in the form of violence against civilians like in Benin or Malawi for 
example. Thus, the violence is so minor that it is not considered a threat to the state 
and does not affect the bargains between the patrons and the elites in power.  
 
Information asymmetries in the informal context 
 
Information asymmetries do play a fundamental role in triggering conflict when there 
is inequality in the informal distribution or exclusion of grieved groups as opposed to 
the formal context. When elites misrepresent the true will to fight and/or capacity to 
fight by evaluating excluded group attacks it is likely that they will respond with 
violence, leading to conflict onset. The overall solution covers a total of 54% of the 
cases with a consistency score of 0.77. There are two different paths that conduct to 
conflict onset when evaluating asymmetries in the information in an informal context: 
 
(5). CONFLICT ONSET = INFOASYM p-e * informal distribution 
       + 
    INFOASYM p-e * EXCLUSION  
 
The first path reports coverage of 43% of the cases with a consistency score of 0.78, 
the second path presents coverage of 43% of the cases and a consistency of 0.75.  
 
When patrons and their constituencies display misleading information concerning their 
true will to fight and capacity, then elites are likely to retaliate instead of conceding 
demands, also because they are inclined to control violence. Therefore, conflict is 
likely to be triggered as the cases of India09, Niger07, Senegal90, Thailand03 and 
India97 show.  
 
Is it important to notice that the display of a threat can be tactical. Groups can threat 
the state power in order to intimidate and achieve concession of their claims, hence, 
if there is no capacity or a true will to fight but the threats are taken seriously by the 
state then conflict will erupt and the grieved groups are likely to lose. In fact, their bluff 
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comes at a high price because violence might be extensive (Kirschner, 2010) and 
concessions are not met, as the case of Thailand thoroughly illustrates.  
 
Information asymmetries as displayed by the groups have the potential to affect 
distribution through patronage networks or exclusion from central power. Elites will 
constrain the degree of informal distribution through patronage networks if they feel 
their investment would not pay off. This means that when groups implement a threat 
display or a bluff the elites in power will likely restrain patronal investment as the patron 
is not actually providing security if the threat is taken seriously. The elites will also 
likely constrain patronage distribution because those resources might be used against 
them instead of buying them support. As opposed, within a formal bargain for 
redistribution information asymmetries do not play a significant role in restraining the 
degree of formal distribution. Whether patrons implement real threats or none to show 
their willingness to fight does not affect the formal aspect of redistribution, this is due 
perhaps, to the nature of the transaction.  
 
The presence of information asymmetries as coming from the patrons and perceived 
by the elites is thought to have a greater impact in bargains for informal redistribution 
(first path) because the resources that come to be redistributed informally pose a 
greater threat to the ability of groups to use more sophisticated attacks.  
 
Exclusion can also be affected because the means of negotiating for an inclusionary 
deal are severely affected when information is conducted through violence. In this 
regard, when information is misinterpreted by the elites they are likely to close or 
constrain the access to sharing the spoils which in turn motivates the groups to 




Armed conflicts are complex multilayered events; they can be understood as the 
byproduct of a failed bargaining game between elite groups. Centering attention on 
grievance based explanations of ethnic conflict onset, it is shown here that inequality 
in the distribution of economic assets, social services and political participation in 
addition to exclusion from central power work as conflict enabling conditions. Thus, it 
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has been shown here that inefficient redistribution through informal channels is also 
relevant when explaining conflict onset. 
 
Illiberal democracies represent the type of regime which is most likely to be affected 
by conflict. Within this type of regime patronage networks work as a channel of 
distribution which cannot be ignored when analyzing exclusionary practices of 
distribution and political participation. As results show, inefficient redistribution via 
patronage networks is a condition that is present in cases of conflict onset. As 
opposed, trajectories or peace can also be explained by the use of patronage networks 
to control violence. 
 
Furthermore, a bargain failure at the agency level most likely is a product of lack of 
trust and asymmetries in the information within the elite bargain. In particular, it is 
shown here that the effect of credible commitments is different within each context of 
distribution. While in a formal bargain for distribution the credibility of the commitments 
of each side of the bargain is relevant in affecting conflict onset, in an informal context 
only trust in the elites as perceived by the patrons is relevant. These results are 
consistent with De Mesquita’s selectorate theory in which the more groups are 
excluded from power, in other words the smaller the size of the coalition in power, the 
more provision of private goods. This in turn explains lack of credible commitment as 
perceived by those excluded. Furthermore, cases which reflect good credible 
commitment coming from the elites are those cases in which the size of the coalition 
is bigger which in turn stimulates the provision of public goods (as providing private 
goods to a big coalition would be too costly).   
 
In terms of information asymmetries, redistribution through formal channels as state 
institutions is not affected by information asymmetries coming from the groups. 
Whether the groups have a clear intention to fight or perform attacks as a form of bluff 
or to pressure the state into conceding, this will not affect the elites in power in their 
decision to politically exclude or restrain formal distribution. However, elites will not 
provide patronage if they believe the group is serious about challenging the state 
because they fear those informally distributed assets could be used against them. In 
other words, groups that bluff or do not hold the true capacity to fight but the state 





An analysis of the stabilizing and de-stabilizing 
effect of patronage networks in the southern 
provinces of Thailand 1980-2003 
 
 
Among the selected cases for the QCA analysis of mechanisms, Thailand is 
categorised as the most likely case because of its position in the factor space. The 
classification of the cases can be done in accordance to the predominance and 
strength of each mechanism playing in each case as interpreted by the fuzzy measure. 
The case of Thailand complies with these conditions, particularly in the absence of 
informal distribution as a mechanism for avoiding conflict, the score is only 0.17 
meaning that there is a very low degree of distribution through patronage networks for 
the period 1993-2003. This case is categorised as a most likely case. Hence, the idea 
of conducting case study analysis for the Malay Muslim conflict in the south of Thailand 
stems from the idea that if the informal mechanism of distribution is present, then this 





The southern provinces of Thailand were annexed in 1909 despite them being an 
independent Malay sultanate. This region is home to Malay Muslims which identify 
themselves with Malaysian cultural background rather than with Thailand. Thus, ever 
since, the Thai government has undertaken a quest to homogenise the area and co-
opt Malay culture under a common Thai identity. In this quest, it has discredit and 
undermined Malay Muslims culture.  
 
Violence in the South of Thailand emerged during the early years of the XX century. 
The Thai attempt to homogenise the country under a common identity has fuelled 
sentiments of exclusion amongst the Malay communities. The beginning of the 
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assimilation campaign dates back to the 1920’s when the Compulsory Primary 
Education Act was proclaimed by the Thai government. As in many cases of ethnic 
and cultural diversification as for example in India the Thai elites wanted to kick-start 
the process of assimilation by targeting schools and language. In Thailand the policies 
were radical, apart from making it compulsory for children to learn the Thai language 
they also forced the students to adopt Thai names and enforced the inculcation of the 
Thai ethic (Abdullah, 2010). This sparked rebellions and violence across the Malay 
Muslim community who did not agree with the new Education policies. During the 
1930s the Language policies became even more discriminative, this time putting a ban 
on the use of Malay and other minority languages, the Thai government does not 
recognise the existence of regional dialects which highly infuriated the Malays and 
other minor communities (Weinstein, 1990). Since the 1930s to the end of the II World 
War the policies of Thai ethnic identity, language and religious assimilation were 
heavily enforced, thus by 1945 a new Act benefiting Islam was launched.  
 
The Patronage of Islam Act 1945 was a strategy by the Thai authorities to 
counterbalance the growing Malay nationalism product of the 1920s and 1930s 
discriminative policies. It created dual ethnic institutions that aimed at co-opting the 
Muslim elites by providing power in deciding and controlling religious affairs. Thus, the 
strategy was just a pure formality of the Thai government and instead of co-opting the 
Southern elites it became very unpopular in the South as posts within the south were 
filled with Muslims brought from Bangkok instead of local elites35. This gave rise to a 
series of movements and armed groups which inflicted scattered and sporadic 
violence. The most affected provinces were Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat in which the 
repertories of violence ranged from attacks to police stations to governments schools 
and targeting of civilians (Croissant, 2007; Askew, 2007; McCargo, 2006; Melvin, 
2007).  There was not a visible head of the Malay movement for autonomy. Thus, by 
1980 the violence significantly decreased with the ascension of General Prem 
Tinsulanonda but refrained aggressively in 2001 with the rise to power of Thaksin 
Shinawatra.  
 
                                                      
35 This is a pattern which repeats itself further on.  
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The conflict is a long-standing conflict, however, according to PRIO UCDP data the 
conflict only takes the character of official onset until 2003 when it firstly reached more 
that 25 battle related deaths per year. Violence has mainly been sporadic and 
scattered and the insurgency is made out of a collection of different groups with 
different objectives but with no visible head or hierarchical organisation.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Thailand’s southern provinces 
 




Elite bargaining in the South of Thailand: Malay Muslims vs. Thai Buddhist   
 
Since the 1930’s Thailand elites have taken the quest to unify the country under a 
national identity. Successive military regimes, have attempted, by the implementation 
of discriminatory policies; to conceal all differences of the various ethnic populations 
living under the Thai sovereign territory. The ethnic fragmentation of Thailand is not 
extreme as we see in some other cases across Africa, hence Thailand is home to at 
least 5 different ethnic groups: The Thais representing 74% of the total population 
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across the 1960’s, The Chinese representing 14% of the population; The Malay 
Muslims representing only 3.5% of the total population for the 1960’s; the Hill tribes in 
the North of the country with a representation of only 1% of the total population for the 
same decade and the ethnic group Shan with less than 0.5% of the population (Vogt, 
et al., 2015) 
 
The Chinese, the second most populous group is seen as an immigrant group with no 
aspirations of power. It has played a great role in the development of Thailand 
economically but politically it does not represent a contender party for political bargain. 
The Hill tribes on the other hand, is a group conformed but many different ethnicities 
with no formal organisation amongst them. The north of the country, home to these 
tribes is also one of the most deprived and poor areas of the Thailand sovereign 
territory (Jitsuchon & Ritcher, 2007). Although highly aggrieved, the opportunity for 
collective action is curtailed due to the high fragmentation across these groups 
(Fearon, 2003; Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2008; Horowitz, 1985). The south also 
highly deprived is home to the Malay Muslim community. The Malay Muslim territory, 
previously the Kingdom of Pattani was annexed to the Kingdom of Siam with the 
withdrawal of the British Empire from Malaysia and the creation of the Thai state.  
 
The Malay Muslims in the south of Thailand are a homogeneous community which 
has lived under the Thai rule with no autonomy or freedom to practice its own ethnic 
customs and traditions and no power to decide on its own affairs. They speak Malay 
instead of Thai and have different religious and cultural practices. The sense of 
otherness has been fuelled by the Thai authorities which have attempted to 
homogenise the country; the constant ban on cultural practices such as religion, the 
prohibition of Muslim schools, the discouragement of the Malay language and the 
neglecting of the region have nurtured sentiments of discrimination amongst the Malay 
population. This pattern continues to date, on the 10th of January 2018 the Thai 
government announced the teaching of history of Thai kings in private Islamic schools 
within the southern provinces (Wongcha-um & Thakral, 2018). 
 
Since the 1960’s Thailand has experienced sporadic ethnic violence predominantly in 
the Southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. The effect of the Cold War 
signified that the Malay armed groups were receiving aid from foreign governments 
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specially from Malaysia, because of this reason; during this decade the conflict 
intensified but it never reached the status of armed conflict in accordance to academic 
definitions. Hence, in 2003 the status of the violence reached the threshold to be 
categorised as an armed conflict. Following this point, the present case study aims at 
explaining the Malay violence which erupted in 2003.  
 
The analysis is divided in three periods and two inflexion points:  
 
1. A first period ranging from 1980 up to 1988: the Prem Tinsalunonda inclusive 
informal elite bargain.   
2. A second period from 1988 to 1996: Political turbulence and rise of the new 
economic elites. 
a. 1997 as inflexion point: Critical juncture characterised by the financial 
economic crisis, the proclamation of a new constitution and the beginning of 
the dismantling of the Prem informal elite bargain. 
3. A third period from 1998 to 2003: Rise of Thaksin Shinawatra to power, replacement 
of the old elite bargain, and onset of armed conflict in the Southern provinces. Being 
2001 the second inflexion point. 
 
 
Following the selection of these periods, a set of hypotheses in regards of the 
mechanisms come to light:  
 
Hypothesis 1. The stabilising effect brought by the deals stemming from the Prem 
Tinsulanonda government is explained by the presence of informal distribution through 
patronage networks, allowed by the increment of Malays working in the local 
bureaucracy and also, formally, from the creation of the SBPAC and CMP-43. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The rise of a new economic elite product of the economic boom during 
the 1980’s was augmenting the size of the elite groups which were bargaining for 
shares of the spoils.  
 
Hypothesis 3. The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and the dismantling of the previous elite 
agreements between the Thai and Malay elites means that there is no patronage 
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distribution which could account for buying peace, instead the increasing sentiments 
of exclusion and mistrust push the southern provinces into violence.  
 
 
1. 1980-1988: The Prem Tinsalunonda informal inclusive elite bargain.  
 
General Prem Tinsulanonda is a charismatic leader, a key member of the elite. 
Historically General Prem has been a strong ally of the Thai Monarchy, in fact, in 
October 2016 with the decease of King Bhumibol General Prem is appointed Regent 
at his 96 years (BBC, 2016). His loyal connections with the monarchy have strengthen 
his power as a player; in fact, without the influence and support of the monarchy, 
perhaps he would not have been able to surpass the two coup attempts during his 
Prime Minister period. By 1978 he won the position of Army Commander the most 
powerful post within the Thai military. Further on, the monarchy also supported his 
candidacy for Prime Minister, which he undertook for a period of 8 years, the longest 
a single person has been in power in Thailand (McCargo, 2005). An unprecedented 
period of political stability and economic growth was experienced during Prem’s rule. 
 
The military in Thailand has a great deal of influence over various aspects, in fact most 
of the prime ministers since the 1932 revolution have been members of the army  
(Bunbonggkam, 1987; Phogpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 1994). The strategic alliance 
between a strong member of the Thai elite and army and the monarchy reflected a 
major source of power and legitimacy. Power was dispensed by the military and 
legitimacy by the crown (MacCargo, 2005), this alliance has been called by Duncan 
MacCargo as the ‘Monarchy network’.  
 
The strategic alliance benefited both parties, for the monarchy it permitted pulling the 
strings and retaining decision-making power through the new ‘democratic’ deal. It 
meant that the monarchic elite could still manipulate relevant issues as it pleased by 
using the visible hand of the prime minister; some sort of update in how a monarchy 
could influence politics by using networks (McCargo, 2005; Wheeler, 2010; Melvin, 
2007). In turn, General Prem’s elite group also benefited as it had the support of the 
monarchy in decision-making and it acted also as a source of legitimacy amongst the 
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Thai society. Ultimately, because the sympathy of General Prem with the South36 and 
his extended power associated with the support the Democratic party37 had in this 
area; the monarchy network arrangements accomplished by the strategic alliance 
between General Prem and the monarchy substantially benefited, and was supported 
by the Malays in the southern provinces. 
 
Before 1980, the south had experienced significant amount of ethnic violence 
perpetrated by the Malays with also, a strong military response from the Thai 
government. By 1980 a shift in the strategy towards the South takes place; General 
Prem promotes a strategy of co-option of elites, instead of a military attack strategy 
which had proven unsuccessful in previous decades. In this regard, his strategy was 
one of cohesion, assimilation and integration of Malay elites (Melvin, 2007). He 
incorporated Malay Muslim elite members into local politics, giving them 
representation and access to decision-making within the South. This affected the 
relations between the two ethnic groups in two ways: firstly, it partially included Malay 
elites within the South bureaucracy as a symbol of formal inclusion, and it stimulated 
the sentiments of trust amongst the Malays by creating two key institutions: the 
SBPAC (South Border Provinces Administration Centre) and the CMP-43 (Civilian 
Military Police) which solidified bonds as these institutions deal directly with security 
affairs in the region. Secondly, by having access to positions of power, the Malay elites 
also had the possibility to establish and benefit from patronage networks which in turn, 
gave the opportunity to take a share of the spoils.  
 
Formal distribution: The creation of the SBPAC and the CMP-43 and recruitment of 
Malay elites 
 
In 1981 two key formal institutions were created as part of the political strategy of the 
‘monarchy network’: the SBPAC and the CMP-43. Ministerial order 8/2524 stated the 
main functions of the SBPAC, it was a centre which ‘coordinated local administrative 
tasks and stressed the importance of public participation by co-opting local leaders 
and scholars in regional development projects (Poocharoen, 2010, p. 188). It also 
                                                      
36 He was originally from the province of Shongkhla within the southern region.  
37 Local government officials were overwhelmingly supportive of the Democratic Party, In fact, the Southern 
region has historically been supportive of this party (McCargo, 2006) 
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provided a local government or a ‘mini government’ to the southern provinces 
(Wheeler, 2010) and it attempted to ‘promote local Muslims to positions in the 
bureaucracy, notably as district officers’ (McCargo, 2006). Firstly, the SBPAC formally 
represented the initiative to transfer the control of local security issues to this agency; 
this initiative was very welcomed across the local elites. Secondly, the SBPAC also 
reflected an attempt to recognise the difference of the Malay ethnicity within the South.  
For instance, as (Wheeler, 2010) points out, one of the rules of the SBPAC was to 
train the civil servants into Malay culture and its differentials with the Thai society. Civil 
servants who work for the SBPAC ought to adjust themselves to the local culture rather 
than trying to change it. Thirdly, the formal institution aimed at co-opting local elites by 
holding meetings with local leaders to discuss matters of interest. During these 
meetings religious, academic, economic or any other type of local leaders could join 
in and participate (McCargo, 2005). This stimulated the creation of bonds and links 
between and amongst the members of the meetings, an event that created and 
solidified the creation of patronage networks.   
 
It can be said therefore, that the main objectives of the SBPAC were threefold: 1. 
Transferring security administration and decision-making to the local elites; 2. Provide 
cultural awareness and recognition of different cultural practices and 3. Empowering 
and inclusion of local leaders. Thus, the SBPAC in some instances was successful, 
but it also incurred in partial failures.  
 
One of the most outstanding successes which also works as an agency mechanism 
is the increase of credible commitments between the elites during this period. The 
tangible proof of inclusion and willingness to transfer security affairs and co-opt Malay 
elites into power raised the credibility of the commitments to include and recognise 
differences as coming from the Thai elite38. Likewise, when the Malay groups stopped 
the use of violence they also raised their credibility of the commitments by providing 
political support to the ‘monarchy network’ and by providing security39. Secondly, the 
                                                      
38 As McCargo argues, between 1998 and 2000, 1354 complains about 1322 officials incurring in abuse of force 
were reported, leading to 51 officials being transferred (McCargo, 2006,  p.44) 
39 In this regard, the provision of security was twofold: firstly, violence episodes cease to happen and secondly, 
an informal network of informants was created which aided the security authorities in raiding or preventing 
future attacks. This network was a significant part of the security operations as the Malay movement did not 
have any leadership which could control or refrain to violence as it wished.  
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SBPAC was also successful in stimulating the political participation of local leaders 
not just in security affairs but also in developmental projects (McCargo, 2006). This is 
a key point in the creation of the patronage networks and the distribution of private 
goods.  
 
Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks per year in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database 
 
On the security side, the political participation of local leaders which was stimulated 
by frequent meetings, inadvertently created an informal intelligence network 
(McCargo, 2006). This net of informal information sharing played a significant role in 
stabilising the area. The network spread all over the region, it consisted of informants 
who fed information to the CMP-43 about potential attacks, plans or movements of the 
remainder insurgents (Fair & Ganguly, 2008). Secondly, within the engineering of the 
network, General Prem had the power to select candidates to serve as senior military 
commanders (McCargo, 2006). Remarkably within the provinces of Yala, Pattani and 
Narathiwat he selected Malay Muslim senior military commanders and gave them 
power to foresee the illegal trade through the Malaysia border. This included the 
collection of rents and commissions (or in some instances persuasion to pay) for those 
involved in the illegal trade. Some of these funds were used for development funds 
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and regional projects managed by the military, which in turn, stimulated the creation 
of patronage networks and an efficient share of the spoils.  
 
In this regard, on the development side, allowing local Malays to capture rents and 
private goods within this scheme, in addition to the input and decision-making power 
-in terms of development projects- that was harnessed from the SBPAC led to an 
unprecedented empowerment of local elites in the formal and informal distribution of 
goods.   
 
However, the SBPAC also had partial failures.  As pointed out above, one of the core 
objectives was also to provide cultural awareness. To do this, the SBPAC set training 
sessions for Thai civil servants to incentivise the knowledge of culture and ethnic 
differentials amongst both groups. This was done with the aim not of differentiating per 
se, but with the aim of recognising the cultural, ethnic and religious differences 
between Thais and Malays. However, this guideline was not really taken seriously. A 
great majority of the Thai bureaucrats working within the SBPAC skipped these 
sessions and, authority from above did not enforce the procedures (McCargo, 2005) 
(Askew, 2007). Common misconceptions about the Malays remained across the 
years, despite the initial will to change that.  
 
Another strategy of the ‘monarchy network’ to stabilise the conflict in the 
Southern region was to increase and improve the level of political participation along 
the Southern bureaucracy. Despite the willingness and efforts to include, still most the 
bureaucracy across years remained majorly Thai. In fact, according to census data, 
less than 20% of the bureaucracy in the Sothern provinces of Yala, Pattani and 
Narathiwat was ethnic Malay (see below) with the ethnic Malay population in these 
provinces surpassing 70%.  
 
Locally, some other conditions refrained Malays from accessing these jobs. Lack of 
education product of neglect and discrimination impedes the population to reach 
positions of power. Furthermore, most Malay population speaks Malay being Thai the 
official state language. Thus, for that portion of the population with access to 
education, some refrain from learning Thai as it is seen locally as a legitimation of the 
Thai discriminative policies.  
 109 
 
Data in regards of ethnicity in Thailand is scarce to find. It is relevant to notice here 
that Malays and Thais are not necessarily Muslims and Buddhist respectively within 
the whole territory of Thailand. But for the Southern region there is complete 
reinforceness of cleavages (Gubler & Selway, 2012). This means that within the 
southern region being Muslim equates with being Malay and Thai equates with being 
Buddhist and viceversa, hence this principle does not apply for the whole territory40. 
In this regard, the following figure shows the number of individuals working in public 
administration by religion for the years: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 in the Southern 
provinces.   
 
Figure 2. Occupation in public administration by religion in the provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat 
 
 
Source: IPUMS census data. Thailand Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
 
According to these figures, in 1970 when the census was conducted only 7.27% of the 
individuals surveyed who worked in public administration were Malay, of all the 
individuals that were Malay only 0.38% worked in public administration. By 1980 this 
percentage rises from 7.27% to 19% for those working in public administration, for the 
                                                      
40 Gubler & Selway’s produce a score of crosscuttingness for each country per year. The score of Ethno 
Geographical Crosscutigness is for Thailand is 0.26 for the totality of the period. This means that there is no 
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whole sample of Malays in 1980 only 0.25% of all Malay workforce worked in Public 
administration; for 1990 10 years after the monarchy network this percentage rises to 
0.47% of the whole Malay sample. By 2000, 20 years after the execution of the 
Monarchy network, this percentage rises to 26%, an increment of 9 percentage points 
since it was first stablished in 1981 for those working in public administration. For the 
general Malay workforce: only 0.59% worked in public administration. This increase 
meant that the Malays in the bargaining game against the Thai elites were given 
concessions at least partially in terms of political participation. Hence, it is noticeable 
that the proportions of Malay vs Thai bureaucrats are staggering. The concessions 
given by the Thai elites in terms of political inclusion only came to benefit the top elite 
of the Malay population.  
 
 
Patronage stabilising effect during General Prem period in power 
 
As depicted in Figure 1 above, the violent attacks perpetrated by the Malay movement 
came to a stop when and during General Prem’s period in power. Despite the success 
of the SBPAC and the CMP-43 in generating trust between the Malay and Thai elite 
groups and the partial inclusion of Malay elites in the bureaucracy, it is an 
overestimation to argue that the sole creation of two institutions, and an increment of 
7% of Malay workforce which started working in bureaucracy was enough to prevent 
violence from refraining. This points out towards the existence of other ignored 
mechanisms that helped prevent violence from reappearing.  
 
Two main points stand as relevant: firstly, the unawareness of patronage as a 
mechanism of inclusion and distribution, despite its indisputable relevance in Thailand; 
and secondly, the nature and character of the Malay violent movement.  
 
In Thailand, the proliferation of patronage is outstandingly significant and very 
common. In fact, traditional politics has implied the non-payment of salaries and 
instead the legal entitlement of 10 to 30% portion of the money involved in a 
transaction; basically, as a fee for the services provided (Phogpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 
1994) (Warsta, 2004). Within Thailand there is also a tradition of presenting gifts to 
bureaucrats, it is understood by Van Roy (1970) as cited in (Phogpaichit & 
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Piriyarangsan, 1994) that corruption persists because political institutions which can 
supersede political practices are slow to develop. This is a statement that illustrates 
the nature of the patronage networks within Thailand and which aids in identifying it 
as a limited access order (North, et al., 2009). In fact, the distribution of spoils amongst 
different elite groups can be beneficial to the poorest communities in which formal 
distribution is not enough or is simply not efficient. Furthermore, as (Phogpaichit & 
Piriyarangsan, 1994) point out, patron-client structures exist because everyone 
concerned sees it as a good structure which can bring benefits in terms of stability, 
order and the resolution of potentially destabilizing conflicts (p.4).  
 
Furthermore, patronage networks as an informal institution is a hidden part of the 
spectrum of transactions performed in limited access orders (North, et al., 2009) such 
as the case of Thailand. They represent a fundamental part of how politics are 
practiced within this social order. In this regard, these networks and coalitions concede 
or deny access to valuable resources; such controlled trade to a selective elite 
coalition group has the potential to manage the problem of violence41. In some 
instances, informal arrangements are more powerful in keeping content the 
population, mainly because of the nature of these arrangements. Patronage is efficient 
and can act instantly while distribution through formal institutions takes longer to 
produce results. Thus, as shown on Figure 1, the change in violence attacks was 
immediate. 
 
The success and influence of the SBPAC and CMP-43 is undisputable, however, there 
were partial failures like the enhancement of cultural awareness and some other 
issues that remain unexplained by the supporters of this thesis (Askew, 2007) 
(McCargo, 2005) (Melvin, 2007) and that can successfully be explained by the 
proliferation, inclusion and strength of the patronage networks that came to be formed.  
 
First and in line with the argument of partial cultural awareness failure, it remains to 
be explained how and why Malay elites who significantly differ with the Thai crown 
came to agree to legitimise it by providing political support. Secondly, and focusing on 
                                                      
41 Whenever a broad coalition of different elites such as in: Bolivia, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, amongst others is 
redistributing rents along the coalition, it enables credible commitments amongst the groups, which in turn, 
supports the regime, aids them in performing their functions and refrain them from using violence 
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the poor Malay population (as opposed to the elites), how did the SBPAC agreements 
between the elites integrated the periphery?  
 
For the first point, the ‘monarchy network’ was strategically engineered between 
General Prem Tinsulanonda and the Thai crown to ‘promote the power and prestige 
of the throne. That prestige in turn, served to underpin national identity, creating 
broader legitimacy for those associated with it’ (McCargo, 2005, p. 503). The success 
of the monarchy network nationally and within the Southern provinces can be 
associated to a cohesive identity and wide span legitimacy. However, if the Malay 
elites were unarguably opposed to cultural homogenisation, why did they ‘joined’ and 
supported the network if it signified accepting and providing legitimacy to the crown, 
despite the other benefits it produced? Furthermore, why did they ‘obey’ to a crown 
that they considered opposite to their cultural practices, taking into account the record 
of discrimination and attempted cultural homogenisation?. Clearly the Malay elites 
wanted to defend and expand their own identity which had been undermined since the 
kingdom of Siam in 1932. Highlighting the effect of patronage networks, Malay elites 
saw an opportunity to benefit from the repartition of spoils. Being patronage so 
common and systemic in Thailand it was perhaps the best bargaining deal they could 
have ever achieved.  
 
Additionally, by joining the network, the coverage and supply of basic needs achieved 
by informal deals are thought to have reached the population almost immediately. 
Formal distribution in turn, is associated with more transaction costs, it is less efficient 
and takes longer to produce noticeable results.  Because the cessation of violence 
with the instauration of the ‘monarchy network’ was instant it could signify that the 
effect of the patronage distribution is the one accounting for the pacifying effect during 
this period. If this is the case, then the psychological impact of legitimising the crown 
drops its place to a lesser important issue. This accordingly leads us to the second 
point. 
 
How did the SBPAC agreements between the elites integrated the Malay periphery? 
Also taking into account the dispersed nature of the Malay movement?.  The initial 
arguments rests in the above explanation, the efficiency of the informal distribution in 
reaching the lowers ends of the distributional chain serves as a platform for integration. 
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This however, is also relevant in highlighting the nature and characteristics of the 
Malay violent movement. The pattern of the violence in the Southern region is one of 
sporadic, scattered unorganised violence (Croissant, 2007).  The only plausible 
mechanism that can be inferred from the success of the SBPAC and CMP-43 in 
decreasing the level of violence is the increase of credible commitments between the 
elites within the bargain. In other examples of bargains for redistribution in which ethnic 
elite groups are in search for an agreement that both sides prefer to war, most likely 
the movement has a ‘visible head’ or leadership. This can, on the one hand, allow for 
general centre agreements that successfully integrate the periphery in enforcing 
orders that restrain the use of violence. On the other hand, if the orders are not 
successfully enforced across the periphery of the violent movement, the most likely 
case is the division between hard-liners and soft-liners which leads to the splintering 
of groups (Butler & Gallagher Cunningham, 2011).  
 
Thus, for the case of Thailand, this is rather different. As previously mentioned, the 
violent movement is scattered and unorganised resembling more of a terrorism feature 
(Croissant, 2007). It is possible to imply therefore, that an effective enforcement of 
orders to stop the use of violence relies on a somehow organised, hierarchical 
movement. Because this is not the case in the South of Thailand then, it is inferred 
that some other mechanism must be operating to effectively control violence, 
especially with such a great efficiency. Taking into consideration the nature of the 
violent actor, which has been previously ignored in explanations pertaining the 
creation of the SBPAC and CMP-43 as instruments of stabilisation, gives support to 
the thesis that more than formal institutions is the plausible mechanism helping here 
to control violence.  
 
2. 1988-1997: Interim period, rise of a new economic elite and political turbulence. 
 
The decade of the 1980s witnessed and outstanding economic boom. Thailand during 
the 1980s presented unprecedented economic and political stability. The economy 
significantly expanded, passing from GDP growth rates of 5.17% in 1980, to 9.52% in 
1987 and peaking at 13.29% in 1988. The financial sector and industry sector were 
the most benefited by the boom (Fofack & Zeufack, 1999). Hence rates began to 
decrease steadily upon 1989, with a final deep decrease during 1998: passing from 
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12.19% in 1989 to  -7.63% in 1998 when the financial crisis hit at its hardest.  
Commencing the decade of the 1990s the country also started experiencing political 
turbulence product of the raising economic elites and their push for more democratic 
practices (Ansell & Samuels, 2014). During this period, there are 10 different PM in 
power and a shuffle of cabinet members, depending on the head of government in 
place. As (Uwanno & Burns, 1998) points out, civilian governments in particular after 
General Prem, were very unstable. Military coups also influenced the changing 
patterns in the elite. The rise of a new economic elite, which increased income 
inequality were now eager to dispute the status quo and to protect their economic 
interests. This new economic elite was willing to ‘invest in changing the political 
regime’ (p.5) seeking the displacement of the previous elites and patronage deals.  
 
Because structural changes are not immediate changes, this period is understood as 
an interim period that gradually paves the way for the big changes happening in 2001 
which represents the victory of the new economic elite which, within an elite 
competition approach effectively displaced old elites obliterating the patronage 
networks and deals. 
 
Formal structures: Democratisation, inequality and elite competition 
 
As depicted in the previous section, Thailand witnessed unprecedented economic 
growth and political stability during the decade of the 1980s. The staggering rates of 
economic growth allowed for the rise of a new economic elite. The economic boom 
benefited the well off the most and impacted differently in the different economic 
sectors (Fofack & Zeufack, 1999; Sarntisart, 2000) . Because the effects of the 
economic boom were felt the most amongst the elites and upper classes this produced 
an increase in income inequality (Kuznets, 1955; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002; Fofack 
& Zeufack, 1999). The findings of the Kuznets curve42 have been intensively 
researched and have reached diverse conclusions depending on the countries 
assessed. According to (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002) Within South East Asia there 
are multiple examples of ‘East Asian Miracles’ and ‘Autocratic disasters’, which both 
                                                      
42 Kuznets finds show that when economic growth increases income inequality tends to also increase, peak and 
then also decrease 
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do not obey to the Kuznets predictions and principles. Thus, Thailand represents a 
typical case in which the relationship between economic growth and income inequality, 
and, democratisation works as theoretically predicted. This further depicts Thailand as 
an atypical case of the East Asian pattern (World Bank, 1996) 
 
Figure 3. Income inequality and Economic growth 
 
 
Source: WB Data 
 
The rise in income inequality not only depicts a potential benefit for the better-off but 
also signals the up surging of a new elite who is willing to protect its newly acquired 
interests by intervening in the decision-making of state policies and also by 
augmenting the size of the coalition or different elites in power, in turn pushing for 
democratisation (Ansell & Samuels, 2014).  
 
One of the researched contributors to the economic boom in Thailand is the 
reallocation of production facilities which also increased asset revaluation (Handley, 
1997). The new movement of capital and the revaluation made thousands of Thais 
wealthy and stimulated economic growth. Furthermore, the agriculture sector shrank, 
while the industry sector expanded considerably, this signals a movement of workforce 
from one sector to the other which is also evidenced in the total sector employment 
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shares (see for example: Bosworth, (2005)). Thus, this can also reflect a sense of 
development of the economy which also supports Kuznets theory. In this regard, the 
new elite product of growing sectors in industry and finance is thought to come into 
competition with the ‘monarchy network’; the old elite which, within its economic aspect 
predominantly represents the incumbent land owner autocratic elites (Ansell & 
Samuels, 2014).  
 
The new economic elite was of course willing to defend and protect its economic 
interests. In this regard, as opposed to redistributionist explanations of 
democratisation (Boix, 2008; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). The democratisation 
period of the 1990s in Thailand is better explained by elite competition rather than a 
class struggle of poor vs. rich. The poor population in Thailand is vast but has never 
organised or demanded economic or political changes. In turn, the product of the 
economic boom and the subsequent elite displacement leads me to think that 
democratisation was a product of elite competition between the old ‘monarchy 
network’ elites and the new economic elites who were in search of changes in the 
status quo.   
 
Elite displacement and democratisation 
 
The elites in power during this period represent different political and economic 
interests from those during the General Prem Tinsulanonda government. In 1988, 
Chatichai Choonhavan rises to power as the first democratically elected head of 
government. He ran for office under the National Development party, a conservative 
party which promoted the interest of the new elite. During his government, he 
implemented financial liberalisation and deregulation policies for the banking sector 
and pushed privatisation reforms that later in 1998 came to be implemented 
(Dempsey, 2000; Handley, 1997). The new government undertook strong measures 
to reduce the bureaucratic power of the elite. Chatichai himself was a business man, 
and his government was widely seen as representing the interests of the business 
elite (Wingfield, 2002). 
 
Chatichai’s election represents the initial point of elite displacement and the breaking 
of the General Prem networks. He introduces his allies to positions of power such as 
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cabinet members and shifts elites in economic power positions such as the Budget 
bureau (Chaianan & Parichat, 1998). Thus, further evidence of the elite displacement 
and the aim of dismantling the General Prem informal networks is the corruption 
scandals that the Chatichai’s government was accused of and which were felt to be 
worse than during the General Prem government (see blow).   
 
In 1991 a military coup against Chatichai was pursued as an attempt to retake the 
power and reinvigorate the old elites. The NPKC (National Peace Keeping Council) 
under the leadership of General Suchinda was formed to run the country as a 
provisional junta. The junta appointed Anand Panyarachun as temporary head of 
government, he was close ally to the crown and a respected businessman (LoGerfo & 
King, 1996). The NPKC comprised all the top military commanders, the junta accused 
the Chatichai government of ‘unprecedented corruption and harassment of permanent 
civil and military officials (…) attempting to destroy the military and undermine military 
unity’ (Bhuchongkul, 1992, p. 2). Amidst the coup, a new constitution was being 
drafted, the scrutiny committee was both close to the NPKC and many of its members 
were senior militaries themselves. There were some controversial reforms. The 
manoeuvre of the coup plus the drafting of a new constitution can be interpreted as 
the preparation for the military to retake power, paving the way for General Suchinda 
to become PM (Bhuchongkul, 1992). After several rallies and protests in Bangkok 
organised by seven political parties (including the Democrats) on the 4th of December, 
the crown pronounced itself. King Bhumibol made a televised speech calling for 
national unity and for the constitution to be passed (Bhuchongkul, 1992). 
 
The legitimacy given by the crown despite the constitution controversy, worked its 
magic to retake power on behalf of the ‘monarchy network’43. In fact, Bhuchongkul 
(1992) further points out that 6.8 million people44 signed a petition in favour of the 
constitution and claiming for early elections, and only 2.141 voted against (p.10). After 
three shifts in the PM position in September 1992 Chuan Leekpai rises to power.  
 
                                                      
43 Thus, General Suchinda publicly announced his non-intention to take on as PM due to the controversy around 
it.  
44 However, newspapers declared that a great amount of the signatures collected in the North-eastern area were 
fraudulent.  
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Leekpai run for office under the Democratic party and served for the period of 1992-
1995 (and later from 1997 to 2001). His cabinet was conformed mainly by banking 
elites. Supachai Panitchpakdi became Deputy Minister of Finance: he was a former 
banker, the same as Tarrin Nimmanahaemida who being a banker also became 
Finance Minister (Thoriby, 1997). Nimmanahaemida was the CEO of the Siam 
Commercial bank from 1984-92, he also served as the Chairman of the Thai’s banker 
association form 1991 to 1992 (Bloomberg, 2016).  
 
The positions of power were progressively but solidly being filled with the rising elites 
attached to the financial markets and to the services industry. The democratisation 
process came about by the pushing of this new elites eager to protect their interests 
and displace the old elites from positions of power.  
 
Within the Southern provinces, the economic boom benefited the Thai elites the most. 
Most of the workforce in the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat works in 
agriculture and fishing. Thus, as mentioned above the economic boom increased the 
GDP share of the industry and financial services sectors, shrinking in turn the 
agricultural sector. As depicted in the graphs below, a greater share of the Malay 
Muslim population works the land in comparison to the Thais. For the industry sector, 
according to the data both ethnic groups expanded the workforce in manufacturing as 
a proxy of the industry sector. Thus, for financial services, the Thais greatly benefited 
of the expansion of this sector. In 1980 both groups within the sample have the same 
number of persons working in financial services, by 1990 while the Thais expanded 
the workforce by 4 times, the Malays remained the same. Furthermore, figure 5 shows 
the decadal increase on ownership of assets which shows a greater increase for the 










Figure 4. Workforce by sector in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat 
 
Source: IPUMS census data 1980, 1990, 2000 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of households with ownership of assets: automobile, 
refrigerator, TV and radio for the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat 
 
 







































The shifting of elites in Bangkok did not have an immediate impact in the Southern 
regions. The economic policies which were drifting towards more45 deregulation and 
liberalisation of markets were implemented (Sarntisart, 2000). However, the process 
of impact in the peripheral regions is thought to be gradual rather than immediate. The 
newly elites were focusing on establishing themselves in positions of power at the 
centre, rather than being worried about controlling the periphery. The patronage 
networks within the south continued to operate as there were no major elite 
displacement within the region, thus, changes were on the go.  
 
Informal mechanism: the dismantling of the old elite’s patronage networks and 
instauration of non-redistributive patronage 
 
The aim of the new elites was to protect their newly acquired economic interests and 
prevent the old elites from continuing not only to dictate economic policies in their 
favour, but also from controlling the redistribution of spoils. As mentioned earlier, 
patronage networks remain as a significant channel of transaction in Thailand’s 
politics.  
 
The establishment of new elites in power in Bangkok disrupted the old elites networks. 
By gaining the main position of power, the new elites were also capable of appointing 
their allies to positions in which the ‘old ways of doing’ were displaced. This created 
fragmentation of the previous patronage deals. Besides this great change, the newly 
acquired positions of power also changed the nature of the patronage deals from 
redistributive to non-redistributive. This is proven by the significant increment on 
corruption scandals in which individuals were accused of pocketing millions of public 
assets. During the General Prem government in comparison, corruption was felt to be 
much less (Bhuchongkul, 1992). Appropriation of public assets changed from 
competitive but legitimate to criminal and monopolistic. 
 
Chatichai’s administration for example was accused of a scale of corruption which was 
unprecedented. His administration became to be known as the ‘buffet cabinet’ 
                                                      
45 The change in the political economy model of the country from ISI to neoliberalism was already undertaken 
throughout the 1960s and 70s. During the 90s the policies drifted towards more deregulation and deepening of 
liberalisation policies.  
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(Dempsey, 2000) (Wingfield, 2002). Because the military and old elites felt the 
displacement of elites taking over and their patronage deals being overrun by personal 
appropriation of funds and also by newly assembled networks; during the coup, the 
junta decided to monitor with jealously the distribution of public funds by establishing 
an assets examination committee which was chaired by General Jirarochana, minister 
of interior during General Prem’s government. In this regard, the NPKC ‘appeared to 
be determined to deal decisively with allegedly corrupt individuals in the Chatichai 
government’ (Bhuchongkul, 1992, p. 10).  
 
The establishing and functioning of the committee can be interpreted as the old elite’s 
strike back. The committee had extensive powers, such as the capability of freezing 
assets in possession of the accused, examining confidential documents of the 
accused such as bank accounts and expropriation of allegedly ill-gotten wealth. Upon 
Chatichai’s ousting, 25 of his cabinet members were accused of major corruption 
practices but only 12 were found guilty of illegal appropriation of public assets (in total 
around 1 million Baht). As for Chatichai himself, he was also accused of being 
‘unusually wealthy’.  The committee then ordered the seizure of 266 million baht of his 
property (Bhuchongkul, 1992, p. 11). The extend of the personal appropriation of 
public funds by the rising elites in comparison to the previous government signifies the 
changing pattern in the patronage networks from a redistributive pattern to a non-
redistributive in which whomever is in power takes advantage of its position by 
enriching their personal bank accounts instead of redistributing the assets along 
patronage lines.  
 
1997 first evidence of impact on the South:  New constitution and first attempts to 
dismantle SBPAC and CMP-43 
  
On October 1997, a new constitution is proclaimed product of a Committee specifically 
gathered for this task. Being the 16th constitution of Thailand it was the first time the 
population was able to participate in its drafting, a much more democratic approach. 
By the beginning of the year the constitutional drafting assembly was created –CDA-, 
its purpose was to unite a diverse group of elites both national and regional in order to 
design and rewrite the constitution, in line with the new democratic values and respect 
for civil rights that came with the process of democratisation. The CDA was composed 
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of 96 members, 76 were drawn from the provinces. The rest were experts in public 
law, political science and public administration. Although the CDA tried to include all 
the visions from the provinces by electing one member of each province to represent 
them in the drafting of the constitution, none Malay was elected for this task. For the 
provices of Yala, Pattani and Nathariwat Thais were the selected members to attend 
the CDA. 
 
The 1997 constitution includes some provisions that can be understood as more 
democratic or more inclusive of regional differences. However, some of the points 
included in this ‘more democratic’ constitution was already mentioned in the previous 
constitutions. (Che Man, 2003) argues that for the 1997 constitution the difference was 
that the provisions were meant to be practiced this time in every sense of the word 
(p.6). Hence, these new provisions continued to be a pure formality, a de jure mention 
rather than de facto. For example: the new constitution reads: “All local government 
organizations shall enjoy autonomy in laying down policies for their governance, 
administration, personnel administration, finance and shall have powers and duties 
particularly on their own part” a decentralisation command. Thus, 1997 also witnessed 
the first attempts to dismantle the SBPAC within the South, which were clear staples 
of decentralisation and recognition of differences. 
 
During the 1980s the SBPAC operated as an independent department under the 
Ministry of Interior and responded directly to the fourth army commander, deriving its 
authority from the Prime Minister himself (Wheeler, 2010). Thus, by 1996 under order 
56/2539 the SBPAC was removed from the Fourth’s Army line and a deputy Prime 
minister replaced the national security council as chair of the committee on solving 
security problems. This reform added an oversight on the SBPAC. The Malay elites 
were confident and trusted the military46. However, with these reforms and the removal 
of the SBPAC from the Fourth’s army line the Malays started to feel vulnerable once 
again.  
 
These changes ordered by the new elites from Bangkok, despite the credited record 
                                                      
46 This sense of trust is a product of the 8 years of positive relations between the monarchy network and the 
Malay elites.  
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of success in the operation of the SBPAC represent the official rupture of the bond 
between what was left of the ‘monarchy network’ and the Malay elites, as Wheeler 
points out, ‘coordination between the military and the bureaucracy suffered (…) order 
56 disrupted the unified chain of command’ (p.220). The restriction of autonomy soon 
was realized by the Malay elites which also contributed to major unrest and more 
importantly to the steady decrease in credibility of commitments. 
 
Thaksin Shinawatra was already maneuvering his way in during his period and also 
had an influence on the 1997 constitution. He was accused of attempting to influence 
CDA members by buying some of the commissioners (Bangkok post, 1997). 
Furthermore, during Chavalit’s period he became a non-MP deputy Prime Minister in 
1998. 
 
3. 2001-2003: Culmination of elite replacement, patronage networks dissolution in 
the South and conflict onset. 
 
The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 epitomises the culminating point of the 
displacement of elites associated to the ‘monarchy network’ and the rupture of the pre-
stablished patronage deals. After a period of significant political turbulence, 
characterised by military coups and constant shifting of Prime Ministers and cabinets 
(a total of 10 changes in 10 years); the 2001 elections bring to power Thaksin 
Shinawatra a billionaire product of the economic boom who symbolises the complete 
replacement of elites and the dismantling of the patronage deals which were effectively 
gluing together the society. With the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra, the Southern 
provinces come to effectively feel the full impact of the elite replacement. 
 
During this time, he created a new party around his figure: the Thai Rak Thai Party in 
English “Thai loves Thai”. It was created in 1998 and during the same year Thaksin 
entered in liaison for creating a monopoly around the telecommunications system 
(Wingfield, 2002). This is also a prove of the extreme information asymmetries coming 
from the Thai elite as there is total control over communications such as radio and TV. 
The Thai Rak Thai party ultimately is the proof of the alliance between different 
economic elites to create a party which could be able to dominate the state and in 
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general the political system, including also those economic elites which had historically 
dominated the economic sectors in Thailand. 
 
His campaign was cemented in populist practices and a rhetoric of rejection of old 
elites’ interest and mismanagement of the economy. He pictured himself as the new 
saviour and preyed on the grievances created by the economic crisis (Phongpaichit & 
Baker, 2008). Thus, son of a prominent business family, his created network 
comprised significant business allies and also incurred in unprecedented forms of 
nepotism. In this regard, he benefited holistically of the economic boom and 
subsequent crisis. On the upper side of the ladder, he secured the strategic powerful 
alliances to control the bureaucracy and effectively finish displacing the old elites; and 
on the lower, he secured the popular support of the masses which were affected by 
the economic crisis by preaching on two clear populist policies: the 1 million baht fund 
and the reforms to the health care system.  
 
Within the South, the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra significantly affected the relationships 
between the Malay Muslims and the Thais. Firstly, the two cornerstone formal 
institutions which had cemented trust between the two groups were dismantled. With 
their eradication, the informal deals of intelligence and mutual work to keep violence 
controlled were deterred. Additionally, his strategy of bureaucratic control implied a 
total replacement of elites in power, the South was not an exception to this mode.   
Furthermore, his rhetoric of war against drugs effectively masked the real problems in 
the south and targeted Malay Muslim leaders, a strategy that was counterproductive 
as the blacklisting of Muslim leaders pushed them into the organised militia 
strengthening the organisation of the movement and changing the nature of violence. 
 
Formal distribution: culmination of elite replacement, within the South: dismantling of 
SBPAC 
 
Thaksin Shinawatra understood that the Southern provinces will represent a challenge 
in the quest for elite substitution. Firstly, the South had always been faithful supporters 
of the Democratic Party and formal and informal alliances between the military and 
the Malay elites were strong in the South. His approach to capture and neutralise the 
area was to attack the military directly by firstly, displacing the old elite from military 
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positions of power and installing his allies; and secondly, by passing the responsibility 
of conflict management in the area from the military to the police, justified by the 
visualisation of the conflict are mere criminality instead of an ethnic based conflict 
(Wheeler, 2010) (Croissant, 2007). 
 
Despite the unprecedented political support which brought Thaksin Shinawatra to 
power (over 70% turnout) he lost the elections to the Democratic Party in the south 
(Croissant, 2007). His populist policies failed to persuade the Malay electorate who 
regarded Thaksin and his allies with mistrust. Thus, Thaksin Shinawatra knew the 
importance of managing the south as it was regarded internationally as a main issue 
in the area47, he attacked the problem through the military. In September each year, 
the military is subject to a customary rotation. Thaksin Shinawatra announced the 
rotation one month earlier as he saw the event as the perfect opportunity to install his 
allies in positions of power within the military (Pongsudhirak, 2003).  
 
General Surayuth was the supreme commander, army chief, of the military force, he 
had extensive support from General Prem Tinsulanonda and by extension, support 
from the crown. Thaksin Shinawatra announced his replacement by appointing 
General Sonthat Attanant one of his allies to the position of army chief. He also 
replaced navy and air forces chiefs with his supporters and even named, one of his 
cousins Chaiyasit Shinawatra as personal assistant to General Attanant. In 2002 
General Chaisayat was officially named army chief of the military forces. Thus, the 
military elite replacement also was undertaken in lower rank positions and within the 
police. Within the southern provinces this process was undertaken during 2001 and 
2002 when ‘key officials were replaced in the south with his associates and loyalists 
(Melvin, 2007). By 2004, the network was controlling ‘the military’s high command as 
well as the police’s and will thus strengthen Thaksin Shinawatra bases of power’ 
(Pongsudhirak, 2003, p. 284). 
 
The shifting of military elites was a national strategy for replacing the ‘monarchy 
network’ with Thaksin Shinawatra’s personal network, thus, within the Southern 
provinces this is represented by the abolition of the SBPAC on 2002 (Melvin, 2007; 
                                                      
47 As the up surging of terrorism as the new world threat. 
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Wheeler, 2010; McCargo, 2006). By order 123/2545 of 2002 the SBPAC was officially 
closed. As Wheeler (2010) highlights: ‘bewildered employees arrived for work to find 
the centre closed’ (p.221).  There is significant agreement amongst academia in 
regards of the impact the closure of the SBPAC signified for the Southern provinces.  
 
Thaksin Shinawatra’s justification for closing the SBPAC was centred in arguing that 
the violence was a product of mere criminality (McCargo, 2005; Wheeler, 2010). This 
not only justified the closure of the SBPAC but also served as an argument for 
transferring conflict management powers from the military to the police (Melvin, 2007; 
McCargo, 2006; Wheeler, 2010; Korff, et al., 2007). The police within the region was 
regarded with mistrust by the Malay elites, they were highly involved in local affairs 
(Korff, et al., 2007; Wheeler, 2010) and they were connected to businessmen and local 
politicians accused of both illegal practices and high corruption (Croissant, 2007). 
Thus, the disbanding of the SBPAC not solely affected the security side but also the 
economic; during the 1980s and early 1990s the SBPAC had the ability to allocate 
funds by development conclusions reached out by the local leaders’ meetings. With 
no SBPAC large-scale development projects were allocated without any consultation 
of the local leaders and their needs. 
 
The dismantling of the SBPAC was a short-sighted and high-handed interpretation of 
the conflict. The justification of pure criminality was founded in the war against drugs48. 
Violent casualties on both sides increased significantly, the Malay groups changed 
their repertoires of violence towards the attack of police rather than Thai civilians 
(Croissant, 2007). On the side of the police, the war on drugs gave policeman ‘carte 
blanche to target selected locals for extrajudicial execution’ (McCargo, 2006, p. 15). 
According to the Crisis Group (2005) those targeted by the state were mainly young, 
poorly armed individuals. No drug barons were killed or arrested. This justification for 
extreme violence on the side of the state and violation of human rights in the name of 
the war against drugs was just a scam to target informal informants who belonged to 
the General Prem networks during the 1980s and early 1990s (see below). UNDOC 
figures suggest that the traffic of drugs increased rather than decreased during this 
                                                      
48 The drug problem however,  has always been a topic of debate within Thailand, Laos and Myanmar seen as 
the golden triangle of production of opium 
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period. Drug seizures of methamphetamines and opioids the two most commercialised 
drugs in this area are reported to be lower on average during Thaksin Shinawatra 
period than in the early 1990s and 1980s.  
 
 Figure 7. Drug seizures of methamphetamines and opioids 
 
 
Note: The 2003 report of 10240 kilograms of opium seized is the only figure provided 
by the government for the whole period. 
Source: UNDOC  
 
 
Informal distribution: rupture of patronage deals as causes of resurgence of violence, 
more than formal institutions?   
  
Despite the notorious impact on trust between the two groups that came due to both 
first the creation of the SBPAC in the General Prem government and secondly, the 
dismantling of it under Thaksin Shinawatra; it is clear to say that the influence and 
operation of the informal system played a significant role in firstly controlling and 
secondly encouraging the use of violence.  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the agency mechanism that can account for 








































from each side of the bargain. Thus, the immediate refraining from the use of violence 
could intuitively be explained by the existence of the inclusionary patronage networks 
who were able to supply immediate funds to the poorest. The coverage and supply of 
basic needs achieved through informal deals reached the population almost 
immediately, in comparison, formal distribution is associated with more transaction 
costs.  
 
Thaksin Shinawatra’s strategy to dismantle the SBPAC and transfer conflict 
management tasks to the police significantly decreased trust between the parties. 
Thus, most importantly it closed the flow of informal transactions that the Malays had 
achieved. Being patronage such an important feature of Thailand’s politics, it is 
undoubtable that the Malays did feel deeply as part of the system when they were 
invited to take a share of the spoils during the 1980s and early 90s. With the closure 
of the SBPAC the signalling to the Malays was that of official expulsion from the 
patronage networks.  
 
The success of the elite replacement strategy had to major impacts informally: the 
cessation of informal distribution product of the dismantling of the General Prem’s 
patronage networks and the eradication of informal intelligence networks which were 
effectively controlling violence during the 1980s. These two consequences of Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s elite replacement within the South encouraged the use of violence by 
the Malay groups, furthermore, the grievances created by the increment in 
extrajudicial killings and violation of human rights contributed to formal organisation of 
the Malay groups to provide more coordinated action and increase violence as a 
cohesive mass movement, changing the nature of the groups.  
 
From redistributive patronage to non-redistributive  
 
The immediate impact of the elite replacement within the south implied the cut on the 
flow of informal resources. The links established between the two groups were 
effectively disrupted and replaced by the new economic elite. The Malays reacted not 
only to the dismantling of their patronage deals but also were aware of the new elite’s 
corruption scandals which included two PMs: Thaksin Shinawatra himself and 
Chatichai the first democratically elected PM after General Prem. Thaksin Shinawatra 
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was accused of assets concealment which should have been declared before taking 
office49 (Pongsudhirak, 2003) (McCargo, 2005) though he was found not guilty. The 
nature of the country’s patronage networks changed from redistributive patronage to 
personal pocketing of public assets with the rise of the new economic elite.  
 
In this regard, from an economic perspective, the cutting of shares from the spoils is 
thought to have left a big chunk of the Malay population with no access to funds. This, 
in addition to the decreased credibility product of the major corruption scandals and 
the evidence of the official take over of a new economic elite, is thought to have 
motivated the Malay groups into the use of violence. 
 
Furthermore, the dismantling of the pre-established patronage networks not only 
affected the economic side but also the social. Another cause of the return to the use 
of violence is the effect that the eradication of the informal intelligence networks had 
on the ability of the authorities to control violence. The transferring of conflict 
management to the police opened the door for extrajudicial killings. Thus, most of the 
individuals which were killed, tortured or disappeared by the police during Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s government were informal informants during the Prem government and 
belonged to the informal intelligence network, this left the regime within the South with 
no possibility of anticipating attacks (Croissant, 2007) (McCargo, 2006). These killings 
were justified under the war on drugs, furthermore, due to the sudden increase in 
violent attacks on the side of the Malays, Thaksin Shinawatra’s strategy was also to 
highly repress; thus, his downfall was the eradication of the informal deals for which 
he was inadvertently left with nothing.  
 
The increase in extrajudicial killings and violation of human rights product of the 
transfer of responsibilities to the police and the justification of the supposedly ‘war on 
drugs’, which in fact targeted Malay Muslim leaders instead of drug barons, aided the 
organisation of groups in  changing the nature of the violence. As mentioned earlier in 
the text, the pattern of the Malay violence is that of scattered, unorganised, terrorist 
                                                      
49 Further on, after his ousting by a military coup in 2006, motivated precisely by corruption scandals he is 
found guilty of a land corruption deal. He aided his wife to buy land from a state agency at a reduced price See 
The guardian 21 October 2008 URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/21/thaksin-thailand-
corruption 
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type form of violence with no ‘visible head’. Thus, this significantly changes with the 
onset of the conflict. 
 
Human Rights Watch produced a report in 2007 about the state of the violence within 
the Southern provinces of Thailand. Informants reported that the police had blacklisted 
Malay Muslim leaders and villagers, people with no mechanism to challenge their 
inclusion on a list had ‘turned to separatism militants to seek protection from imminent 
threats of blacklisting, arbitrary arrests, disappearance and extrajudicial killings’ 
(HRW, 2007). Furthermore, a BRN (National Revolutionary Front) militant declared 
that Thaksin Shinawatra policies gave the separatists a ‘much needed boost in 
renewing their insurgency’ He further argues: 
 
There was a period of about seven to eight years of quiet, but that did not mean 
our movement had given up. Thai authorities thought they had succeeded in 
pacifying the situation. For us, it was a period of recuperating. After the 
government launched anti-drug campaigns, villagers were deeply in fear. Out 
of resentment towards Thai authorities, those villagers were desperate and 
requested us to give them protection. We gave them training in military and 
self-defense tactics, in parallel with political indoctrination about the struggle for 
independence. This is how we re-established control of the population and 
stepped up attacks on the government. We truly believe in our cause—that we 
are fighting to liberate our land and protecting our people from the oppressive 
Thai authorities”  
 
Human Rights Watch interview with 
Asor, Narathiwat, July 25, 2006. 
 
 
The access to patronage which was curtailed by Thaksin Shinawatra’s strategy of elite 
replacement within the south and the extrajudicial killings of previous informal 
intelligence informants plus the eradication of trust between the parties product of the 






Research on the potential causes of the violence in the South of Thailand have cited 
the dismantling of the SBPAC as the main cause. Thus, it has been shown here that 
the sole creation of two formal institutions plus their following dismantling under the 
government of Thaksin Shinawatra is unlikely to be the sole mechanism leading to 
conflict onset. The effect of patronage networks as an informal distribution channel is 
undoubtedly relevant in explaining the controlled violence during General Prem’s 
government and the subsequent destabilisation during the Thaksin Shinawatra period.  
 
It is true that during the General Prem period in power the creation of the SBPAC and 
the CMP-43 significantly increased the trust between the bargaining parties. Providing 
an official sign of recognition of differences and willingness to integrate the Malay 
elites. Furthermore, the General Prem era also showed signs of willingness to 
integrate by opening the opportunities to the Malays to become members of the 
bureaucracy. The SBPAC and the increase in Malay bureaucratic posts empowered 
the local elites. However, because the violence coming from the Malay groups ceased 
to exist immediately it is unlikely that a formal mechanism of redistribution and 
integration can account for the pacifying effect. A formal mechanism, given the 
grievances associated with the Malay movement and the nature of the violent 
movement simply do not provide enough explanatory power to justify the sudden stop 
in violence within the south. This shows that there must be another mechanism 
operating which has not been acknowledged. 
 
Given the relevance of patronage networks within Thailand it is thought that it is 
precisely the informal deals that were forged out the SBPAC that can explain the 
sudden stop in violence as a strategy. Informal distribution is efficient and its effect is 
thought to be immediate. These transactions are founded on trust and personal bonds. 
As opposed, formal distribution takes longer to produce results because it involves 
more transaction costs.   
 
Secondly, the economic boom favoured the most the well- off which in turn gae rise to 
a new economic elite. This new economic elite became dissatisfied with the status quo 
and the old elites’ ways of doing. They were ready to protect their newly acquired 
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interests by pushing for democratisation practices. The second period therefore, saw 
the beginning of the elite displacement in which not only positions of power were taken 
by the new elite in an elite competition approach but also sees how the patronage 
shifts from redistributive to non-redistributive as corruption scandals of personal 
pocketing of funds become predominant in comparison to the General Prem and 
previous eras. This paves the way for the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra, the evidence of 
the complete take over of new elites.  
 
Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire product of the economic boom incurs in 
unprecedented practices of nepotism and takes over the military: the main commander 
of the ‘monarchy network’ which represents the old elites. With the rise of Thaksin 
Shinawatra all the patronage networks of the ‘monarchy network’ are replaced. The 
South is no exception. During the interim period the south refrained from feeling any 
significant change in the shifting of elites, mainly because the new elite was busy 
taking over the central positions of power in Bangkok. Thus, the dismantling of the 
SBPAC is the official signalling to the Malay elites of their expulsion from the 
redistribution of spoils. He also hands in the management of the conflict to the police, 
a highly mistrusted institution within the South. This, in addition to the dismantling of 
the informal intelligence nets of information increased the use of violence amongst the 
Malay groups. Their lines were engrossed by Malay leaders which were targeted 
under the ‘war against drugs’ and were suffering mass violation of human rights and 
extrajudicial killings. This curse of events led to the change in the nature of the 
violence, as the groups become more organised. In this regard, it is shown here that 
more than formal institutions explain the resurgence of the violence within the southern 
provinces, as well as their stabilising effect during the General Prem government and 











India Bodo conflict: 




From the fsQCA results, India’s Bodo conflict represents a least likely case of conflict. 
The mechanism of interest is present but to a lower extent. The fuzzy informal 
measure reveals a 0.42 degree of informal distribution which is close to 0.5 the 
crossover point.  Distribution through patronage if present is likely to stay at the top. 
As a least likely case, the India Bodo conflict has the potential to provide a cross-case 




The Bodos are one of the earlier settlers in the North-east state of Assam in India. As 
a mongoloid origin ethnic group, they are thought to have migrated to India circa 5000 
BC and are widely accepted as Assam original inhabitants (Chadha, 2005). They ruled 
and had significant power around the VI-X centuries AD. They hold sovereignty over 
Manipur, Tripura, Jainit and Sylthet. Their power over Assam lasted until 1825 AD 
(George, 1994), thus in present time they reside in the Northern areas of the 
Brahmaputra Valley within the state of Assam, they are regarded as a cradle of culture 
and civilisation within this area. However, during the XIX Century the admiration and 
prestige of the Bodos was undermined. They passed through a period of religious and 
cultural mess in which they lost respect from other ethnicities. This propelled a 
downfall in their status and suddenly they were not only regarded with disdain, but 
also became victims of exploitation by the other ‘advanced’ or thriving communities 
(Samaddar, 2005). 
 
During the British empire, their cultural background and attachment to the land was 
threaten. Massive migration to the state of Assam was supported by the colonial rulers 
with the aim of encouraging tea crops and providing major labour force (Samaddar, 
2005). The Indian State had two interests in mind; to firstly expand the production of 
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Assam tea crops and secondly, to grow more food for supporting the troops stationed 
in Assam (Singh & Mushahary, 2015). The Bodos felt threaten by this migration spells 
which continued until the early 1970s, during the period after decolonisation migration 
came from outside India, Bangladesh in particular (Chadha, 2005). The different 
ethnicities occupied Bodo’s land and the Bodo population was substantially reduced: 
figures show that by 1947 Bodo’s still constituted 49% of Assam population but by 
1971 they were reduced to 29% due to internal and external migration (George, 1994). 
  
In 1947 India was faced with the process of decolonisation. As a highly-fragmented 
state across ethnicities and castes the struggle to form a nation-state was daunting. 
Hence, the legacy of Ghandi and the forthcoming organisation of the state led to the 
creation of a federation, a union of states which recognises differences not only across 
ethnicities or tribes but also across castes. This form of organisation gave rise to a 
three-tier elite bargain between national elites, federal elites and grieved groups. 
 
In terms of political organisation, with the formation of the union of states, local forms 
of informal governance were officially recognised. Gram Panchayats came to be the 
source of power and organisation of the federal states. This recognition of local 
patronage power legitimised the castes and provided the pre-decolonisation 
patronage system with a formal official legal form of power (Pur, 2007). Therefore, the 
historical domestic power was able to rule under the modernising forms of the nation-
state.  
 
Not only the caste system was formally introduced into modern politics; the ethnicities 
were also included, in some instances with certain provisions of extra autonomy as 
provided in the Sixth schedule of the Indian constitution. Furthermore, the 
representation in the federation from each one of the state was legalised by quotas in 
the federal council of states. Districts within the state of Assam were formally 
introduced within the sixth schedule as an autonomous district with the Reorganisation 
Act of 1971. Thus,  for the Bodos this process of recognition only takes effect later in 
the period. 
 
Regionally, the north-eastern region of India is the one of the most conflicted areas. 
Traditionally called as the seven sister states it is home to different ethnic conflicts 
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including Bodos, Nagas, Manipuri, Tripura and Mizoram. Within conflict scholarship, it 
remains as an understudied area as conflicts are regarded as minor and in some 
instances similar across each other. However, these conflicts are long-standing with 
in some cases violence sparking since decolonisation in 1947 and also, in some cases 
as in the Manipuri case, violence has reached high death tolls.  In the case of the Bodo 
conflict, according to UCDP data the conflict reached 25 battle related deaths for the 
first time in 1989 in a confrontation with ABSU. A second onset in confrontation with 
the NdFB (an armed arm from ABSU) came in 1994 reaching 100 battle related deaths 
that year. It is this more violent onset which is the focus of this chapter.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Assam state in India 
 








It is theorised that the Bodo ethnicity became violent in 1994 product of a series of 
bargain failures undertaken with the Assamese elites but also with the Indian central 
government elites. The subjective perceptions of deprivation, exclusion and cultural 
undermining motivated the Bodo middle class to campaign locally and at the state 
level for representation and recognition. After two failed attempts for recognition, the 
movement radicalised and so did the demands. The increasing sentiments of mistrust 
prevented both sides of the bargain from reaching settlements they both prefer to 
violence. Violence reached its peak in 1994.  
 
Historically, the sentiments of alienation, undermining and non-recognition started to 
take shape since the early 1960s. Distribution within the formal sector as access to 
political representation, recognition over cultural differences, decision-making over 
budget allocation and distribution within the informal sector in the form of patronage 
networks are thought to be restricted for the Bodo ethnicity within the state of Assam. 
 
In this regard, the bargaining game will be analysed for the period 1960-1994. As 
stated above, the bargaining games between the elite groups for this case are 
represented by various dyads given the complexity of the relationships in India. As a 
highly ethnically fragmented nation-state India has resolved for a Federal Republic, as 
a federation there is autonomy in the subnational states and a micro cosmos of 
national politics. As such, it is possible to identify 4 elite bargaining dyads: 1. Bodos 
vs Assam elites, 2. Bodos vs. Indian –state- elites, 3. Bodos politicised middle class 
vs. Bodos non politicised middle class; and finally, 4. Bodos vs non Bodos (those other 
ethnicities that live within the northern area of the Brahmaputra valley, the territory that 
has been claimed by the Bodos as Bodoland). 
 
The analysis of the bargaining process will be presented by time periods in which the 




1. 1960-74: Language bargains, seeds of radicalisation and start of collective action. 
Formation of the ABSU and PTCA, initial period of non-violent agitation and moderate 
state repression. 
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2. 1975-85: Second round of bargaining. PTCA and ABSU political demands: The road 
towards complete radicalization and the use of violence. 
3. 1986-93: Period of heighten ARMED violence, culminating in 1993 with the third 
bargain failure. (1988 inflexion point: ABSU demand for Bodoland and creation of the 
BdSF) 




1. The Language policy act of 1960 and the development of the language bargains 
between Bodo and Assamese showed the Bodos the unwillingness of negotiation on 
the Assamese side and turned the Bodo language movement into a politicised 
movement. 
2. The radicalisation of demands was a product of discrimination sentiments powered by 
the concessions made to the Assamese and other minor ethnicities within Assam. 
3. The lack of decision-making power within the Local Panchayats plus the low degree 
of Bodo integration within this decentralised unit of government impeded the 
distribution of patronage for the Bodo community. 
4.  The use of violence came as a last alternative after several attempts to demand 




1. 1960-74: Language bargains, seeds of radicalisation and start of collective 
action. Formation of the ABSU and PTCA, initial period of non-violent agitation.  
 
After decolonisation and during the 1960s the state of Assam was recognised as 
‘unitary’ under the federation, meaning no further recognition of tribal areas was in 
place. Thus, Assam is a highly ethnically heterogeneous state. Under its territorial 
boundaries, the majoritarian population are the Assamese which have the political 
power and in turn fill in the quotas for representation on the federal state. Bengalis 
(who were brought to Assam supported by the British for working on tea plantations) 
and Bodos conform the second largest ethnic groups and there are many more 
minority groups such as the Misshings, Chepangs, Boria or Tigua amongst others 
(Joshua Project, 2017).  
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The Assamese as a majoritarian group has been the political elite ruling the state of 
Assam, the Bodos in turn and despite their cultural, political and social sophistication 
have been permanently excluded50 from political power within the state of Assam and 
overall in the Indian union of states. The Bodos conform a highly culturally rich ethnic 
society, their historical background is quite extent; thus, under the rule of the 
Assamese and their policies for homogenization the Bodos have felt their cultural 
background is under threat51.  
 
Furthermore, there is no access to Assam state assets for local Bodo patronage 
networks, or great degrees of formal distribution to the Bodo predominant districts. 
The economic neglect in addition to the language policy of 1960 evidenced the will of 
homogenisation and discrimination the Assamese elites inflicted on the Bodo 
community.  
 
The language policy 1960  
 
In 1959, the ASS –Assamese Sandhya Sabha- send a formal request to the Indian 
government for Assamese language to be adopted as the official language of Assam. 
In 1960 the union state government officially conceded the demand, making 
Assamese the official language for the state (Saika, 2011) (Dhar, 2014) (Singh & 
Mushahary, 2015) (George, 1994) (Karlsson, 2011). The decision of the Indian elite to 
concede was based on the status of the Assamese being the majoritarian population 
within Assam, and with the aim of providing homogenisation to the highly ethnically 
fragmented state.  
 
The concession made by the Indian state raised the subjective status of superiority 
amongst the Assamese elites. in fact, Maheshar Neog a major figure in the ASS 
believed that the concession of the Indian state had created a ‘new image’ in the eyes 
of the Assamese population (Dhar, 2014). Furthermore, members of the Assamese 
                                                      
50 For the whole 1960-94 period of analysis 
51 This is similar to the case of the Malay Muslims in Thailand. It shows how it is not just political 
representation what drives collective action, but also the undermining of cultural practices particularly: 
language policies.   
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political elite such as Prafulla Mahanta or Bhighu Phukan, Chief minister and Home 
Minister respectively, are perceived as upper caste Assamese Hindu Leaders (Dash, 
1989).  
 
The language policy not only meant that all official communications had to be done in 
Assamese language, but also that the education system will instruct Assamese as a 
unique language. This policy was received with great regret amongst the Bodo elites 
and all the minority groups.  
 
The Official Language Act of 1960 sparked resentment amongst both the Bodo elites 
and the Bengali elites, the two majoritarian groups. In 1961 there were protest 
commanded by the Bengali population to resist the Language Policy Act, the 
Assamese in turn severely repressed the protests by opening fire in an attempt to 
stand to its claim of superiority within the Assam state  (Deb, 2006). The Bengalis 
proposed the Shastri Formula which aimed at making Bengali a second official 
language, this infuriated the BSS –Bodo Sandhya Sabha- which also began its own 
campaign for recognition and officially sent a statement denying the possibility of 
imposing the Shastri Formula (Deb, 2006) (Dhar, 2014) and demanding recognition of 
the Bodo language. 
 
The BSS was created in 1952 but had no major impact until then. It took protagonism 
by not only demanding to the India elites the recognition of Bodo as another official 
language, but also by demanding to the Assamese elites the teaching of Bodo in 
schools. The Language Policy Act sparked the cultural proudness amongst the Bodos, 
it effectively raised political and cultural consciousness and led the path for the 
struggles of recognition (George, 1994). The strategic move of the Assamese to be 
recognised as a superior group within the State of Assam planted the seed for 
collective action amongst the Bodos and predetermined the character of the elites’ 
relationship between both groups. The Bodo were aware of the Assamese wills of 
power and mistrust them as the Assamese had shown they regarded other minority 
groups as unequal.  
 
In 1961 the BSS started making formal appeals to the Assam government for the 
instruction of Bodo language in schools. The argument referred to the right of Bodo 
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children to take education in their mother tongue. The Assam government in turn 
proclaimed a commission to study the case and Rupha Brahma a Bodo poet, politician 
and scholar was appointed to discuss the matter with the Assamese elites.  The 
Assamese elites partially conceded the claims in 1963 by allowing Bodo to be taught 
in primary schools (Dhar, 2014). Thus, soon the Bodo realised the concession was 
not good enough as children struggled to cope with education in another language 
upon secondary school52 (Dhar, 2014) 
 
The suspicion on the lack of commitment to the Bodo preservation of the culture began 
to arise upon this concession. The Assamese did not want to recognise differences as 
they were aware that doing so, could trigger further demands for autonomy or even 
secession. Thus, the unwillingness to negotiate and to include cultural differences 
progressively led to the radicalisation of the Bodo movement, culminating with their 
radical demand of separation: the state of Bodoland.    
 
Hence, in regards of the primary education concession; the Bodos not only realised 
that the concession did not fulfil their demands but also that the schools and 
educational system within the Bodo dominated districts were harshly deprived and 
underfunded53. Moreover, the Bodo schools which undertook Bodo language as 
official education language were faced with bureaucracy discrimination (Das, 1994). 
They were understaffed and lack the basic tools for good teaching practices. This 
further enhanced the realisation of mistrust and dissatisfaction with the Assamese 
elites.  
 
Upon 1963 and considering the failed partial concession, the Bodo continued to claim 
for Bodo language to be official in education up until secondary level. The demands 
continued to be headed by the BSS and by 1968 the Assamese elites conceded the 
demand. The implementation of the policy was done in stages: initially, Bodo will be 
compulsory up to sixth grade and by 1973 it was to be compulsory till tenth grade. The 
ASS on its side, was also pursuing to protect Assamese in consideration of the 
                                                      
52 Further on, during the second period of analysis and once the demands start to become more radical; the 
Bodos start demanding students to be taught in Bodo in university as well as conducting research and 
publications in Bodo language. A form of preserving the language.  
53 See also further on district councils. 
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previous Bodo and Bengali demands. In September 1967, the ASS sends a proposal 
to the Legislative Assembly for two main universities, Gauhati and Dibrugarh to adopt 
Assamese as the sole language of publication (Dhar, 2014).  
 
The Bodos despite the concession in 1968 for secondary level of education in Bodo, 
and in addition to the ASS course of act; also demanded Bodo as the sole language 
of instruction and publication within Bodo dominated districts. Their argument was that 
a truthful recognition and celebration of Bodo language will allow students to be able 
to transfer knowledge in Bodo. Therefore, they claimed research and publications 
should be published in Bodo as the only means to fully preserve, expand and 
recognise the language (Dhar, 2014). Thus, it is relevant as well to mention that elite 
groups at universities are powerful players at spreading message for self-
determination (or also in another cases even spreading revolution messages, for 
example in Argentina and Chile under the dictatorship). The power of reproduction of 
language and messages at the university level can significantly affect the outcome of 
disputes (Borman, et al., 2015). 
 
In 1971-72 the ASS intentions materialised when Gauhati and Dibrugarh universities 
abolished English as the education language and changed to Assamese as the only 
medium of instruction and publication (Dhar, 2014) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) 
(Chadha, 2005). This infuriated the Bodos as well as some other minority groups who 
did not want English to be abolished as main language of upper education and 
publication54. Considering this event, the Bodos headed by the BSS became more 
radicalised in their thoughts. They were now convinced that their cultural identity could 
not be preserved under an all Assamese State government. 
 
Further on during 1974-75, a third round of bargaining in regards of the Language 
issue is fought across Devnagari vs Roman script for the Bodo language. The Bodos 
were pushing for the adoption of Roman script for written Bodo. Thus, historically the 
Bodo had been using Devnagari script which is considered to be Assamese (Dhar, 
2014). The ASS responded with strong opposition to the BSS demand, arguing that 
                                                      
54 This further exemplifies the Assamese exclusionary intentions as for minority groups to enter university, 
they must learn Assamese.  
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the Assamese script remained to be enough and suitable for the Bodo written texts. 
The Bodo script movement, with the accumulation of defeats and mediocre 
concessions was able to mobilise the common people. 
 
Therefore, the script movement of 1974-75 embodies the unification of mass protest 
and demonstrates the sentiment of mistrust and dissatisfaction along the Bodo people. 
It was the first time the movement took on political activism strategies and forged a 
movement strong enough to draw people to the streets in a form of collective action 
(George, 1994) (Dhar, 2014). The previous bargains had only been disputed between 
the BSS and the Assamese government directly, but not with the support of the 
common people. According to (Dhar, 2014), the script movement was carried out in 4 
phases. In the first phase the Bodo students abstained from class; in second phase 
the protestors raised slogans in the district offices; in the third phase the movement 
submitted a formal appeal and received no response, which powered the fourth phase 
in which large amounts of Bodo supporters came to the streets to protest. There were 
some spells of violent repression, the state government was totally unwilling to provide 
any concessions. In further dialogue with the Indian central government the BSS 
ended up withdrawing the demand and accepting the use of Devnagari script in 1975, 
it realised it could not fulfil its original aim.  
 
The Language issues were the driving force for a more political approach.  The BSS 
was regarded as a literature and language organisation with no political aspirations, 
hence, the dynamics of the bargain for language recognition instigated the Bodo 
movement into a stronger political approach and planted the seeds for collective 
action. This atmosphere pushed forward by the low credibility of the Assamese 
commitments gave rise to stronger sentiments of discrimination, cohesive collective 
action and the ascent of ABSU and the PTCA as leader organisations in the fight for 
recognition and autonomy.   
 
1967-8 PTCA and ABSU: consolidation of the political movement. Formalisation of 
political, economic and social demands beyond language policies.  
 
The PTCA, Plain Tribal Council of Assam was the first political party created to 
represent the plain tribes of Assam (Dash, 1989). It served as an umbrella organisation 
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which represented different plain tribes’ interests. However, the plain tribes fall into the 
Bodo-Karachi category being dominated by Bodo interests (Gupta, 2014) (Dash, 
1989) (Joshua Project, 2017). With the solidification and protagonist role of the Bodo 
movement, smaller plain tribes feared discrimination from the Bodos themselves in 
Bodo dominated districts. This further gave rise to further ethnic issues in another elite 
bargain: Bodos vs. Non Bodos55.  
 
During 1968 the PTCA campaigned for boycotting local elections in Krokajhar, a Bodo 
dominated district in Assam (Dash, 1989) (Brahma, 2014). The elections were for the 
Parliamentary constituency of Assam which is the only reserved seat for tribals (Dash, 
1989). The PTCA had a strong support. It based its claims in arguing that the 
implementation of the Delimitation of Constituencies Act of 1962 was misleading and 
that therefore the elections only legitimised the mistaken interpretations of the Act. 
The Assamese elites responded by heavily repressing the boycott and the protests 
(Brahma, 2014). Amongst the repression tactics was: the imprisonment of women and 
men present at the polling stations (Narzary, 2010), bullet injuries at the hand of the 
police and police torture (Dash, 1989). This further undermined the relation between 
Assamese and Bodo elites and for the Bodos it was the last straw.  
 
The Assamese state repression of 1968 plus the major discontent brought by the 
mediocre bargain concessions of the language demands paired with the inspiration 
for a more political approach radicalised the demands of the Bodo movement.  
 
Inspired by the election boycott repression, the PTCA took on the most radical demand 
ever made since the first moments of independence. The creation of a separate state 
on the north bank of the Brahmaputra river: the state of Udayachal (Pathak, 2012) 
(Saika, 2011) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Dash, 1989). As the relationship with the 
Assamese elite was severely weaken and overwhelmed by mistrust, the Bodo took 
the demand for Udayachal directly to the Indian government in 1973 (Singh & 
Mushahary, 2015) (Dash, 1989).  
 
                                                      
55 This bargain will not be analysed because even given the dominant role of the Bodos, all tribes were in a 
powerless position relative to the Assamese.  
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Thus, the Bodo movement had decreased credibility in the commitments that the 
Indian elite could offer. The reputation in regards of the track of transactions with the 
Bodo community was not positive. In 1960, it accepted the Assamese demands for 
Assamese as official language despite clear disagreement within tribal minorities. 
Further on in 1963 it conceded further demands to other ethnicities, leaving the Bodos 
with a strong sense of discrimination. Likewise, in 1963 Nagaland and Meghalaya 
were carved out of Assam as a process of reorganisation of the state of Assam56 
(George, 1994) (Dash, 1989), and despite the Bodos not formally bidding for autonomy 
the bargain concession to Meghalaya and in particular to Nagaland created moral 
hazard. The Bodos demands were soft by the 1960s (up until 1967 and Udayachal), 
the Naga demands were harder57 and yet being the Bodos more of a soft line 
concession they were undermined by the Indian elite. Moreover, this sentiment is 
further solidified in 1988 when Mizoram and Tripura are included to the Sixth schedule 
a demand the Bodos have put forward since 1968 when ABSU was created and that 
was further formalised in 1987 by the 92-point chart of demands and in 1988 with the 
three main points declaration (Dash, 1989) (George, 1994). Hence despite the 
pressure for being included in the Sixth schedule the Indian elite had completely 
ignored this Bodo demand. 
 
Hence, the Bodo had a raised expectative given the evidence of repression on the 
Assamese elite and the declaration of Indira Ghandi in 1967 of a reorganisation plan 
of Assam (Gupta, 2014). By this time, the newly created PTCA was demanding 
autonomy, thus the movement was gaining momentum and the demands are soon to 
shift to separation. The reorganisation Act of Assam was defined in 1971. As perhaps 
expected, the Bodos did not receive any concessions on the demands for autonomy. 
It can be interpreted that the demand was a non-negotiable point for the Indian elite 
whose interest was to prevent further fragmentation of the Assam state. Another point 
of view refers to the ‘harder’ approach of Indira Ghandi towards ethno-nationalist 
movements as opposed to her father Nehru. As (Karlsson, 2011) points out: Indira 
Ghandi ‘was suspicious of all such expressions [of ethnicity] a thus applied a far more 
un-accommodating strategy” (p.17).  
                                                      
56 Further revised in 1969 by PM Indira Ghandi  
57 Hence, according to (Karlsson, 2011) during pre-independence, Ghandi assured the Nagas their right for 
independence (pg. 15). 
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The discontent with the 1971 Reorganisation Act propelled the PTCA into hardening 
its demands. By 1973 it formally demanded to the Indian elite the creation of the Union 
State of Udayachal. The movement was at its peak, the protest and resentment from 
the 1974 protest united the movement. Thus, by 1977 the PTCA withdraws the 
demands for Udayachal and decides to undertake a softer demand for autonomy. 
Charan Narzary the Secretary of the PTCA joined the Janat Assamese government, 
for the Bodo movement this was a proof he was brokered into (Goswami, 2014) (see 
next time period).   
 
Thus, 1967 not only resulted in the empowerment of the PTCA, another major 
organisation also started to become predominant in representing the Bodo interests: 
the ABSU All Bodo Students Union. The ABSU was formed in the Krokajhar district of 
Assam (Chadha, 2005). Since the politicisation of the movement and further on the 
dissatisfaction with the leadership of PTCA in the Udayachal bargain, ABSU claims 
the major role in representing Bodo interests and represents the embodiment of the 
radicalisation of the group by becoming armed in 1988 creating the NdFB –National 
Democratic Front of Bodoland-. The NdFB is the product of a series of unsatisfactory 
bargain concessions, progressive dissatisfaction58 and inexistent credibility in the 
Assamese elite despite the Bodo attempts to pursue its demands peacefully (Tiwari, 
1995). 
 
Although the Language issue was the force behind sparking further political demands 
the Bodo movement perceived some other issues as discriminative. There were 
economic problems directly related to land distribution; significant exclusion in terms 
of political participation within the Bodo dominated district councils and high rates and 
perception of bureaucratic corruption which was non redistributive to the Bodos. 
 
Economic Land distribution and Assamese discrimination 
 
                                                      
58 The culmination of the dissatisfaction with the bargain deals is the 1993 peace accord. The Bodos let their 
guard down and sat to negotiate. However, the outcome of the peace accord was a complete failure, what I 
would call just a formality of the government to persuade without real compromise to solve the Bodo 
concerns.  
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Immigration into the State of Assam affected the Bodos in two different moments. 
Firstly, during colonial periods and the support of the British elite to provide Assam 
with high influx of labour to exploit the Assam tea plantations (Pathak, 2017) (Singh & 
Mushahary, 2015) (Karlsson, 2011). And secondly, they were further displaced with 
the influx of Bengali refugees circa the time of decolonisation (Chadha, 2005) (Dash, 
1989). 
 
The Bodos have been historically a ‘sons of the soil’ ethnicity. The first migratory 
movement which began during the XIX Century brought foreign ethnicities to Bodo 
owned land to guarantee enough labour for tea plantation exploitation (Dash, 1989). 
Hence, the real problem for the Bodos came from the land-revenue policies of the 
British colony. In their efforts to safeguard this area of India for tea exploitation 
(Pathak, 2017), the British imposed a cash based system. This forced the Bodos to 
work in tea crops, displacing them from their traditional ways of living: agriculture 
(Dash, 1989) (Daimari & Mishra, n.d.). Furthermore, those families who did not partake 
in cash earning jobs were forced to get indebted to pay the land taxes. When loans 
were not repaid to the ‘Kabuliwalas’ their debts resulted in the Bodos losing their land 
and being evicted (Singh & Mushahary, 2015). 
 
The British also undertook development projects such as the construction of railways 
and roads for exportation the Bodos suffered from this, as many were evicted from 
their land. The dramatic economic transformation of the land had a profound impact 
not only for the Bodos but also for other tribal ethnicities of Assam (Karlsson, 2011).  
 
After decolonisation, flows of immigration from Bengal and Bangladesh caused the 
demography of the Bodo dominated districts to change once again. Kokrajhar and 
Goalpara districts were the most affected. Census data presented in (Chadha, 2005) 
shows how the population of this two districts increased drastically: in the period of 
1951-56 the population grew at a rate of 38.39%; from 1961-71 at a rate of 44.15% 






Figure 1. Decadal Population growth in Assam  
 
Source: (Government of Assam, 2014) 
 
 
The problems associated to land distribution in Bodo dominated territories created 
great economic inequality which, during independence was further enhanced by 
Assamese economic discrimination (Dash, 1989). Bodo leaders have alleged that the 
remaining Bodo lands have been taken for Assamese government projects59, 
displacing Bodo communities into the Assam forest borderline which collides with 
Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. This forest areas are environmentally protected which 
in turn have forced Bodos to be violently evicted from them by Assamese forces.    
 
Additionally, the Assam administration dominated by Assamese officers has also 
encouraged the allocation of land for non-tribals despite land protection laws declared 
in 186060. The Assamese officers, in an effort to provide patronage to their own, helped 
non-tribal acquire tribal land (Mwshahary, 2004). This resulted in significant chunks of 
land relocated to the Assamese which in turn significantly impoverished the Bodos.  
                                                      
59 However, (Gupta, 2014) point out that the Bodo movement did  not include land distribution demands on 
their claims (p.3). Hence, the demand for land distribution was not explicit but the economic discrimination 
product of land distribution was. 
60 The Assam Land regulation of 1860 established reserved lands for the ‘backward classes’. These land were 




Informal distribution: Political participation in Bodo dominated districts and non-
redistributive patronage.  
 
The colonial administration had significant impact in the establishment of the middle-
educated class for the Assamese society but also for the tribes. The number of 
government jobs class I61 started to expand. Thus, traditionally the Assamese were 
considered as superior in relation to the ‘backward tribes’ such as the Bodos. The 
Assamese in turn, occupying the majority of the government posts and somehow, 
supported by the British elite took hold of the position of superiority and as such 
preached their chauvinism (Brahma, 2008).    
 
This is evidenced in the Language policies which not only discriminated within the 
cultural aspect of inequality, but also, they reproduced discrimination and constrained 
access to public jobs. The use of Assamese as an official language also introduced 
legislation which demanded the knowledge of Assamese to obtain employment in 
government offices of the state (Saika, 2011). This affected any kind of employment 
post, ranging from administrative low skills jobs to the very end of high skilled 
prestigious jobs such as those in decision-making. For example, job posts for clerks 
insisted in the knowledge of Assamese as an essential qualification (Dash, 1989). 
These policies favoured the Assamese speaking majority and their privileged position 
in the control of the economy and the politics of the region. For high skilled jobs, the 
representation of Bodos was minimum even for constituencies which were reserved 
for ST. Within Bodo dominated districts, bureaucratic posts are taken by the 
majoritarian Assamese. Despite the Bodo movement being powered by an educated 
middle class62 (Das, 1994) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015), Bodo skilled candidates to 
politics have been unable to capture decision-making posts.  
 
                                                      
61 Those bureaucratic jobs under the colony which were aimed at locals not British bureaucrats. The 
Covenanted civil service was only for the British. 
62 Because there is no political elite the activist middle class is understood as the political elite. 
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In terms of parliamentary seats, the design of the parliamentary system in India is 
based on a majority principle. This prevents Scheduled tribes63 such as the Bodos to 
win a majority of seats in the Assamese Assembly. According to (George, 1994) even 
if the Bodos secured a 100% of their constituency votes, they will only account for 30% 
of the total due to the constituency boundaries (p.882). The formal rules of the game 
in addition to the extended control and dominance of the power seats by the Assamese 
have prevented the Bodos from any chance to gain access to power or rule their 
affairs. 
 
Elections held for Legislative Assamese Assembly from 1967 to 1991 provide a clear 
indication of this statement. The constituencies with Bodo and PTCA presence are: 
Bongaigaon, Dhubri, Krokajhar (west), Krokajhar (East), Sidli, Binji, Golpara (East), 
Golpara (West), Barpeta, Nalbari (East and West united in 1971), Uldagari, Gohpur 
(South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2017).  From the 12 constituencies with Bodo and PTCA 
presence only 3 are reserved for ST: Sidli, Krokajhar and Uldagari. Thus, even for 
those constituencies with reserved seats for tribes; no ethnic party like the PTCA was 
guaranteed a seat. I some instances Bodo candidates have been elected but not being 
part of the ethnic movement network.  
 
For the 1967 elections PTCA64 did not compete. It started formally competing in 
legislative elections upon 1972, for this election it won only 1 seat out of 6 contested. 
The seat won was for the constituency of Kokrajhar West, the candidate was Charan 
Narzary the secretary of the PTCA which was formally sponsored by the party. Later 
in 1977 the PTCA in the leadership of Narzary came to an agreement with the Janata 
party, this was seen by the Bodos as a gesture of disloyalty and accused Narzary of 
being brokered into the Janata government when he suddenly dropped the Udayachal 
demand (Brahma, 2008). Thus, although both constituencies in Kokrajhar are 
reserved for tribes; Kokrajhar east was won by the India National Congress, a national 
party. The candidate was Assamese political leader Sarat Chandra Sinha who was 
sympathetic to the Bodo cause65 but was of Assamese origin. Sidli and Uldagari the 
                                                      
63 Also, the Bodos were not recognised as Scheduled tribe until 2003.  
64 PTCA was not recognised as a party until 1972. The conditions for being recognised is to reach a certain 
threshold of votes. Thus, in 1972 it was not officially recognised but it gathered enough votes to win one seat.  
65 He sanctioned 5000 teaching jobs for the Bodos (Hazarika, 1994) 
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other reserved constituency was also lost to the INC. However, Uldagari was won by 
a Bodo candidate not from the PTCA.  
 
In the 1978 elections PTCA won 3 seats out of 9 contested. This time, the PTCA lost 
Kokrajhar West to Ranendra Nayaran Basumatari from the INC but who was a Bodo 
himself, and won Sidli and Uldagari. In 1983 the PTCA lost both Kokrajhar seats out 
of 26 seats contented it won only 1. Nataran Basmatari was elected again for 
Krokajhar West, so did Kumar Basumatary for Uldagari. The 1985 election Charan 
Narzarany was elected again for Kokrajhar east, thus by this time the PTCA was 
already divided into PTCA remaining and PTCA-Progressive a splintering product of 
the 1977 announcement of the withdrawal of the Udayachal demand. The PTCA in 
the leadership of Narzary is considered to be ‘bought into’ by the Assamese elites. 
They essentially withdrew all the autonomy and separation demands and the 
campaigns retrieved to conservative demands which was seen by the majority of the 
Bodo movement as a betrayal. However, despite the dissatisfaction of the Bodo 
movement with the Janata PTCA deal, there were efforts to include the Bodo elite into 
the Assam legislative assembly. Even another PTCA leader: Samar Brahma 
Choudhury became Forest Minister. Likewise, another attempt to include the 
leadership of the PTCA came in 1985 when it again reached a deal with the AGP 
(Brahma, 2008, p. 11). 
 
It can be interpreted that the efforts of the Assamese elite to include were genuine 
however not enough in the eyes of the Bodo movement. There is a persistent 
mismatch of efforts and expectations within the bargaining process. For the majority 
of the Bodo movement the inclusions and alliances between the Janata party and the 
PTCA and further on between the AGP and the PTCA did not compel with 
expectations of an autonomous separate authority. Nor did they transform is tangible 
changes which improved the Bodo discriminative situation. 
 







































Furthermore, in the case of appointment to Government Services of the State which 
were in fact, reserved for tribals; many of these posts were hoarded by the Assamese 
elite. The Assamese argued that the Bodos were unfit for the job, though, the Bodo 
elite is educated and considering generations prior to the Language Policy, they were 
in fact, literate in Assamese (Mwshahary, 2004). For the Bodos this was the 
personification of the voluntary and orchestrated exclusion of the tribal elites.   
 
Considering the whole of the public posts in government and recognising the 
percentage of jobs reserved for ST, there is still a great backlog of jobs effectively 
taken by ST. This is particularly persistent in fourth-grade jobs, or in other words, those 
jobs which do not have a lot of visibility. According to (Misra, 1989), ‘out of the 83 
fourth-grade jobs (10% of the total) reserved for the ST of the plains in the secretariat 
at Dispur, only 17 had been filled up’ (Misra, 1989, p. 1149). The AGP government 
had simply not make any major effort to change the situation. 
 
Panchayats and patronage distribution  
 
It is nonetheless the District Councils the most important division of authority within 
the Bodo districts and at the local level. India has a particular organisation of power 
which formalises66 the traditional forms of power organisation. As a highly 
heterogeneous country, one way of controlling the population and preventing 
fragmentation was to recognise the authority of chiefs and community leaders by 
institutionalising local panchayats (Constitution of India, 2015) (Brown, 1994).  
Panchayats are recognised as units of self-government which are endowed with 
significant powers, they are constituted in every state at the village, intermediate and 
district levels (art. 243B). Panchayats have been recognised as an innovative 
institutional modernisation. Within India, instead of eliminating traditional ways of self-
government like in fact patronage networks, they have become to be institutionalised 
and formalised in the way of Local Panchayats.  
 
                                                      
66 Formalisation describes how informal patronage networks are recognised as a legal way of administering 
power and decision-making within local communities. The colony and also Ghandi as a freedom fighter 
recognised the need for formalising patronage networks as a way of preserving the unity of the Indian country.   
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Thus, their formalisation was not straight forward. They were firstly recognised as 
sources of power and organisation in 1870 further on legalised in 1915. However, they 
were not formally addressed or recognised upon independence. In fact, the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1947 did not make any reference to the Village Panchayats 
(Mithun, 2014), even the chairman of the drafting committee assured that village 
Panchayats were no more than ‘a sink of localism, a den of ignorance [and] narrow-
mindedness’ (Mithun, 2014, p. 48). Hence, the line of criticism was successful in 
raising the importance of Panchayats, which were therefore, formally included as a 
separate chapter in the constitution. Thus, in present time they are no longer 
considered as ‘agents of state government’ (Mithun, 2014, p. 3) but rather as units of 
local self-government67. They offer a form of decentralisation in which the rural local 
government gains prevalence, thus their effectiveness depends on the ability of the 
leaders to deliver as well as appropriate funding. 
 
Panchayats are therefore, a “three-tiered system of elected committees stretching 
from village to district” (Brown, 1994, p. 377). However, their implementation has not 
come with ease. There is a lack of clarity in regards of the functions and relationships 
between the elected members and the Assam state administration. Also, because 
these institutions are the lower end of formalisation they suffer from lack of resources 
or in Brown’s words: financial weakness. Furthermore, it has been argued that in some 
instances, they have become ‘vehicles for prosperous peasants’ (p.3770) to 
appropriate scare resources and services whilst the poorer peasants remain with no 
redistribution or power over those assets. Thus, despite this when Panchayats are in 
fact, captured by local elites (in this case by Bodo elites rather than Assamese elites) 
then redistribution; even if at a low scale, is possible.  
 
It is plausible the Bodos were unable to capture a great degree of informal distribution 
by participating in the local Panchayats due to two reasons. Firstly, Gaon Panchayats, 
the lower level of the three-tier decentralised system does not hold any decision-
making power. At the level of the Anchalik Panchayat (the upper level, see below) 
patronage is likely to be captured by those members of the upper level. Thus, the 
                                                      
67 It is fair to say that the line between formal and informal institutions when it comes to the local Panchayats 
is rather blurred.  
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underfunding of these forms of government also constrain the degree and effect that 
patronage can effectively take. The overall functioning of the system is also not ideal 
(see below). Secondly, the enforcement and use of local Panchayats does not have 
an ethnic base. In other words, the process of formalisation through which Panchayats 
were adopted and absorbed under formal institutions was not based on ethnicity68. 
Thus, even if the formalisation and adoption of Panchayats relied on ethnicity, still the 
Bodos will had continued to be undermined. It would take first to be recognised as a 
ST/SC for which the Bodos did not until later in the period. In this regard, the 
distribution to ethnic Bodos through patronage is likely to be present but minor.  
    
The shortcoming of adequate funding has been an issue since the first establishment 
of Panchayats (Choudhury, 1982) (Brown, 1994) (Mithun, 2014). According to (Mithun, 
2014), within Assam the establishment of Panchayats dates back to 1870 
implemented through the Village Chowkidary Act. During this time, the Panchayats 
were only implemented in three districts: Sylhet, Goalpara and Cachar. Thus, the 
implementation and functioning back then was hardly democratic, members were not 
elected but rather appointed. In 1915, the Assam Local-government Act was passed; 
members of the Panchayat were to be elected or appointed for a period of three years 
(Mithun, 2014). In 1948 the rural Panchayat Act aimed at developing local self-
government in rural areas and providing for development of villages (p.50). The 
responsibilities of the Panchayats were associated to water supply, medical relief and 
sanitation; hence, with the 1948 Act the functions were further expanded to a list of 
34. Further on, in 1959 the Assam Panchayat Act was declared. This act formally 
established the Gaon Panchayats as the lower level of administration, as a three-tier 
system the Panchayats are divided in Zilla Parisad operating at the District level, 
Anchalik Panchayat operating at the Block level (known as Community development 
blocks) and finally Gaon Panchayats operating at the village level. In 1961 there were 
43 Gaon Panchayats in Dhubri, 34 in Goalpara, and 38 in Kokrajhar (Choudhury, 
1982). Each Gaon Panchayat has an average population of 10000 to 20000 persons. 
Thus, the resources struggle to reach the Gaon Panchayats, they are underfunded 
and their earning is meagre (Choudhury, 1982) (Brown, 1994) it Is unclear whether 
resources get stocked in the mid or upper level.  
                                                      
68 As for example in Namibia, see Namibia chapter.  
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Furthermore, in regards of the lack of clarity within the functions of the Panchayat in 
relation to the Assam government, initially in 1959 they were organised as three-tier 
structure with Gaon Panchayat at the base level (Mithun, 2014). However, in 1972 
with the implementation of the Panchayati Raj Act it was reverted to a two-tier system 
(p.52) and further in 1986 reversed back to three-tier.  The dismantling of the three-
tier system in the period from 1972 to 1986 created disarray, which in turn created 
confusion in the functions and distribution of funds. In 1978 there were ‘Community 
Blocks which were implemented to bring development administration as near to the 
village as possible’ (Choudhury, 1982, p. 237). They provided highly qualified staff to 
guide the villages in developmental issues, such as: agriculture, social welfare, 
education; they also coordinated the Anchalik Panchayats (intermediate level). Thus, 
with the dismantling of the Anchalik Panchayats in an attempt to implement a two-tier 
system, the functions developed both by the Anchalik Panchayats and the Community 
block were removed (Choudhury, 1982) (Ramen, 2009). There was a lack of clarity as 
to how the funds were going to be spent as well as how the Gaon Panchayats were 
going to be held accountable.  
 
Moreover, as (Choudhury, 1982), (Brown, 1994) and later on (Ramen, 2009) point out; 
there is a general perception of corruption by the public. Choudhury in his study of 
Panchayats within the District of Hailakandi finds that rural voters do not share a good 
opinion of their Panchayat leaders, they consider them as ‘corrupt and indifferent to 
the well-being of the common men’ (p. 86). As for Brown, she remarks that Local 
Panchayats have been instruments of ‘prosperous peasants’ for the appropriation of 
the already scarce resources. Ramen in turn, in his analysis of functionality of 
Panchayats; examines decision-making in terms of budgetary and spending 
allocation. He points out that decision-making in terms of resource allocation for all the 
districts in Assam, from 1994 onwards, depends upon the intermediary level: Anchalik 
Panchayats. He argues that Gaon Panchayats ‘depend heavily on the technical 
persons, normally the Junior Engineer’69 (p. 95). Furthermore, the ‘technical persons’ 
are not accountable to the Assam state Panchayati Raj institutions. Thus, the Junior 
                                                      
69 The Junior Engineers are responsible for 4-5 Gaon Panchayats and their responsibility is to assist  the Gaon 
Panchayats in preparation for the Developmetal action plans (p.95). 
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Engineers must verify and report completed and efficient work as well as approving 
the budget estimation. Consequently, Ramen finds this procedure is piled with bribery. 
Financial assets are entirely controlled by the Anchalik leadership. The Gaon 
panchayats therefore, as legitimate representation of the village do not hold any 
efficient decision-making power in terms of redistribution of funds70.  
 
Corruption and bribery can represent a form of non-redistributive patronage in the form 
of appropriation of public funds with no will of redistributing and persuasion for non-
focalised investment. It is likely therefore, that funds will be invested in the priorities of 
the leaders rather than those of the community. Thus, leaving the majority of the 
community with no access or benefit from those resources. At the level of the Gaon 
Panchayat, secretaries, members and presidents have pointed out that ‘they never 
get the resources according to their requirement’ (Ramen, 2009, p. 97). Furthermore, 
being a function of the Gaon Panchayat to suggest the budget to the Anchalik 
Panchayat, some presidents have pointed out that they have never undertaken the 
task of Annual resource estimation. Some others did not even know that was part of 
their functions (p. 99).  
 
If budget allocation is firstly, undertaken at the Anchalik Panchayat level and secondly 
overwhelmed by bribery it is likely resources will reach the community. Likewise, 
decision –making at the Anchalik Panchayat level is not guaranteed to be Bodo. 
Furthermore, there is great resentment between the Bodo and the Assamese 
ethnicities. Assamese leadership, is likely to invest resources not accordingly to the –
Bodo- population needs.  
 
In fact, Assam is an Agricultural state. Its income depends mainly in the production of 
food for export (Daimari & Mishra, n.d.) (Choudhury, 1982) (Das, 1997). Das (1997) 
work studies the peasant movement in the district of Goalpara one of the poorest and 
also a Bodo majority district (Nath, 2013) (Government of Assam, 2014). Studying the 
agricultural policies and the peasant movement Das finds out that the leadership in 
Goalpara district is mainly Assamese despite Goalpara being a Bodo majority district 
                                                      
70 One example of this is the task of Gaon Panchayats to construct houses for the poor. Thus, the amount 
required for construction is allocated by the Development Block.  
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(Das, 1997, p. 173). He argues that this displacement of leadership has undermined 
the ability of the ‘common people’ to influence in investment and decision-making for 
resource mobilisation. Das points out: “The district leadership or the State leadership 
(mostly come from Assamese community) had to face difficulties in membership 
drive.” (p.173).  
 
Thus, upon 1994, Gaon Panchayat consisted on 9-11 members elected by popular 
suffrage. Conversely, the president and vice-president were elected from amongst the 
members of the Gaon Panchayat on the very first meeting (Ramen, 2009). Within the 
Bodo presence districts there is also Assamese and Bengali population which have, 
to the detriment of the Bodos, driven the votes. However, India is also recognised for 
its outstanding Affirmative Action Programmes for SC/ST and women. Reserved seats 
of SC/ST operate at all Panchayat levels; Zilla, Anchalik and Gaon. As determined by 
the 1994 Act, in 2001 there were 109 ST reserved seats at the Gaon Panchayat tier 
in Goalpara, conforming 13.9% of the total seats. At the Anchalik panchayat level there 
were 13 ST reserved seats in Goalpara, for a total of 16% or the total seats. Thus, at 
the Zilla panchayat level, out of 16 members only 3 seats are reserved of ST. 
 
Table 2. ST reserved seats for Panchayats (2001) 
 
Source: Adapted from (Ramen, 2009) The Assam state election commission.  
 
Affirmative Action programs such as this one which aims at guaranteeing ST inclusion 
in Panchayat Raj institutions, works according to the formal regulations and is indeed 
successful in ensuring political representation. Despite this, the problematic 
associated to the functioning of the Panchayats goes beyond mere allocated seating. 
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Leaders of Panchayats tend to have strong political association holding membership 
in political parties or social movements. Thus, as Ramen points out in his interviews 
with Panchayat Leaders, ‘the Panchayat had to function under the state ruling party’ 
(p.246). This means that ultimately despite having an opportunity for inclusion and 
gaining benefits from the virtues of decentralisation, the strong influence of the state 
ruling party particularly over the Gaon Panchayats resulted in decision-making in the 
interest of the ruling party, displacing ethnic interest represented by for example, the 
PTCA or the ABSU. 
 
Panchayat institutions are an ideal way of recognising the authority of local leaders, 
as well as legitimising patronage networks, which despite the introduction of 
modernisation remained as the most important ways of decision-making and 
redistribution at the local level in India. Hence, within Assam heterogeneous districts 
such as Goalpara or Krokajhar face considerable structural problems. The strong 
influence of the State Ruling Party and the way in which resource allocation is decided, 
in addition to the appropriation of funds by elites with no intend to redistribute 
undermine the opportunity of ethnic elites within heterogeneous districts of taking 
control of the village needs, and deciding upon investment and resource allocation. It 
also considerably affects the perception of trust between Assamese and Bodo elites. 
The ‘common people’ do not trust the leaders as the record of delivery in promised 
transactions is meagre. The Bodo leaders, elected to the reserved seats have no 
power over resource allocation or decision-making. Furthermore, although the 
reserved seats have been guaranteed over the period of time covered in this analysis, 
for the Bodos it is simply not enough as it defeats the objective of taking control of their 
own affairs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
There is also another form of Panchayats which continue to be fully informal (Pur, 
2007). Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) remain to be prevalent in rural 
India, they are inter-caste institutions with functional, oppressive and progressive 
features (Pur, 2007, p. 402). Thus, the distribution that can be captured through both 
institutionalised and informal patronage networks is limited for the Bodo community. 
The formal Panchayats are captured by the Assamese whose power determines 
decision-making, and they remain unwilling to increase the shares of the pie. The Bodo 
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patronage line does not have a significant access to public and/or private good 
distribution. 
 
Moreover, funds allocated by the State of Assam to district councils have been 
reported to be unduly and development programs to be meagre (Sharma, 2006). 
There is perception of corruption along the district councils which further enhances 
demands for autonomy within Bodo dominated districts as per the inclusion of Bodos 
in the Sixth Schedule. Patronage networks at the India state level have proven to be 
effective in preventing violence by redistributing goods informally (Kenny, 2011) , thus 
they way in which these networks operate differ from state to state. 
 
 
2. 1975-1986: Second round of bargaining. PTCA and ABSU political demands: The 
road towards complete radicalization and the use of violence.  
 
This period is marked by three main events: the withdrawal of support to the PTCA by 
ABSU in 1979, the splintering of the PTCA into two different groups and the 1985 
Assam accords. By the end of the 1960’s decade, the ABSU highly supported the 
PTCA; thus, the mishandling of the Udayachal demand by the PTCA propelled the 
ABSU into withdrawing its support by 1979. The PTCA softened its demands and 
gradually distanced itself from ethno-nationalist goals (Saika, 2011), the ABSU highly 
condemned this and pre-empted the intentions of the PTCA to succumb to Assam 
power politics in 1984.  
 
In 1967 when the PTCA was formally created to address the claims of the plain tribals, 
a memorandum was sent to Indira Ghandi for the creation of an autonomous region 
(Chadha, 2005). The hopes of the PTCA to gain concessions on this demand were 
lost when in 1971 the Reorganisation Act of Assam was published with no reference 
to the Bodo issue. The demands were hardened by 1973 when PTCA with the support 
of ABSU demanded the creation of the Union state of Udayachal (Pathak, 2012) 
(Saika, 2011) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Dash, 1989) (Ray & Agrawal, 1994). A 
state that would be majority Bodo but that will embrace other tribal minorities from the 
plains in the north valley of the Brahmaputra river.  
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Thus, by 1977 the PTCA made an announcement stating that they were giving up on 
the Udayachal demand, and instead they were pursuing a campaign for an 
autonomous territory (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) (Chadha, 2005). The Bodo movement 
had witnessed some quiet years since the 1974 protests; hence, despite the 
passiveness of the movement during this years, the statement put forward by the 
PTCA infuriated both the hardliners of the PTCA and ABSU itself (Ray & Agrawal, 
1994).  This resulted in the division of the PTCA into two different groups: the 
remaining PTCA and the PTCA-P progressive in 1979 (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) 
(Chadha, 2005). The remaining PTCA joined the Assamese ministry and gave up its 
demands, this was interpreted by the hardliners and by ABSU like a gesture of 
disloyalty.  
 
As stated earlier, Charan Narzary joined the legislative assembly and Samar Brahma 
Choundry became Forest Minister (Brahma, 2008) (Nath, 2014). This appointment 
and in fact, the Narzary election were a product of the Assamese elite efforts to include 
the PTCA leadership in government. However, the deals between first, the Janata 
party in 1977 and then the AGP party and the PTCA in 1985 were interpreted by the 
Bodo movement as betrayal. In fact, the ABSU considered Samar Brahma Choudhry 
as “the most treacherous, opportunists and crooked (with devil mastermind) fellow” 
(Nath, 2014, p. 30). Both hard-line PTCA and the ABSU considered that the remaining 
PTCA where effectively ‘bought’ into by the Janata government. They thought the  
Assamese was providing both private and public goods to alienate this portion of the 
PTCA (Misra, 1989). Consequently, Samar Brahma and Narzary were accused of 
‘drifting into corruption practices’ (Mullick, 2001). In this regard, the access to potential 
patronage funds in the eyes of the PTCA remained at the top level, across the elites 
rather than spilling further down the line.  
 
ABSU and PTCA-P aligned themselves in 1979 forming a new political force (Misra, 
1989) (Butler & Gallagher Cunningham, 2011). By 1980 the first demand of the 
coalition was put forward to Indira Ghandi. The relationship with the Assamese elite 
was broken since the 1974 protests and the lack of trust product of the Language 
policy bargains. Therefore, in the same vein as the Udayachal demands, this bargain 
claim was send directly to the India State government. The demand was once again, 
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for a separate union state which they named: Mishing Bodoland (Ray & Agrawal, 
1994) (Misra, 1989). 
 
The ABSU was interested in unifying a stronger movement. The Mishing Bodoland 
project did not take effect because the bargain between Bodos vs non Bodos71 
became predominant. Particularly, the ABSU failed to bring together the other plain 
tribals (Nath, 2008) and instead decided to campaign for a Bodo unitary state; 
therefore, the coalition between ABSU and the PTCA-P stopped campaigning for it.  
Thus, the ABSU in its interest for a more unified Bodo organised movement; prepared 
a convention in 1984 to discuss Bodo issues. A new political group was born product 
of this convention: the UTNLF (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) (Butler & Gallagher 
Cunningham, 2011)72. This new group distanced itself from collective plain tribal 
interests, and instead focused attention on Bodo issues.  
 
Meanwhile, the turn towards ethno political goals by the Bodos also sparked 
resentment along the Assamese population in regards of outland immigration into 
Assam. As such, the Bengal immigration problem not only affected the Bodos but also 
it sparked fears amongst the Assamese ruling elite (Baruah, 1986). By 1979 the 
Assamese elite was also focused on their own ethno nationalist worries. The AASU –
All Assamese Students Union-  organised a series of peaceful protests to raise 
awareness of the illegal immigration into Assam (Misra, 1989), their demands were for 
‘detection, disenfranchisement and deportation of foreigners” (Baruah, 1986, p. 1192). 
There was good popular support but conceding for the Indian State government was 
costly. Thus, the Indian government whilst recognising the power of the Assamese 
anti-immigration movement73 conceded on several aspects. The bargain culminated 
in 1985 with the Assam accords (Baruah, 1986) (Misra, 1989).  
 
                                                      
71 Some minority groups became dissatisfied with the Bodo predominance in the ethnic issues within the north 
Brahmaputra valley region. The Mishing Bodoland sparked initial unity between both ethnic groups. However, 
the Mishings soon became reluctant to accept a Bodo leadership in the matter. The Bodos always had it clear 
and were just attempting to gather more support (Misra, 1989).  
72 Thus, (George, 1994) states that in 1984 the PTCA did not unify but split to form the UNTLF 
73 This process of bargaining lasted 6 years. The Indian elite gradually recognised the need for conceding. See: 
(Baruah, 1986) 
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The results of the AASU and their bargaining with the Indian State government raised 
the hopes of the Bodos as they witnessed significant concessions to the ethnic 
Assamese (George, 1994). The accord also shuffled the Assamese elites in power 
which made the Bodos think they had further opportunities of negotiating their claims 
as new elites could mean a change of players. Thus, when the excitement of the 
Accord had passed, they soon realised the new government was not very different 
from the past one (Dhar, 2014) 
 
This sentiment of dissatisfaction, low credibility and discrimination launched the ABSU 
into a period of violence marked by the 92 points charter demands and the 1988 
creation of the BdNF. 
 
ABSU completeness of radicalisation and use of violence as a strategy to succeed in 
the demand for the state of ‘Bodoland’. 
 
The radicalisation of the ABSU and the decision to take up arms is a product of the 
failed bargains preceding the 92 charter of demands put forward in 1988. The PTCA 
and ABSU (and earlier on the BSS) in representation of the Bodos, via legal and 
peaceful means attempted constantly to raise their concerns and create a dialogue to 
put their demands on the table and receive some sort of room for negotiation. Thus, 
on the part of the Assamese elite and the regional government they received mediocre 
concessions which didn’t meet their interests. When the Bodos further claimed, the 
Assamese responded with force and denial.   
 
In this vein, when the channels of demand were depleted and commitment between 
the elites was at its low; the Bodos directed the bargain demands towards the Indian 
elite. The Indian elite did not even acknowledge the Bodo concerns. In turn, it 
completely ignored their demands and undermined their pleas by conceding to other 
groups in Assam. 
 
The relative deprivation on economic, political and social-cultural aspects became 
subjective when the movement witnessed several attempts to claim for equality and 
in return discrimination took a stronger effect. For the Bodos there was no other choice 
but to take up arms. The initial spells of violence were a display to force the Indian 
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elites into taking their demands seriously, though the main interest was not to fight a 
fully-fledged civil war but to pressure the government into bargaining. The Bodos did 
not have the potential to defeat the Assamese state forces, let alone the Indian federal 
government. However, as the frustration intensifies and also the violence increases 
the movement starts realising that the only way towards reaching their demands is by 
fighting.   
 
3. 1986-93: Period of heighten armed violence, culminating in 1993 with the third 
bargain failure. (1988 inflexion point: ABSU demand for Bodoland and creation 
of the BdNF) 
 
In 1987 the ABSU under the leadership of Upendra Nath Brahma submits a 92 point 
charter of demands to federal and national authorities (Brahma, 2014) (Chadha, 2005) 
(George, 1994) (Mwshahary, 2004). For the state of Assam it was sent to the Chief 
Minister of Assam on the 1st January 1987; nationally, it was submitted to the then 
Prime Minister Indira Ghandi and also to the Home Minister of India: Buta Singh and 
to the President of India Sri. Giani Jail Singh (Brahma, 2014). The 92-point charter 
was a collection and socio-political, economic and cultural demands which embraced 
or collected all the sources of grievances and discriminations as perceived by the 
Bodos74.  Despite the absence of trust between the ABSU and the Assam or Indian 
government the ABSU advocated initially for a peaceful approach to highlight and 
communicate their demands. The strength of the ‘chain of command’ within both PTCA 
and ABSU meant that violence was efficiently controlled in the leadership of the 
movement75. Thus, the position of peaceful means was about to be discarded in 1987 
after the death of a Bodo student by the police and the 18Th ABSU Annual conference.   
 
In 1988 in the District of Dhubri, ABSU was preparing for its 18th Annual Conference. 
During this meeting amongst ABSU leaders and sympathisers a significant decision 
                                                      
74 27 of these demands are related to Language issues. There are other several demands that relate to the 
plain tribals in general. (Misra, 1989) 
75 This poses a significant difference with Thailand and the displacement of elites within the Malay districts. 
The Malays lacked a central chain of command, in turn the movement was dispersed with no visible head. It 
has been described as some sort of terrorist organisation. The Bodos in turn had a strongly organised and 
respected organisation  
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was made to discard 89 points of the 92-point charter and focus just on three main 
political points. The three main demands were:  
 
1. Creation of a Regional Council for non-Karbi tribes angling Autonomus Council. 
2. Creation of autonomous council for the Tribals living in the southern part of the 
Brahamaputra valley; and, 
3. Creation of a separate state with the status of Union Territory on the Northern Bank of 
the Brahmaputra river for the plain tribes of Assam. (Mullick, 2001) (George, 1994) 
(Dash, 1989) (Misra, 1989) 
 
 
Besides the narrowing of demands, during the Conference it was decided as well to 
create the BPAC: Bodo People’s action committee. The aim of the BPAC was to serve 
as a ‘people’s organisation’, solidifying the base of the movement (Chadha, 2005). 
ABSU was conscious of the need of popular support and cohesion, they realised that 
without it, the authorities were simply not going to pay attention to their demands. 
ABSU also was clear about the possibility of drawing the movement to the streets for 
parades, blockages, hunger protests, Mass rallies amongst other repertories of 
contention (Chaklader, 2004). These protests were even held in Delhi in various 
opportunities commencing even since 1987 (Mwshahary, 2004). In fact, the 
achievements of the ABSU could not have been made possible without the BPAC. 
The embodiment of the demands was reflected in the campaign slogan: ‘divide Assam 
50/50’, which also for the first time claim the lands as mainly Bodo by naming it 
‘Bodoland’76. It is remarkable to mention however, the division amongst moderates 
and extremists; the moderates continue to demand a union territory, whereas the 
extremist (embodied also in the mass movement) demanded the separate state of 
Bodoland (Chaklader, 2004) (Misra, 1989). 
 
This period is marked by heighten violence thus, the strategies implemented by BPAC 
and ABSU to pressure the central government were initially not intended to be violent, 
                                                      
76 As noted earlier, the bargains between non- Bodos and Bodos were also taking place at this time. The non-
Bodo community conformed an organisation representing different plain tribal groups which were not Bodos 
and who opposed a Bodo dominated state. Furthermore, within the official talks between the Assam 
government and ABSU it was stated that ABSU with its use of violence upon 1989 was forcibly attempting to  
establish hegemony over  all the other plain tribes (Misra, 1989) 
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in fact the movement pointed out the idea of ‘following Gandhi’s path of non-violence 
(Hira Moni, 2009) (George, 1994) (Chaklader, 2004). The organisations knew their 
impossibility to win if violence was the main strategy. Hence, the Assam state 
repressed harshly which in turn motivated the Bodos to use armed violence (Chadha, 
2005). (Misra, 1989) significantly disagrees with this, stating that the ABSU purposely 
used violence to ‘attract central attention as well as to establish itself as the most 
powerful plains tribal organisation in the state’ (Misra, 1989, p. 1147). 
 
Nonetheless, since before the period of state repression -1989-1993-, both the 
Assamese state leadership and the Indian elite were open to discussion and 
negotiation upon the receipt of the ABSU memorandums of demands.  In 1987 and 
1988 there were a series of bipartite talks between the Assamese elite and the 
leadership of the ABSU, thus they proved to be fruitless (Dhar, 2014). The response 
from the government, despite its openness to dialogue was not positive (Saika, 2011). 
(Mwshahary, 2004) points out that these two bipartite talks were taken by the state of 
Assam as ‘mockery’. One of the Assam representatives: the Home Minister, failed to 
show up to the subsequent meetings, which was seen by the ABSU leadership as a 
lack of commitment and disrespect. This further undermined the perceived credibility 
of the commitment of the Assamese to respond positively to the Bodo demands, the 
failure of these talks and the subsequent events contributed to the bid for violent action 
amongst the ABSU leadership.   
 
Initially, the ABSU – BPAC strategy was to threaten and pressure the Assam 
government by calling the movement into Bandhs –general strikes-. The strategy was 
to increase the time lapse of the bandhs progressively if the Assam government did 
not call for a serious formal meeting, the ultimate goal however by this time, was to 
achieve the creation of a separate state by 1990 (Hira Moni, 2009, p. 116) 
(Mwshahary, 2004). The first round of tripartite talks in 1988 was a product of a 1000 
hour bandh (Mwshahary, 2004). After a series of strikes and protests, the Assam and 
Indian government agreed to hold a negotiation meeting with the leadership of ABSU. 
The talks were held in New Delhi in August 1987. ABSU and BPAC had a strong chain 
of command, which initially kept the strikes peaceful as their intention was to pressure 
but not to fight. Thus, this gradually changed when the leadership condemned state 
repression and supported the use of violence.   
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The use of mass movement mobilisation on the side of the Bodos decreased the trust 
between the parties before and after the series of talks. Despite the Bodo mass 
movement being initially peaceful in its demonstrations, the Assamese elites were left 
with a sense of unpredictability and mistrust; as the Bodo leadership could change the 
curse or intensity of protest and strikes at any given moment77.  This is perhaps a 
product of the ABSU’s strategy of gradually increasing the duration of Bandhs, it 
successfully pressured the Assamese and the Indian elites to dialogue, but the sense 
of commitments were so far at its lowest. The subsequent use of state repression to 
contain the protests, strikes and rallies further undermined the credibility of the 
commitments to negotiation and concessions on the Assamese side.    
 
The first ever rally in Guwahati 1987, sparked some violence by Assamese 
youngsters, the victims sought attention with the police. The aftermath of the rally left 
one Bodo student with a head injury inflicted by the police and he later died. This 
episode led to the first Bodo martyr: Sujit Narzary (Hira Moni, 2009) (Mwshahary, 
2004). The police released without charges the other Bodo participants who were 
arrested as a product of the violence that broke out. Hira Moni further points out that 
this initial stage of the mass movement ‘definitely shaped the further course of action 
for ABSU’ (Hira Moni, 2009, p. 119). 
 
The death of Sujit Narzary in 1987 along with the frequency and intensity of rallies and 
strikes, the growing sentiments of anger on the side of the Bodos embodied in the 18th 
annual conference (1988), the willingness of the police to control violence and their 
sentiments of anger and devastation inevitably led to violent episodes sparked by the 
animosity, lack of trust and misinterpretations on both sides of the bargain. The 
Assamese police was it is ‘right’ to control episodes of violence by using force, thus, 
the force used was excessive and was also inspired by sentiments of animosity 
embedded in ethnicity. On the side of the Bodos, despite their initial non-willingness 
to fight a fully-fledged war78 the creation of information asymmetries came from the 
extreme feelings of anger which had been fuelled since the 1960s, violence on their 
                                                      
77 Mass movement was indeed a powerful tool to have. 
78 They were not armed, they did not have to this point any access to fire arms. Nor they had any sort of 
financing plan. 
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side was starting to be used as a means and during this period culminated with bomb 
explosions and acts of destruction (George, 1994). Thus, although violence was 
initially used as a way to pressure the government, it later took the form of main 
strategy. The mistrust created from this bargain between the mass movement and the 
Assam government embodied in the security authorities, significantly affected both the 
conditions for negotiation in 1993 in the creation of the BAC – Bodo Autonomous 
Council- and also increased the use of violence on each side.  
 
The solidification of the mass movement is a product of the minor accommodation of 
the language policies and an eloquent mismatch of demands and rights between the 
groups, which were sparked by the death of Sujit Narzary and the conclusions of the 
ABSU 18th annual conference. After the death of Sujit Narzary, ABSU increases the 
bid on the use of violence, changing the discourse and withdrawing from the initial 
Gandhian inspiration.  
 
In this vein, 1989 to 1993 is regarded as the period of heighten Bodo violence which 
also inspires the creation of the NdFB –Bodo democratic front-. The beginning of 1989 
witnessed the violent turn in the mass movement (Mwshahary, 2004) (Chadha, 2005). 
The sustained strategy of ABSU of holding rallies and strikes was seen as a threat to 
the authorities who heavily repressed in a will to maintain order. Both sides inflicted 
significant use of force, the Bodo targeted civilians in some instances and they were 
themselves victims of police brutality. There are reports of torture, arbitrary arrest, 
sexual violence against Bodo women and extrajudicial killings. On the side of the 
Bodos there are reports of bombs on trains and bridges, ambushes, overriding of 
military camps; and against civilians reports of attacks to non-Bodo villages killing 
children and women, extortions and damage to private and public property (Chaklader, 
2004) (Saika, 2011). 
 
For instance, in 1990 two bombs exploited in railway tracks. One between Binji and 
Chapakhata and the other one between Sesapani and Fakirgram in the district of 
Krokajhar killing 15 people and injuring 50 more (Misra, 1989) (George, 1994). The 
year continued with episodes of violence and state repression, having its peak during 
1989 (see graph). This further pushed the Indian Federal Government to intervene 
and hold a series of tripartite talks which will culminate in the 1993 peace accord. The 
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1993 peace accord is regarded as the zenith of inexistent credible commitment 
between the parties.  It effectively reflects the reliance of the Indian and Assamese 
elite on producing purely formal concessions with no will to address the real problems. 
 
It also reflects the unwillingness to redistribute shares of the pie with Bodo elites. The 
concessions are – somehow- present formally but it is just that. Furthermore, the lack 
of informality and the excessive reliance on formal agreements and rules led the 
Bodos into major dissatisfaction and further use of violence.  
 
Figure 2. State repression and rebel violence.  
 




Upon 1992 there were around 8 rounds of negotiation but no actual agreement on any 
side. The Assamese did not commit to the talks and the Bodos instead used violence 
to voice their discontent. The talks finally reached an agreement in 1993 thus as 
mentioned above, the agreement was not enforced and the non-adoption of the points 
agreed led the Bodos into further violence leading to the death of 100 people on both 





The India case of the Bodo ethnicity depicts a three way elite bargain which after 
repetitive failures due mainly to lack of credible commitments reached a point of 
systematic violence upon the denial of bargaining demands. Structurally the formal 
aspect of the bargain seems to be more relevant in this particular case. The Bodos, 
focused on demands to the government campaigned for the recognition of the cultural 
rights and their difference as an ethnicity. The movement was commanded by the 
middle class and the demands focused initially on the cultural aspect. Despite 
economic deprivation and economic neglect of the Bodo predominant districts the 
trigger of the conflict was based on the language policies of the 1960s. During the 
1970s- 1990s the demands also focus on the economic and political dimensions as 
the movement gives rise to the PTCA and the ABSU. The access to informal 
distribution seems to be meagre and for those members who were able to capture 
funds it is likely the distribution remained at the top without reaching the lower ends of 
the vertical line. However, the informal aspect is thought to be less relevant in 
contributing to the conflict as compared with the formal one. Perhaps this 
differentiation is also dependent on the focus of the demands, for the Bodo case 
cultural and political rather than economic. 
 
Furthermore, the informal mechanisms also fail to produce any benefits due to the 
ineffectiveness of the local Panchayats. Economic reassurance and in essence buying 
off the opposition encourage the constituencies not to fight as the inclusion is 
perceived informally rather than formally. Thus, the Panchayats highly underfunded 
and with resources that get invested not in the Bodo priorities do not have the capacity 
to maintain content the population. Furthermore, the functioning of the Panchayats 
and also other institutions within Assam are seen by the Bodos as highly corrupt and 
untrustworthy; this means that, for the Bodos the perception of non-redistributive 
patronage is salient which can also influence the sentiments of exclusion and 








Recognition of Traditional Authority 
 
 
Results obtained from the fsQCA analysis position Namibia as a most likely case of 
peace according to the mechanisms evaluated. The score for the informal mechanism 
shows a strong presence of patronage distribution at 0.76. Being a most likely case, 
Namibia has the potential of updating the confidence in the effectiveness of the 




Southern Africa represents a region of the African continent which has been 
substantially disputed by European colonial powers. Its geostrategic point has been 
appreciated by European colonial administrations since the 1400’s and the co-optation 
of different Spice routes. Namibia, located just above South Africa and in what was 
previously called South West Africa, was a German colony between 1884 and 1919. 
In 1919 with the German loss of the First World War, South West Africa was put under 
control of the British by a League of Nations mandate. Upon 1919, The British annexed 
South West Africa to South Africa who came to rule the territory until its independence 
in 1990. Consequently, what came to be known as the Namibia nation-state is a 
product of European interference, as well as South African post-independence rule.  
 
These historical features stage Namibia as a complex yet very interesting case to 
evaluate the presence and strength of informal mechanisms of distribution which are 
set to influence the peacefulness of independent Namibia. It portraits an ethnically 
diverse region which is fragmented along 8 main different ethnic groups. Within each 
group there are also further divisions along different clans. Despite known ethnic 
issues, Namibia in comparison to other countries has managed to avoid violent conflict 
as a course of action for resolving ethnic disputes. It resembles a case of ethnic 
 171 
political inclusion and a success story in the recognition of traditional chiefs and 
embedded patronage networks. 
 
Namibia is home to 8 broad ethnic groups which have historically controlled areas of 
the country. These groups are further divided or conformed by different communities. 
Each community has its own chief and its own set of rules. For the Ovambo for 
example, which controls the northern part of the country there is a collection of at least 
6 major communities: Ondonga, Ukuanyama, Ukuambi, Ongandjera, Ukualuthi and 
Ombalantu (Cooper, 2001)  along with some other minor tribes.  
 
Figure 1. Political map of Namibia 
 




Since the early XX century the territory of what is now Namibia was divided by two 
thirds south by a red line which separated the white settlements from the aboriginal, 
‘backward’ original settlers. The zone to the south; the police zone was almost cleared 
from ethnic settlers (apart from Hereros and Nama and other minor groups) and 
communities in the north were forbidden from crossing the red line. Ethnic members 
could only cross if they were required as labour. Part of the reason why the police 
zone was created was due to the inability of the Germans to capture the powerful 
Ovambo and Kavango dominated territories (Werner, 1993). They therefore, created 
the zone in order to protect areas of influence of the railway and railroads (p.5).  
 
The colonial powers granted autonomy to the ethnic groups. As far as the police zone 
was protected they did not care about intervening in local ethnic affairs. This is further 
sustained by the Odendaal Commission which in the 1960s established homelands 
for the different ethnic groups. The commission’s objective was to fully establish 
apartheid policies in the Namibian territory, by that time South West Africa (Werner, 
1993). As cited by Werner (1993) the commission had no interest on economic 
development thus, ‘development would best prevail if homeland residents ‘were not 
unsettled unnecessarily by disrupting their existing strong traditional family and 
homeland ties’ (Werner, 1993, p. 12). 
 










Elite bargains across different ethnicities in Namibia 
 
The Ovambo group represents the majoritarian group in Namibia, it is also one of the 
most powerful groups. As mentioned above, the colonial powers mainly respected the 
traditions and recognised the power of certain ethnicities. They remained subject to 
colonial power but nonetheless autonomous. Different groups held different 
relationships to the colony, furthermore, they also in some instances had animosity 
relations amongst each other in regards, mainly, to land disputes.  
 
The legacy of the colonial period and the introduction of the modern nation-state led 
to a process of recognition of traditional authority. The present chapter aims at 
explaining how and why the recognition of Traditional Leadership led to peaceful 
problem solving across different ethnic groups. Furthermore, it demonstrates how 
 174 
chieftainship and patronage as informal institutions led to the dispute of ethnic issues 
within the formal state structures (this includes disputes between different groups and 
between groups and the government elites); and how the state is effectively seen as 
a neutral guarantor despite being an Ovambo majority government. The process to be 
analysed is the formalisation of informality starting throughout the South African 
colonial period and culminating in the instauration of the Traditional Authorities Act 
and the Traditional Authorities Council in the mid 1990s.  
 
There has been recognised agreement amongst the academia in regards of the effect 
of political inclusion and power-sharing structures. Thus understudied; ethnic inclusion 
explanations of conflict avoidance point out to the idea that those countries in which 
the majority of the ethnically relevant countries share power there is a decreased 
possibility of conflict onset. Thus, despite the intuitive accuracy in this prediction, a 
substantial political argument has been left unexplained. Political inclusion is unlikely 
to be the only mechanism relevant for achieving peaceful trajectories. In fact, there 
are cases in which there has been agreed power-sharing amongst ethnically relevant 
groups yet conflict is still present, for example in Mali or Senegal (See QCA chapter).  
 
In this regard, the peacefulness of the Namibian state is explained not only by political 
inclusion but also by the huge role patronage networks came to play in political 
decision-making and economic distribution. The case study analysis of Namibia is 




1. 1919 to 1989: studying the colonial background of South West Africa. This period 
analyses the alliances and animosities between the colonial settlers and some of the 
ethnic communities, as well as, the initial points of recognition of Traditional 
Leadership. 
2. 1990 – 1994: evaluates independent Namibia and the establishment of the rules of the 
game: in particular, the road towards the recognition of Traditional Leadership under 
the SWAPO government and some of its advantages. 
3. 1995 – present: the official formalisation by the proclamation of two key pieces of 
legislation: The Traditional Authorities Act and the Regional Council Act.  
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Two working hypotheses come to light: 
 
1. The recognition of Traditional Authorities through a process of formalisation created a 
hybrid political system which enhanced legitimacy of the nation-state formal structures. 
2. Ethnic disputes are brought forward to the Namibian state as a product of the 
recognition of Traditional Leadership in the form of indirect rule.  
 
 
1. 1919 – 1989: Traditional Authorities and the Colonial Administration: Elite 
bargains of co-optation and dissuasion  
 
Previous intervention of foreign colonial interests, Namibia as many countries in Africa 
and other parts of the world was ruled by ethnic groups in head of chiefs and headmen. 
Their authority is recognised as an autochthonous form of government. The chiefs and 
headmen have ultimate power in decision-making pertaining allocation of funds, 
development projects and even other personal aspects of life such as marriage and 
death. They are also recognised as patrons as they provide or are responsible for the 
safety of the community, receive and exchange gifts with members of the community 
or other communities, and foremost distribute goods along the community.  
 
Different ethnic groups have different set of informal rules in accordance to their 
different traditions. Thus, rules are not written and are sanctioned by the chief. The 
strength of the different chiefs changes depending on their quality of governance and 
their charisma and personality. For the eight broad ethnic groups in Namibia the 
relationship with the colonial administration was outstandingly different (Werner, 
1993). In fact, each chief saw the arrival of colonial commanders with their own 
particularistic interest. Each chief from each community played its game of power in 
no different way as the feuds played the game in Europe, they acted foremost to 
protect their interests (Cooper, 2001). The political game between the different groups 
and within the different clans in each group within Namibia resembled a highly 
sophisticated political game.  
 




The colonial authorities treated the communities and their chiefs outstandingly 
different depending on their political and economic interest in the area. As mentioned 
above, communities within the ‘Police zone’ were massacred and evicted from the 
area (Kossler, 2007) (Forrest, 1994) (Keulder, 2010), whereas communities in the 
Northern part of South West Africa were dealt with via negotiation or again, eviction 
and murder if they did not wish to cooperate.  
 
The relationship of the colonial administration with the Ovambo group in the North part 
of Namibia was not different. Despite being the majoritarian group, the Ovambo did 
not receive any preferential treatment. The same rules of the game applied when the 
colonial authorities reached this area; the different tribes within the Ovambo group had 
different relationships with the colonial authorities and with other sources of power 
such as the Christian Missions79.  
 
Cooper’s analysis on Ovambo politics in the XX Century (2001) clearly illustrates this 
pattern and demonstrates how each community decided to align or not with the 
colonial authorities to defend its political and economic interest. The Ukuanyama and 
the Odonga communities were the strongest players as they represented most the 
population in the Ovambo area. 
 
King Mandume from the Ukunayama community was a strong chief, he had refused 
to collaborate with Portuguese and British forces in the past and kept on defending 
the autonomy of his people in Ovamboland. In 1911 he expelled all foreign traders 
from his territory (SWAPO, 1980) , in 1917 he fomented a revolt against the 
Portuguese (Melber, n.d.). Hence, since 1916 the colonial forces were conspiring to 
assassinate him as his power was regarded as a challenge to the colonial interests. 
He had continuously refused to send men to seek employment in the Police zone, 
arguing that he needed them to raid cattle and to defend the sovereignty of the region 
(Cooper, 2001), furthermore he refused to submit to the colonial demands. The truth 
of his death has been contested, some say he was assassinated by the colonial 
commanders in battle, other stories point out at him taking his own life (Cooper, 2001) 
                                                      
79 The Ovambo were majorly Christians. 
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(Hayes, 1993) (Hayes, 1997). Thus, King Mandume represents a venerated freedom 
fighter in Namibia and foremost illustrates how the Chiefs of the communities were 
highly respected and represented a key element of power. His death dates back to 
1917 (Hayes, 1993). 
 
As a game of political power between the different communities was in place given the 
differences in power between different clans, there were some communities who 
supported the colonial authorities in the conspiracy against King Mandume. The 
Odonga community80 for example, in the head of Chief Martin of Odonga who was 
following his own political agenda, decided to support the military mission against 
Mandume (Cooper, 2001). Chief Martin of Odonga provided circa a 100 men to raid 
King Mandume. The Ukunayama were left with no leader to follow after the death of 
King Mandume. Because of this, the colonial administration appointed an European 
officer with the rank of ‘Assistant Native Commissioner’. His task was to advice and 
guide the Ukunayama community into the political and bureaucratic system employed 
by the whites (Cooper, 2001). It was the beginning of an indirect form of rule to control 
the Ukunayama clan. 
 
Many of the tribal rules were evaluated and those who contradicted the colonial law 
were abolished. However, the Native Commissioner mostly did not interfere in local 
affairs, the ruling system implied that the native communities were free to decide their 
own affairs. In other words, they were free to carry on with their political and decision-
making systems as long as they did not interfere with the colonial interests (Dobler, 
2014) .In this regard, the colonial administration partly respected and recognised the 
informal institutions which ruled the Ovambo community. It was in their interest to 
safeguard loyalty coming from the Chiefs and not to spoil this by heavily interfering in 
their local affairs.  
 
For the Odonga clan, Chief Martin of Odonga had strong interests in forging a political 
alliance with the colonial authorities. Within Ovamboland, the Ukunayama were the 
strongest community amongst the Ovambo ethnicity; thus, Chief Martin wanted to 
                                                      
80 The Odonga and Ukunayama to data have a conflicting relationship. In 2015 the High Court of Namibia 
produced a judgement on a border dispute dating back to 2004. For details see: High Court of Namibia Case 
No. A44/2013. Online: http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHCMD/2015/170.pdf 
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establish an Odonga superiority. Furthermore, as Cooper (2001) points out, Chief 
Martin had legitimacy issues associated to how he became Chief therefore, he also 
needed to associate with the colonial authorities to strengthen his own position within 
the Odonga community (p.181). His collaboration to the colonial authorities extended 
from military support, sending men to work in the Police zone through to providing 
informal intelligence information about local affairs and politics within other 
Ovamboland communities.  
 
Thus, with the decline of the Ukuyanama product of the assassination (or suicide) of 
King Mandume; King Iipumbu of Ukuambi became the most serious threat to the 
colonial administration in Ovamboland (Cooper, 2001). In 1932 he was also 
assassinated. The colonial authority had to make sure no serious opposition to their 
political interests was in place. Thus, this did not undermine the principle of non-
intervention in local affairs. If the chiefs were eliminated because they were perceived 
as a threat, a council of headmen was created and the rules that governed the society 
remained the same. The communities retained their autonomy in decision-making. 
Likewise, the Chiefs of cooperating communities were respected in their ability to 
make decisions following their traditions and seeking the best interests for the 
communities. In other words, clans who collaborated and those who did not were still 
administered according to their own decision-making structures. An illustrative 
example of this is the construction of dams by the colonial authority after the end of 
the 1920’s famine. 
 
During the end of the 1920s Namibia suffered a devastating drought which led to major 
famine all over the territory. Communities which were allies of the colonial 
administration had dams constructed as development projects to prevent future 
famine product of extended periods of drought. Thus, the whole decision-making 
process involving the construction of the dams was autonomous to the communities. 
Geographers were sent to the area to determine the most adequate locations for the 
dams. Despite the scientific advice of the geographers, the colonial commanders did 
not interfere with the decision of chiefs to locate the dams where geographically it was 
not adequate to do so (Cooper, 2001).  This furthermore exemplifies the recognition 
of the traditional authorities and their set of rules and procedures. The funds were 
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invested and the dams were constructed according to the will and rule of the chiefs 
and councils of headmen.  
 
Fast-forwarding into the formalisation of traditional leadership in Namibia in its final 
stages, this can be understood as a product of two laws: The Traditional Authorities 
Act (1995) and the establishment of the Traditional Authorities Council (1997). Thus, 
the roots of these two elements of formalisation can be traced back to the colonial 
period between the 1920’s and 1940’s. In particular, the traditional authorities Council 
is derived from the forms of government which were exercised when Chiefs were 
eliminated, as the case of the Ukunayama and the Ukuambi. According to Cooper 
(2001) the colonial administration felt more comfortable with those communities being 
ruled by councils lacking a chief. This solidified a form of indirect rule which later came 
to take form in the Traditional Councils Act. The advantage for the colonial authorities 
was twofold: efficiency and enforcement of their own rules.  
 
In regards of efficiency, the Chiefs are regarded as the deity of the tribe. Because of 
this, they rule their own time and govern at their own pace. This caused potential 
problems for the colony when decisions needed to be taken fast and in a certain period 
of time. Though they could not force the chiefs to respond in their set timelines. 
Furthermore, in regards of enforcement of colonial law, they were able to easily press 
for changes in tribal law, even for the most critical issues. Thus, in independent 
Namibia the authority of Traditional Leaders under the 1995 Act, respects and 
recognises the customary law of each one of the individual communities.  
 
Another significant issue in the recognition of Traditional Leadership during and after 
colonial times was the payment of salaries. The new Native Commissioner Eedes circa 
the 1940’s requested a formal payment of salaries for Ovamboland chiefs (Cooper, 
2001) (Keulder, 2010). His argument was based on long distance travel for meetings. 
Chiefs sometimes were encouraged to travel for meetings with European bureaucrats, 
however, the expenses of that journey were paid by themselves81. Thus, the official 
establishment of salaries for Chiefs was a very disputed matter. Some colonial officials 
                                                      
81 This is also a significant change in tribal law. Chiefs were traditionally forbidden from leaving their land. It 
was a gesture of abandonment. Thus, by the time the Councils were formed and the colonial authorities were 
planning on meetings in Windhoek mainly, this rule was completely abolished from most of the communities.  
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argued that paying salaries could lead to corruption and misappropriation of funds, 
and even jealousy amongst the headmen in the community. Others argued in favour, 
stating that the payment of salaries will provide legitimacy to the colonial order, a sort 
of co-optation mechanism. Hence, during Eedes period as Native Commissioner no 
salaries were paid to the chiefs. It was not until 1957 were salaries began to be paid 
and were regulated in 1995 with the Traditional Authorities Act in 1995. The payment 
of salaries fills in the loop of formalisation as the Chiefs are regarded as civil servants.  
 
 
SWAPO and the rise of traditional authorities – One Namibia, one nation 
 
The political landscape in South West Africa was starting to heat up. Increasing 
discontent with the Apartheid administration and the discrimination of Black 
communities was starting to take place. By the late 1950’s diverse organisations of 
Black nationalists were being spread along the South West Africa territory. These 
groups merged in 1960 to create an umbrella organisation: the SWAPO, South West 
Africa People’s Organisation (Forrest, 1994). 
 
SWAPO operated in bordering Angola and Zambia as well. In Namibia its zone of 
action was based in the north, in Ovamboland. Although the independence of Namibia 
was not a freedom struggle as in the other countries, the significance of SWAPO as a 
liberation movement is undeniable. UN resolution 435 of 1978 stressed the importance 
of the UN to assist a process of decolonisation and further democratic self-government 
in Namibia (Berridge, 1989) (Forrest, 1994), throughout the process, SWAPO was the 
ruling political force. Since the early 1960’s, SWAPO began establishing a bond with 
the Traditional Authorities, in fact, the recognition of SWAPO by both the general 
people and the Traditional Authorities was extensive (Cooper, 2001). 
 
SWAPO appealed to the public by its slogan One Namibia, One Nation. The objective 
of the organisation was to ‘unite all the people of Namibia, irrespective of race, religion, 
sex of ethnic origin, into a cohesive, representative, national political entity (…) to 
combat all reactionary tendencies of individualism, tribalism, racism, sexism and 
regionalism’ (Cooper, 2001, p. 284). Furthermore, a competing political organisation 
was also being formed. In 1978 South Africa organised the Turnhalle Constitutional 
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conference, within the conference an alliance of various political forces united into one 
organisation: the DTA, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. It was set as the opposition of 
the SWAPO and it aimed at safeguarding the interests of the colonial administration 
in the forthcoming political order. Some communities, like the Damaras, aligned with 
the DTA (Pauli, 2010) and others with SWAPO, like most of the Ovambo communities 
(Cranenburgh, 2006) as a result the country was highly polarised.  
 
SWAPO as a liberation movement also had an armed militancy. Those Traditional 
Authorities who did not support SWAPO were targeted with violence. In the process 
both chiefs, headmen and their families were assassinated. Thus, when it became 
apparent that independence was going to take effect a big deal of Traditional 
Authorities from across the territory of South West Africa came to support SWAPO. 
Upon the moment of decolonisation SWAPO had significant baseline support from 
Traditional Leaders and the general population.      
 
 
2. 1989-1994: Traditional Authorities under SWAPO, instances and advantages of 
formalisation  
 
SWAPO’s main political platform was the unification of all differences under a same 
national identity. Thus, upon independence the party started studying procedures to 
recognise traditional authorities and as such assess the possibility of decentralised 
ruling incorporating traditional authorities. For this matter, the government appointed 
a Commission to study retrospectively the plausibility of bringing back Traditional 
Leadership and incorporating it into formal governance structures. As Cooper (2001) 
points out, the appointed commission produced a report which highlights various 
aspects of the importance of Traditional Authorities in Namibia. In its conclusion, it 
remarks the necessity and viability of incorporating Traditional Leaders into formal 
structures of government. This gave way to the integration of Chiefs into formal 
politics. Thus, the integration of traditional leadership could only work if some sort of 
hybrid system was created. The institution needed to remain legitimate but also 
comply with formal rules of leadership. 
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Many challenges arose from the idea of incorporating Traditional Leadership into 
decentralised forms of government. Firstly, SWAPO had campaigned for one Namibia, 
one nation, implying a unique national identity. Recognising ethnic chiefs could only 
mean the fragmentation of that united identity and ideology. Secondly, some traditional 
rules contradict formal politics. Thus, a recognition of Traditional Authority could only 
imply the official recognition of informal institutions criteria such as selection process, 
sanctions and source of rules. In this regard, a system which both recognises 
customary law and traditional procedures and also regulates these rules needed to be 
created. In essence a hybrid system.  
 
A clear example of this pertains the selection of the Chiefs, exercised by succession 
or any other means which are based mainly on personal issues rather than by merit. 
Other examples include justice procedures and systems of punishment for felonies; 
as well as customary rules which contradict Human Rights practices. These traditional 
procedures needed to be recognised and enforced, but also sanctioned or regulated 
via formal political procedures. In this regard, a mandate was established pointing out 
to the constitution as being the predominant set of rules (Keulder, 2010). This utmost 
exemplifies the nature of the hybridity of the Namibian system.  
 
Analysing the first challenge of fragmenting the society by the recognition of Chiefs 
and ethnicity is a preoccupation that made sense. However, the fact that the struggle 
for independence was united and embraced in the ‘one Namibia nation’ campaign 
reflects the reality of all different discriminated ethnic groups against one common 
enemy: the colonial power and the Apartheid discriminatory system. Despite the 
Namibian independence being agreed and enforced by the UN resolution, for SWAPO 
the political campaign of one national identity implied the unification of the country for 
a common cause. All different ethnicities as heterogenic as the country is agreed on 
one common cause which was the rejection of the Apartheid. Further on, the unifying 
ideal started to wear off as the enemy was defeated. Differences across ethnicities are 
impossible to hide or ignore and the banner of ‘One Namibia, One Nation’ could only 
be maintained if ethnic differences were recognised.  
 
This was precisely SWAPO’s line of thought, to recognise differences but under a 
common umbrella: a Namibian nation. The strategy played well along the 
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communities. Afrobarometer survey data provides empirical evidence on the popular 
perception of Namibia as a unified nation, and also on the relevance of personal 
recognition of ethnic identity.  
 
Round one of the survey (1999) asks the public whether they agree or disagree with 
the following statements:  
1. You would want your children to think of themselves as (ethnic group). 
2. You would want your children to think of themselves as Namibian? 
3. It is desirable to create one united Namibian nation out of all the different groups who 
live in this country. 
 
The graph below shows the results of the Questions. It confirms the common will 
across the different communities of belonging both to their specific ethnicity and also 
of having a unified Namibian identity.  
 
Figure 1. Opinions on Identity in Namibia 
 
 
Source: Afrobarometer 1999 round. 
 
As the survey data shows in Figure 1. Opinions on identity in Namibia, Namibian 
population regard themselves both as Namibian and as part of their own ethnicity. A 












high percentage of respondents strongly agreed with the statement indicating that their 
children should also regard themselves as Namibian. This data is from 1999 almost 
10 years after independence and 4 years after the formalisation of traditional authority. 
Despite the strong debates about the danger of recognising ethnicity fearing the 
possibility of leading towards a fragmented society; the data shows the desire of the 
population of having a dual system in which ethnicity is recognised as a defining 
feature and also the recognition of a common national identity.    
 
SWAPO’s ideal of recognising ethnic differences and also of fomenting a Namibian 
common identity not only provided legitimacy across the formal and informal structures 
of the state, but also provided the link between heterogeneity and homogeneity. In 
other words, the recognition of heterogeneity served as a channel for bringing disputes 
into a homogenic system in which the Namibian state was seen as a neutral authority 
to resolve disputes82 instead of an enemy. Likewise, this also exemplifies the hybrid 
nature of the system in which both traditional sanctions and rules are recognised as 
well as formal legal-rational mechanisms for solving disputes.  
 
Afrobarometer survey data also provides empirical evidence on the legitimacy of both 
Traditional Leaders and formal Leaders like Government councillors. Responses in 
regards of the Question: “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of 
the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views?” 
illustrated in the following graph show that citizens who responded that they have 
contacted either their Traditional Leader or their Government councillor for solving an 
issue see the Leader which was contacted as legitimate, or as a plausible useful 







                                                      
82 Between different groups and between groups and the nation-state. Thus, SWAPO is regarded as highly 
Ovambo dominated.  
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Figure 2. Influential point of contact for problem-solving 
 
  
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 2,3,4,5,6.  
 
For those respondents who answered that they have contacted an influential person: 
often, sometimes or only once83, the data shows that Traditional Leaders are the 
preferred point of contact for solving disputes. However, the formal institutions, 
particularly since 2003 are increasingly regarded as plausible channels for conflict 
resolution. This foremost reflects the undisputable relevance of informal institutions in 
the form of Traditional Leadership, but also shows that the political system functions 
on the base of hybridity and recognition of diversity.  
 
Furthermore, despite traditional leaders being the preferred point of contact for 
problem-solving; the legitimacy which stems from the hybridity of the system is shown 
by the respondents’ recognition of the need for a government which is not entirely 
dependent on Traditional Leadership authority. 
 
                                                      

























Figure 3. Decisions by Traditional Authorities 
 
 
Source: Afrobarometer data rounds 1,2.  
 
As it can be inferred from Figure 3. Decisions by Traditional Authorities, most of the 
respondents in both rounds (1999, 2003) disapprove the idea of all decisions being 
made by their Chiefs or Traditional Authority representative. In this regard, graph 2 
and graph 3 provide evidence on two main factors. Firstly, the legitimacy of both 
institutional frameworks and secondly, the desire for a dual hybrid system in which 
Traditional leadership is preserved but also regulated by state institutions.  
 
The way in which a dual or hybrid system works would imply that disputes and conflicts 
are taken indirectly to the state by the Traditional Leaders. In other words, the 
mechanism of controlling violence is exercised by the formalisation process in which 
Chiefs and informal rules of the game are recognised by the state, and the absence 
of violence does not entirely respond to the formal inclusion or the presence of a 
pseudo-democratic political system. In this regard, the formal rules of the game are 
reflected in the type of the regime, a single party illiberal democracy. SWAPO and its 
political machinery is recognised as the main authority.  Despite current accusations 
of SWAPO’s autocratic practices, the party has had considerable political support. 



















SWAPO has retained significant majority in voting polls (Bauer, 2001). The political 
regime is recognised as a democracy and if not one of the most solid ones in Africa, 
thus, in reality SWAPO has undertaken increasing autocratic practices to retain power. 
 
The party is and remains an Ovambo majority. Thus, the leadership of the party has 
attempted to co-opt elites from the other ethnic groups by selecting members of 
different ethnicities for ministerial posts (Dusing, 2000). This ultimately represents 
formal political inclusion and distribution of political participation across the different 
ethnicities, with the aim of co-opting key political elites of ethnic minorities in order to 
prevent any meaningful divisive opposition.   
 
The illiberal democratic characteristic of the Namibia political regime has been 
reinforced by the absolute winning of the party in all general elections as well as some 
amendments made to the constitution along the process. SWAPO has made 
considerable attempts to hold onto power (Cranenburgh, 2006). One example that 
illustrates this is the amendments made to the constitution in regards of the selection 
and appointment of Governors for the 13 demarcated regions. Namibia is divided 
along 13 regions, since 2010 with reforms introduced by the Regional Governors 
Appointment Act, the elected president has the power to appoint the 13 Governors 
(Melber, et al., 2016). The reforms are likely to be brought to strengthen the hold on 
political power; thus, despite this the party continues to be visualised as multi-ethnic 
and the population seems accepting of SWAPO increasing autocratic practices. 
 
Furthermore, the selection of candidates for ministerial positions increasingly recruits 
candidates with a SWAPO activist background. According to (Melber, et al., 2016) 
between 2000 and 2010 a 100% of SWAPO candidates in cabinets were activists. 
Melber’s et al. argument relies on the increasing gerontocracy of the party and the lack 
of upward mobility. They point out to the average age of cabinets and in general 
political posts being representative of older generations and retaining political power 
in just one political elite (p.301). This ultimately means that power is concentrated in a 
small political elite, the one that rose with the independence process.  
 
Afrobarometer data also provides empirical evidence consistent with Melber et al. 
argument. Despite the integration of various ethnicities within government as an 
 188 
attempt to co-opt elites, there is still a feeling amongst the population of being treated 
differently. In other words, the formal mechanism of inclusion is present but the de 
facto feelings of the general population seem otherwise. Retrieving data from rounds 
1, 5, 6 of the Afrobarometer survey in regards of the question ‘How often are 
___________s [R’s Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government?’ one can see 
that across the different ethnicities there is a pattern of feeling mistreated by the 
government. Data from 1999 was crosstab with language spoken at home whilst data 
from 2008 and 2014 is crosstab with the ethnic group the Respondent feels belonging 
to. Taking this into account, from 1999 to 2008 the feelings of mistreatment rise 
steadily for all the ethnic groups except for the Kavango. In 1999 The government 
brought forward a reform which allowed Sam Nujoma the then president, to run for a 
third period (Cranenburgh, 2006) (Cooper, 2014). The reform was highly controversial; 
thus SWAPO still was able to secure the majority of the votes. It is possible that the 
rising sentiments of mistreatment are related to the grip on power SWAPO was able 
to achieve through the reforms. Overall there seems to be some discontent in the way 
the government treats the different ethnic groups. Thus, what is remarkable is the lack 
of violence or discontent with the government despite this being the case.  
 
 
Figure 4. Ethnic group treated unfairly by the Government  
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Source: Afrobarometer data round 1, 5, 6. 1999: data from language spoken at home. 
2008 and 2014 data from ethnic group. 
 
The data also reflects an interesting trend. Ovambos are the majoritarian group and 
are thought to be the core of the SWAPO party. The creation, establishment and 
baseline of SWAPO is Ovambo. Thus, surprisingly, this group also falls with the 
pattern of respondents feeling that sometimes their group is treated unfairly. 
 
Respondents in all the Afrobarometer rounds also pointed out towards the rejection of 
a one-party rule, yet again no significant discontent or violence has emerged despite 
these trends. This evidence could be pointing out to the effect Traditional Authorities 
and their recognition can have. This further shows that political inclusion goes beyond 
formal institutions and that democracy as such cannot be either responsible per se for 
peaceful solving of disputes amongst the different ethnicities.  
 
In this regard, notwithstanding the importance of the formal mechanisms of inclusion 
that SWAPO has implemented and the general sense of agreement with the 
government; the core elements which have been identified as potential sources of 
violent conflict are still present. Being Namibia highly heterogeneous and holding 
these triggers it is not just the effect of a ‘good’ inclusive government what has 
prevented the country from violence84, but also the relevance of other hidden 
mechanisms which put an extra effect on the prevention of violence. Ultimately, 
arguments are pointing out towards the recognition of Traditional Leadership as 
accounting for the legitimacy of the government, without legitimacy and the Traditional 
Leaders operating as a middle point between the formal government and the local 
communities, it is likely that conflict could have erupted in Namibia, particularly for 
those ethnicities which were historically undermined and excluded politically and 
economically.  
 
Talking about economic factors, the recognition of Traditional Authorities also had a 
significant impact in rural Namibia and in preventing inequalities from triggering 
violence. In terms of economic inequality, Namibia ranks amongst the most unequal 
                                                      
84 See below for Caprivi arguments. 
 190 
countries in the world, according to the Gini coefficient, for the mid 1990’s the Gini 
index has a score of 0.71 (Melber, 2007). The internal socio-economic cleavages are 
both between classes and also amongst ethnic groups, in other words both horizontal 
and vertical inequality. The stark inequalities can mostly be captured across rural and 
urban settings. Within Namibia, the formal state structures do not have a presence in 
rural areas, a characteristic that is shared with many other developing nations. In fact, 
rural communities remain unaffected by state policies and there is lack of state 
infrastructure within rural areas (hospitals, schools etc)  (Kaulder, 1997) (Dusing, 
2000). Thus, it is precisely the archaic forms of government such as Traditional 
Authorities that has come to fill in this gap. Duties such as division and mobilisation of 
labour, collection of taxes, decision-making in investment and even provision of health 
facilities have been provided by Traditional Authorities to this date. Furthermore, a 
staggering 60% of the population in Namibia lives on rural areas (Dusing, 2000, p. 
212).  Thus, this further confirms the relevance of the recognition and formalisation of 
traditional leadership. In this vein, the preservation and recognition of traditional 
leadership has therefore affected rural areas in several ways; but economically and 
most importantly,  with the formalisation process the Namibian state has incorporated 
and extended it’s state arm to the rural communities. 
 
The state has effectively used Traditional Leadership as a link between the formal 
central state leadership and the rural communities. This can be reflected in the 
involvement of Chiefs in targeted state development or poverty alleviation policies. 
Hence, without the recognition of Traditional Authorities this task would prove 
impossible. One possible example pertains another drought event in 1992. Since 
independence and during the process leading to formalisation and integration of 
Traditional Authorities, the Ministry of Agriculture integrated traditional leaders into the 
Land and Farming committee. Farmers were then selected by the Chiefs to receive 
subsidies (Dusing, 2000, p. 216). Without the Chief’s authorisation and decision-
making power, the allocation of funds would likely be inefficient. The representation of 
an effective administrative and political authority in rural areas means that the funds 
are allocated efficiently and they incorporate the needs of the population. Furthermore, 
the success of projects aimed at rural areas is also dependent on key chief leadership 
elements such as the control of the community labour and land allocation, both things 
only regulated by the Chiefs.  
 191 
 
Another potential example of extended state support dependent on traditional 
authorities are social services. As mentioned above, figures form 2015 report that 60% 
of the Namibian population resides in rural areas. The state of the health care sector 
is positive in comparison to other countries in the area, but its coverage is likely to be 
mainly urban. For example, WHO data reports 27 beds per 10000 population. It is 
likely that most of these beds are in urban areas. Thus, the number of nursing and 
midwifery personnel is good in comparison to other countries in the region. Nursing 
and midwifery personnel density per 1000 population reports 3.056 in 2004 and 2.775 
in 2007. Thus, once again, despite the good reports in personnel density it is still 
unlikely there are many hospitals in rural areas85. Furthermore, data on number of 
physicians is not very compelling, in 2004 there were 598 physicians; and in 2007, 
774. This roughly gives a density of 0.37 per 1000 population.  
 
In this regard, traditional medicine is formally supervised by Chiefs and Headmen in 
communities and it has come to fill the gap of health facilities in rural areas. One of 
the functions of Traditional Authorities refers to the register and administration of 
traditional healers (Cooper, 2001). The practice of Traditional healing becomes 
particularly relevant for this matter after independence (during the colonial period it 
was illegal). The number of recognised traditional healers is much greater than 
physicians and they are foremost located in rural areas (WHO, 2001). The Lumpkin 
Report published by WHO in 1994 certifies that there is at least 1 traditional medicine 
practitioner per 500 people in the Kavango and Ovambo region, 300 in the Caprivi 
region and 1 per a 1000 people in Windhoek (WHO, 2001). 
 
The process of formalisation implies that the Ministry of Health and Social Service 
regulates the practice of Traditional medicine, that is incorporating informal practices 
and customs into the state formal structures. The government aim is to include 
medicine practitioners into a form of community-based health care, regulated by the 
Traditional Leaders. Their job is to register and administer traditional healers in each 
community. This represents a way of incorporating traditional health services within 
                                                      
85 Unfortunately, there is no data on number hospitals in rural areas.  
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the state services but without the need to invest or have a physical state presence in 
rural areas.  
 
There is a certain degree of economic Horizontal Inequality present in Namibia across 
ethnic groups. According to data on economic inequality86 provided by Cederman et 
al. (2011) the Damaras hold considerable wealth in comparison to the other groups. 
Likewise, the Baster are considerably poor in relation to the other groups. Thus, The 
Hereros and Mafwe are closer to the average mean of per capita economic production. 
Despite this there is harmonic tendency in the accumulation of assets across the 
different groups. The distribution of labour across the communities as well as the 
distribution of funds is decided by the chiefs. By using data of the DHS in ownership 
of assets it is possible to provide a portrait of the accumulation of wealth across the 
different ethnic groups. The advantage of using ownership of assets for this task is 
that it is likely that funds redistributed informally are invested in household assets 
rather than other major investments. In this regard, it is possible to capture the very 
detail of the informal distribution, whether Chiefs allocate funds to labourers and the 
spare is invested in household assets.  
 
Figure 5. Ownership of assets (TV, fridge, radio and car) across ethnicities.  
 
                                                      
86 This is measured by “dividing the total sum of the economic production in the settlement area by the 
group’s population size enables us to derive group-specific measures of per capita economic production… …we 
derive an indicator of group wealth by summing up the (population-weighted) proportions of the Nordhaus 
cells covered by a group.” 
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Source: DHS surveys 2006, 2013 Figures for ownership of cars, TV, radio and fridge. 
 
The DHS does not provide data for ethnic group, thus, language spoken reinforces 
crosscutingness across ethnicities. English is the official language, but the ethnic 
languages represent the different ethnic groups. From the figure above, it can be 
inferred that the changeability in the accumulation of assets across time follows the 
same pattern for all the groups except for the Lozi. This means that following the 
pattern of the economy, for this case a contracting economy from 2006 to 2013; none 
group was treated preferentially. All the ethnicities felt a negative repercussion in the 
accumulation of assets during this period meaning that the distribution of economic 
assets informally impacted similarly across ethnicities. The Lozi are the exception, 
thus the increase in assets is of only one percentual point: from 36% to 37%. The 
graph further confirms economic inequality across groups, almost 80% of whites own 
cars, radio, TV and fridge while only 27% of the Kavango group owns those assets. 
Thus, as mentioned above this extreme inequality has not produced conflict in 
Namibia, further evidence that informal mechanisms of redistribution are operating 
across communities.  
 
3. 1995-2012: Formalisation: Analysis of the Traditional Authorities Act and 












afrikaans damara/nama herero kwangali lozi oshiwambo
Ownership of assets (%) by language spoken
2006 2013
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The culmination of the process of recognition of the effectiveness, legitimacy and 
adequacy of informal institutions for decentralised forms of government is evidenced 
in the promulgation of the Traditional Authorities Act in 1995, the Traditional Authorities 
Council Act (1997) and a collection of other minor legal rules. The need for 
decentralised forms of government was early spotted in the Namibian process of 
decolonisation. As has been mentioned earlier, Pre-colonial Namibia was ruled by 
kingdoms in which each ethnic group governed its own portion of territory. The 
preservation of these forms of government is evidenced in the recognition of 
Chieftanships as decentralised forms of government.  
 
To begin, Chapter 12 of the Constitution of Namibia defines the structure of Regional 
and Local Government. It states that Namibia should be ‘divided into regional and local 
units, which shall consist of such regions and Local Authorities as may be determined 
and defined by Act of Parliament.’ (Chapter 12, article 1).  It further stipulates that the 
boundaries of regions (article 2) shall be geographical only, with no reference to race, 
colour or ethnic origin. Article 2 attempts to eliminate ethnicity from the formal 
decentralised structure of the government. However, Traditional Leadership has its 
roots in ethnicity and the foundation of chiefs and local administration stems from 
ethnic differences.  
 
The formal elimination of ethnic boundaries and the establishment of political 
boundaries served as a strategy for minimising ethnic identities as the main identity 
feature. However, as illustrated in Picture 1. Opinions on identity in Namibia; the 
common people do feel identified by their ethnic background as much as feeling 
Namibian. In this regard, the baseline of local government in political terms does not 
eliminate the ethnic component of the local administrations. Besides, it was ethnicity 
in the first place what gave rise to Traditional Leadership in precolonial times. In fact, 
there has been an increase in ethnic disputes since the promulgation of the local 
authorities acts. Thus, the post-enactment of the Traditional Authorities Act disputes 
are precisely related to borders and control of natural resources (Cooper, 2001). 
Cooper argues that the establishment of Traditional Leadership in modern politics in 
Namibia advocated by SWAPO has ‘opened the Pandora box of ethnicity’ and that it 
has increased the number of ethnic disputes. Hence, as opposed to Cooper’s 
argument, what opened the Pandora box of ethnicity in terms of ethnic disputes was 
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not the promulgation of Traditional Authorities Act and their recognition as local forms 
of government, but the political delimitation of the regions which did not match the 
ethnic borders.  
 
Figure 6. Political Regions vs. Ethnic boundaries. 
 
Source: Right map ETH GROWuP platform. Left map: USAID. 
 
On the right a map of the ethnic settlements post-independence, 1990. On the left, a 
map of the political regions established with the constitution. When the Act stipulated 
the demarcation of political boundaries, the borders stepped on ethnically claimed 
lands which historically had been governed by one group. Basically, a low scale 
delimitation which resembles the border demarcation between countries post-
independence in Africa. The Namibian government was keen in enforcing the 
boundaries and as such fuelled many border disputes between the communities 
(Cooper, 2001). Thus, the disputes were minor and often referred to the construction 
of dams or roads or other development projects. In the bigger picture, the recognition 
of Traditional Leadership had much more other benefits than minor border disputes.  
 
The constitution is regarded as the superior Law. Article 102.5 in Chapter 12 stipulates 
that the Council of Traditional Leaders is established to ‘advise the President on the 
control and utilisation of communal land and on all such other matters as may be 
referred to it by the President for advice’. This article demonstrates the importance 
that is given to Traditional Leadership as it is the only body of the executive branch 
which is by rule of the constitution enforced to advise the President directly.    
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By promulgating legal frameworks of recognition, these informal institutions transfer to 
be formal thus they maintain the essence of the criteria that defines them as informal. 
The Traditional Authorities Act 1995 recognises firstly, customary law: as the collection 
of norms, rules and traditions of a traditional community. Secondly, the rules of 
designation: In relation to the institution of a Traditional Leader including the 
appointment, election or hereditary succession to office of a Traditional Leader or any 
other method of instituting a traditional leader recognised under customary law (p.3). 
These two interpretations and provisions clearly illustrate the informal aspect of the 
institution as well as the hybridity of the system.  
 
Legal-rational authority as the foundation of the modern nation-state establishes the 
selection of bureaucrats or leaders by competitive mechanisms underpinned by merit. 
Thus, the interpretation of the legality of Traditional Authorities as recognised by the 
Namibian state still refers to the selection of Chiefs by informal customary processes. 
Article 3 of the Act stipulates that the ‘selection, tenure and removal from and 
succession to the office of a Chief is regulated by the customary law of the traditional 
community in respect of he or she is designated’ (p.4). Thus, the link between the 
formal and informal mechanisms of selection is triggered when the community needs 
to formally notify the Minister of Regional and Local Government of the designation, 
who then needs to authorise it. Thus, the invalidation of the designation of the Chief 
by the Minister is only valid if the Leader is selected not following the customary law 
or traditional procedure, a conjunction of formal and informal rules.  In this regard,  this 
illustrates how, on the one hand the institution is formalised but yet retains key aspects 
of informality; and secondly, how it is established as a hybrid system of rules. 
Pertaining this last point, the recognition of customary law for each one of the 
communities has often gone in contradiction with the formal rules and the constitution. 
Despite this, the recognition of customary law is one of the key aspects of the 
recognition of Traditional Leadership. 
 
The Traditional Authorities Act also defines their functions, duties and powers as well 
as stipulating remuneration, an element of the link between Traditional Leadership and 
the nation-state that had been debated since colonial times. The promulgation of laws 
for salaries completes the cycle of formalisation, as the chiefs are now regarded as 
civil servants. The duties of Traditional Leaders specified in the Traditional Authorities 
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Act remain loyal to their functions before independence, the administration of land 
being the most important. Likewise, the enforcement of cultural practices as well as 
assisting and cooperating with the central government in the execution of policies and 
Law enforcement. Thus, the limitation of power clearly stipulates the Constitution as 
the norm or norms. Any custom, tradition of practice which contradicts the Constitution 
would cease to apply. This represents the recognition of informal mechanisms and 
customary law but yet presents a link to formal sanctions. 
 
Furthermore, Traditional Leaders cannot participate in politics per se. In fact, the Act 
clearly stipulates that no person holding political office can be a Traditional Leader, 
and viceversa. If a Traditional Leader is appointed to political office he must resign 
from his duty as Traditional Leader. This rule, in addition to the Constitution being the 
norm of norms has created significant disagreements in the communities. Some of the 
Traditional Leaders have openly criticised their inability to hold political posts (Cooper, 
2014). Their interest in politics has been stimulated with the establishment of this 
hybrid system, and their duty as a traditional leader is rooted in inheritance or 
succession, reason why they consider it is sacred. In this regard, they consider it is 
discriminatory not to be able to participate formally in politics when them can 
accurately and legitimately represent their constituencies.    
 
Besides the Traditional Authorities Act which as stated above formalises, regulates 
and incorporates the duties of Traditional Leaders into the Namibian modern state, the 
Council of Traditional Leaders Act (1997) is also a key piece of legislation. Within this 
Act The Council is created, it’s main function is to advise the President on ‘(a) the 
control and utilization of land; and (b) all such other matters as may be referred to it 
by the President for advice’ (Article 2. p. 2). Each Traditional Authority can designate 
members to the Council for a period of 5 years with possibility of re-appointment. The 
restrictions in terms of formal politics operate here as well. Members cannot hold any 
post in political office and cannot be active members of any political party. Thus, the 
formation of this Council is the only direct point of advice to the President. In fact, it 
pertains the utmost representation of the relevance given and recognised to the 
Traditional Leaders by the modern nation-state.  The Council, in hierarchical terms is 
above the Ministry of Regional and Local Housing and the Ministry of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation; and is directly advised and connected to the 
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Traditional Authorities at the local level (Keulder, 2010). This represents the direct link 
between the local people and the upper level of the Executive branch. 
 
Thus, it could be argued that the informal mechanism of integration and political 
inclusion has failed in the Caprivi region. The Caprivi strip is one of the most illustrative 
examples of the deliberate demarcation of borders performed by the colonial powers. 
The Caprivi border lines were solely drawn to serve exclusively the interest of the 
European colonial powers. It was product of a land trading deal between German 
Chancellor Graf von Caprivi and Great Britain as part of a settlement between the two 
countries in 1890. The main interest of the Caprivi strip as a part of South West Africa 
was access to the Zambezi river which flows mainly through bordering Zambia, at that 
time the British colony of Northern Rodhesia (Kangumu, 2011) (Fisch, 1999). 
 
The annexation of the Caprivi Strip to the territory of the then South West Africa 
disregarded, as in many places in the African continent, the indigenous bonds 
amongst the resident population. For the Caprivi case, the communities that live there, 
were separated and arbitrarily divided, in fact, the population living in the Caprivi strip 
has historical bonds more associated with the population of Zambia and Botswana 
rather than that of Namibia (Kangumu, 2011) (Zeller, 2010) (Fisch, 1999). Thus, as 
well as being annexed to South West Africa completely arbitrarily, a consequence the 
Namibian government is still feeling today; the region was very inaccessible due to the 
rainforest landscape. 
 
Even since colonial times the region was neglected due to inaccessibility and the 
toughness of the landscape87. For the Europeans it was difficult to administer the area 
because of malaria and other known diseases. Also, the land as such was regarded 
useless for it did not have any mineral resources as diamonds or copper (Kangumu, 
2011). For the South African administration, the rough tropical rainforest landscape 
and the diseases led them to declare the Strip as a Bantu Reserve: ‘where the natives, 
it was presumed would be happy to live under their own laws and customs and where 
‘detribalization’ could be kept to a minimum’ (p. 93). 
                                                      
87 AS Fisch points out, when the Germans got granted the region by the settlement played with Great Britain 
they underestimated the economic and human cost an effective administration of the region could bring. This 
is the reason of the neglect of the area. 
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Thus, likewise since colonial times the recognition of Traditional Leadership was in 
place. As Kangumu (2011) points out, in 1939 the then Magistrate and the Native 
Commissioner had written instructions for the Caprivi administration, amongst them 
‘to foster the operation of native institutions and to endeavour to improve them  and 
make them an effective instrument  of Government’ (p. 96). As in the other regions of 
Namibia, the formalisation of Traditional Leadership took place, the same mechanisms 
of inclusion both formal and informal were implemented (Zeller, 2010). In fact, in 1987 
when the ideas of secessionism started taking form, the chiefs did not support them 
because under an independent Caprivi, they will lose their positions; as Caprivi would 
be ruled by politicians rather than by chiefs (Kangumu, 2011).  
 
Thus, there was some discontent associated to the isolation of the region and the 
colonial policies implemented. The Chiefs and their communities felt like the 
administration cared more about animals and nature conservation rather than 
themselves. This is a concern that the locals had continuously voiced to the colonial 
administration. Due to the nature protection laws imposed, communities could not hunt 
and their crops were frequently destroyed by elephants or hippos protected by the 
colony (Kangumu, 2011, p. 102). Furthermore, they could not eradicate pests and 
overall they felt the administration cared more about the landscape than the welfare 
of the Caprivian communities.  
 
The discontent was evidenced with the Odentaal Commission in which the South 
African administration held discussions with the different regions of South West Africa 
to ‘impose’ the Apartheid measures in the form of Batustan. The Caprivi region was 
also part of these meetings. During the Caprivian meetings the chiefs of different 
communities got a chance to voice their discontent to which they were clear about 
willing to be governed by another government which ‘would have the people’s interest 
rather than the protection of wild animals at heart’ (Kangumu, 2011, p. 197). 
 
The source of neglect was not precisely the product of deliberate exclusion of the 
region, but rather a product of the absurdity of the annexation of Caprivi to South West 
Africa and the isolation of the region. For the people, the sentiments of neglect 
solidified in the creation of CANU: the Caprivian African National Union. In 1964, in 
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the head of Mishake Muyongo CANU was merged with SWAPO to fight the common 
enemy in the freedom struggle. There is debate as to whether CANU was absorbed 
or merged into SWAPO. On the side of CANU, it has been argued that independence 
or political autonomy was promised by SWAPO. On the SWAPO side it is argued that 
such a promise was never made and that when the first constitution was drafted 
Muyongo did not mention any issue regarding political autonomy or independence 
(Fisch, 1999) (Kangumu, 2011). Muyongo despite being appointed to positions of 
power within SWAPO did voiced his dissatisfaction with the Caprivi issue. This 
discontent grew progressively within CANU itself and in 1987 the movement joined 
the DTA for which Muyongo was elected Vice-President and president in 1991 after 
the resignation of Chief Kuaima Riruako (Fisch, 1999). The DTA as previously 
mentioned represents the South African interest and serves as the principal opposition 
to SWAPO.  
 
In 1999 coordianted by Muyongo, attacks on government institutions and buildings 
took place. Katima Mulilo represents the biggest urban area in the Caprivi reason why 
it serves as an ideal target point for violent manifestations (Melber, 2009). The 
organisation and planning of the attacks took place in Katima Mulilo, where most of 
the population in the city are SWAPO supporters. Many armed men belonging to the 
newly created Caprivi Liberation Army took control of main roads, a situation which 
left Namibia shocked as it was its first experience with armed opposition. The Katima 
Mulilo attacks left 15 casualties on both sides. The government reacted violently and 
heavily repressed the movement (Zeller, 2010) (BBC news, 1999) (Menges, 2015). 
Most of the Chiefs opposed to the idea of a violent movement and even the idea of an 
independent Caprivi. In Fisch (1999) analysis of the movement, she questions how 
Muyongo (even despite his political background) was able to convince people into 
violence, knowing that realistically the chances of succeeding were dim and that 
support regionally and in Katima Mulilo was slim. Her take on the real causes of the 
rebellion in 1999 are linked to the real personality of Muyongo. It is argued that the 
rebellion was partly a personal take on revenge by Muyongo to the Namibian state (p. 
40).    
 
 In this regard, the mechanisms of informal political inclusion and economic 
redistribution did not fail in the Caprivi Strip. Thus, the inaccessibility to the region and 
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its isolation did play a major role in the formal administration and ruling from Windhoek. 
A clear example of this is the presence of roads and ways of accessing Katima Mulilo. 
Ever since colonial times the transport to take supplies or mail had to be taken by 
separate journeys by ship and by train and ox wagon (Fisch, 1999). From Windhoek 
the capital, journeys across Botswana and South Africa had to be taken to reach the 
Strip, a direct route via inner Namibia was simply impossible. Also, until the 1950s the 
only way to reach the Caprivi Strip in a reasonable timespan was by air. Journeys by 
land took at the very least 3 months to complete and the landscape was rough making 
the journey not pleasant. It was only in 1999 when the Caprivi highway which connects 
Rundu with Katima Mulilo was officially opened. Perhaps the integration of the Caprivi 
Strip was curtailed by geographical impediments, it was the only region in Namibia 
which was completely isolated since colonial times and which was annexed to Namibia 
(South West Africa then) by trading of regions between colonial powers. Because of 
this, and also keeping in mind that the violence which erupted in Caprivi was minor, it 




Concluding Remarks: The success of a hybrid system, revealing the effect of 
informal mechanisms of inclusion and redistribution. 
 
Due to its colonial background and unique transition to independence and democracy, 
Namibia depicts a very interesting analysis on how the recognition of traditional 
leadership allowed for non-violent problem solving. Many authors point out to the idea 
that the peacefulness of Namibia is a product of the UN assistance on decolonisation. 
However, it has been shown here that the model of state which recognises and 
enforces Traditional Leadership and that has been adopted by Namibia upon 
decolonisation, is firstly a product of the recognition of Traditional Authorities during 
colonial times and secondly, a product of SWAPO’s reliance on a baseline of 
Traditional Leaders to gain political support. The UN mission in Namibia UNTAG did 
not stipulate or guided any issue pertaining Traditional Authorities. It only assisted in 
ensuring free and fair elections upon 1990.  
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Thus, another set of arguments has pointed out to the idea that it is precisely the solid 
democracy what has guaranteed non-violence in the Namibia context. Comparatively 
and across many assessments of the quality of the political system and the level of 
democracy in Namibia it has been pointed out that Namibia remains a stable country 
in Sub-Sahara Africa due to its quality and levels of democracy. Thus, it has been 
shown here that the political system in Namibia despite being categorised as 
democratic is hardly democratic in practice. SWAPO as the main political force has 
increasingly solidified its grip on power by using diverse autocratic practices. Despite 
some discontent with the single party system, SWAPO continues to dominate the 
political landscape and to date has not lost any election. In this regard, it is not per se 
the formal rules of the game what are keeping violence from erupting, as the possibility 
of the common people to change or protest their government via democracy; but the 
non-democratic mechanisms of informal inclusion that are visualised in the 
incorporation of Traditional Authorities.  
 
The incorporation of Traditional Authorities in the formal state has given birth to a 
political system that is both formal and informal. The mechanisms of political 
participation and distribution abide by informal criteria based on the customary law of 
Traditional Leadership. The Namibian formalising rules depicted in the Traditional 
Authorities Act 1995 and the Traditional Council Act 1997 recognise and respect 
customary law, but also regulate Traditional Leadership pointing out to the norm of 
norms: The Constitution. The outstanding levels of legitimacy of Traditional Leaders 
somehow guarantee that problem-solving and disputes between ethnicities and 
between ethnicities and the state itself are brought to it indirectly via Traditional 
Leaders. This means that the state is able to reach locally and provide problem-solving 
instances as well as present itself as ‘existent’ in regions in which it does not have a 
formal state presence.  
 
Finally, Namibia portrays and ideal case of recognition of informal institutions and their 
channels of redistribution and political participation. Thus, many other cases might 
also employ informal channels efficiently and prevent conflict by their recognition but 
do not reach the point of integrating or formalising them. However, it is undeniable that 
informal institutions do have a significant impact in either fostering or controlling 




Rise of the ethnic elite 
 
 
From the results drawn from the fsQCA analysis in chapter 6, Bolivia comes up as a 
least likely case of a peaceful trajectory. This is because it is an illiberal democracy 
with strong constant political exclusion and high degrees of horizontal inequality, yet it 
managed to avoid civil conflict. It also presents features of mutually reinforcing 
cleavages (Selway, 2012) which have also been highlighted as triggers of conflict. 
Bolivia therefore reflects a case in which the avoidance of conflict seems particularly 
hard. In this regard, the question to be asked is: how and why did Bolivia not fall into 
civil war given the fact that all conditions were present for it to present a case of 
contemporary conflict onset?  
 
According to the mechanisms studied informal distribution through patronage 
networks comes to claim a protagonist role. The degree of informal distribution through 
patronage networks reflects a score of 0.56. The measure makes sense in relation to 
Namibia, the other peaceful trajectory case studied; however, it is likely to be more 
redistributive that what the initial measure accounts for as it will be explained along 
the text. Thus, as a least likely case if the mechanism is found to be operating 
effectively in the case of Bolivia it improves the confidence that it can be also operating 




Bolivia is often referred to as one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. Thus, 
despite poverty and inequality it has managed to avoid violent conflict, a common form 
of action in the region. It is a multi-ethnic landlocked country, hosting different 
indigenous communities autochthonous from the Andes and from the plains. As all 
other countries in Latin America, during colonial times the process of ‘mestizaje’ took 
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place in which the blend of different ethnicities took place to form the ‘mestizo’. The 
mestizo is the product of the mixture between black slave communities, local 
indigenous and foreign Europeans (mainly Spanish) the mestizo came to rise as the 
dominant elite within Bolivia and across all the other Latin American countries. Their 
status of elite is a product of decolonisation, in which the original indigenous 
communities as well as the black communities, continued to be regarded as inferior 
members of the social strata. After the wars of independence, the mestizos 
consolidated their political and social power, the black communities continued to be 
enslaved and the indigenous communities were regarded as agrarian labour force. 
This principle of division of power and wealth in the 1800’s served as the starting point 
for the modern Latin American conflicts with a twofold character: a mutually reinforcing 
ethnic and class dispute (Albro, 2007).    
 
Elite Bargains in Bolivia: historically ruling mestizo vs. Aymara, Quechua and 
Guaraní 
 
Bolivia is a highly heterogenic country; thus, ethnic fragmentation in other Latin 
American countries is higher than in Bolivia. According to ACNUR in Colombia there 
are between 87 and 102 ethnic groups composing 3.63% of the population; in Bolivia 
on the other hand, according to CEPAL data there are around 37 ethnic groups which 
conform 66% of the total population. Bolivia is considerably smaller than Colombia but 
the relative size of ethnic indigenous population in contrast to mestizo population is 
staggering. Bolivia is perhaps the most ethnically diverse country in South America 
(CELADE, 2000, 2010). Out of the 37 ethnic groups there are three main groups which 
occupy not just the sovereign state of Bolivia but also spread to neighbouring Peru, 
Argentina and Chile88: The Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní.  
 
Despite the mestizos being one of the minorities, they have dominated both political 
and economic power. Thus, since the early 1980’s significant changes began to 
happen, which planted the seeds for the rise of ethnic indigenous communities to 
                                                      
88 This is both the product of colonisation and decolonisation processes. For example, during colonial times the 
Spanish conquistadores allowed for the Incas to continue to rule Bolivian territories. Before the arrival of the 
Spanish, the Inca had also colonised what came to be Bolivia, displacing native ethnic indigenous groups along 
the way. Furthermore, during decolonisation the formation of the Bolivian nation-state was territorially 
challenged by wars with neighbouring Paraguay and Chile.  
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power later in 2006. Multiple factors associated to the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Policies, the decline of the left and the increase in the ‘ethnic cause’ 
discourse, in addition to the formal institutional changes all paved the way for the rise 
of Evo Morales in 2006 an Aymara who epitomises the rise of the indigenous 
communities to power.  
 
Despite historical political and economic exclusion exemplified in very high degrees of 
inequality and mestizo elite consensus to alternate power and exclude indigenous 
groups; struggles for power in Bolivia have mainly been peaceful. Bolivia therefore 
presents an ideal case to refute the idea that civil conflict as an outcome is mainly 
dependent on the distribution of power via formal channels.  
 
The analysis of the Bolivia case will be presented in three different periods: 
 
1. 1980 to 1994: Explains the change in the political parties from a class base to 
an ethnic base across the 1980s decade and culminates with the promulgation 
of the Popular Participation Law which decentralised political power as a 
response to poverty and rising popular protest. 
2. 1994 to 2006: A second period which describes the effects of the LPP, the 
relevance of patrimonialism and the establishment of the ethnic base across 
parties. 
3. 2006 to 2014: A third period which highlight the shift in the elites and proves 
the relevance of patronage networks showing how the MAS, Evo’s political 
party continue to usufruct from them. 
 
 
In this regard, the following hypotheses comes to light: 
 
1. Informal mechanisms of distribution efficiently operating under a highly 
exclusionary mestizo government explain the lack of violent conflict. 
2. The rise of Evo Morales and the ‘change in the elite’ in 2006 did not alter the 
informal deals of distribution that had been operating since the end of the 
dictatorship at the beginning of the 1980’s despite them being highly 
condemned.  
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1. 1980s – 1989: From class base to ethnic base political parties, beginning of the 
erosion of the mestizo ‘democracia pactada’  (agreed democracy).  
 
The history of Bolivia during the XX century has been one of political instability. During 
the 1960’s and 1970’s there was a continuous alternation of military leaders brought 
to power by coups d’état. Beginning the decade of the 1980’s and after the bloodiest 
coup which took effect on the 1st of November 1979, there was a call for elections. The 
winner was a coalition of communist parties: UDP (Popular Democratic Union) which 
leader was Hernan Siles Suazo. Thus, despite winning in the polls and following the 
‘tradition’ of military coups in the way of exercising politics, he was deposed and 
General Garcia Meza rose to power. Two years later Garcia Meza was also deposed 
by another general: General Natusch Busch, who, after successfully taking power 
exited and gave power to General Celso Torrelio. The atmosphere of instability was 
reaching it maximum point, in 1982 General Vildoso deposed General Celso. Vildoso 
restored constitutional rights and called for general elections. Due to the impossibility 
of holding elections the congress then was in charge of selecting a president. 
Following the results of the 1980 election Siles Suazo was then recognised as the 
legitimate president (Sanginés Krause, 1987). 
 
By this time the country was also suffering extreme economic instability. Inflation was 
at its peak and as many other countries in Latin America, Bolivia was also suffering 
from the external debt crisis. Siles Suazo policies could not significantly remediate the 
economic downfall (Sanginés Krause, 1987) also partly due to parliamentary blockage 
(Torrico Teran, 2006), he renounced the presidency in 1984, a year before his 
presidential period was due. In 1985 Victor Paz Estenssoro was elected as the new 
president. Paz Estenssoro in light of the economic crisis and by external pressure of 
the IMF; had no other chance than to apply Structural Adjustment Policies.   
 
The implementation of SAPs significantly affected the political landscape, empowered 
economically more the mestizo elites and impoverished more the indigenous 
communities. In regards of the political landscape and in light of the previous 
instability, deposing of leaders and also the parliamentary blockage of policies; the 
elites opted for consensual deals of political power (Torrico Teran, 2006) (Alenda, 
2004) (Mayorga, 2003). This strategy was undertaken to please all or at least almost 
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all of the political sectors with significant access to power and to guarantee legislative 
support in congress. This strategy was partly elaborated based on previous 
experiences of presidents who were unable to rule due to no support within congress. 
This therefore gave rise to a hybrid presidential and parliamentarian political system 
(Pachano, 2006). Three main political forces were favoured from the consensual deal: 
the MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement), the ADN (Nationalist Democratic Action) 
and the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) (Alenda, 2004). According to Alenda 
(2004), with this coalition the three political parties had access to 63.2% of the 
electorate. This alliance was ultimately what made possible the implementation of 
Decree 21060, the decree that gave rise to the neoliberal reforms.   
 
In fact, these coalitions in power (from 1985 up to 2003) generated political stability 
and a formal inclusion of diverse political players from the mestizo elites. For example, 
and illustrating on the first coalition, that of 1985: the ADN was a far right political party 
which sympathised with neoliberal policies; the MIR on the other hand, is a leftist party 
based on Marxism ideology. By this time, the base of the parties was on class. Parties 
appealed to social strata for gathering support.  
 
In part, the inclusion of the MIR was due to the extensive political support it had which 
was proven by the 1980 elections when Siles Suazo legitimately won the presidential 
elections. The party had its base on the workforce and it had significant support also 
from the indigenous working class. Within Bolivia indigenous population and working 
class (peasant and industrial) is a mutually reinforcing cleavage (Selway, 2012). Thus, 
this type of coalition clearly illustrates the nature of the formal inclusive elite bargain 
which allowed for the redistribution of political participation, social services and 
economic assets across different sectors of the mestizo elites, but excluding the 
indigenous communities.  
 
Although the indigenous electorate helped to bring the MIR into the coalition they 
remained politically, socially and economically excluded. The Structural Adjustment 
Policies were implemented in an attempt to restore macroeconomic stability. Thus, the 
route of action of the restructuring ethos was neoliberal, meaning that the inclusion of 
the MIR and its interests was purely strategic, via policies the indigenous population 
did not receive any benefit from the restructuring or from the MIR being in power. In 
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fact, the policies implemented could only be detrimental to the poorest population 
which is a mutually reinforcing characteristic with ethnicity89. Rates of poverty were 
increased within the already impoverished rural areas, in 2001 90% of the rural areas 
were living in poverty (USAID, 2005) (Esposito Guevara, 2008). This had two 
significant effects: firstly, the discrediting of the leftist parties (Guisselquist, 2005) and 
secondly, the triggering of a wave of migration to the main cities (Esposito Guevara, 
2008).  These two consequences of both the implementation of the neoliberal agenda 
and the production of the ‘democracia pactada’ (agreed democracy) since 1985, come 
to influence significantly the subsequent events which paved the way for the rise of 
ethnicity and the subsequent shift in the elites in power which takes place in 2006.  
 
The discrediting of the leftist parties as a product of the elite deal between ADN, MIR 
and MNR, and the si ne qua non implementation of the neoliberal reforms substantially 
helped to bring up the ethnic call (Guisselquist, 2005). Thus, this discrediting came 
not only from the national events but also from the fall of the USSR; the consequence 
was in fact, that most of the electorate base conformed by the peasants, the workforce 
and the poor was left with no political party to sympathise with. In some instances, in 
the remote rural areas the indigenous population was alien to voting and engaging 
with the political system but, due to the triggering of migration into cities many 
indigenous population came to thicken the urban voting base which, for the parties 
only facilitated the capturing of votes.  
 
As Guisselquist (2005) points out, the ethnic base of the political parties is not a 
phenomenon stemming from the social movements and the early 2000s protests; it is 
better understood as a process which was constructed along the 1980s and which 
shows its biggest effect with the protests and the rise of Evo Morales to power in 2006. 
In fact, the ethnic base of the political parties is also strongly related to the strength of 
the indigenous civil society. Parties dominated by the mestizo elites had to appeal to 
indigenous votes in order to prevent them from being significantly challenged. 
 
                                                      
89 This can be evidenced by the conversion of peasant trade unions into indigenous movements. After the 
1952 revolution two main trade unions were created: the Central Obrera de Bolivia (COB) and the Centro 
Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos (CNTC). By the end of the 1970s, the CNTC transforms itself into the 
Indigenous Movement Tupac Katari (OEA, 1978). 
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Informal mechanisms of distribution 
 
 The decade of the 1980’s and the 1990’s however, despite increased 
inequality, increased poverty rates, loss of prestige of the political parties and 
perpetual exclusion of the majority indigenous groups, shows no signs of political 
violence. Extensive research has pointed out to the idea that in scenarios of political 
exclusion and increased horizontal inequality; both conditions that are present in 
Bolivia, ethnic conflict is likely to happen (Stewart, 2002) (Cederman, 2011). Thus, the 
fundamental shortcoming in this hypothesis is the lack of attention to informal 
processes of distribution that are likely to be more important than formal ones. 
Informality drives political behaviour, keeps content the population if distribution is 
efficient and is in fact a legitimate channel that bonds people together. 
 
Patronage networks are an embedded characteristic of Bolivian politics (Alenda, 2003) 
(Hicks, et al., n.d.) thus, with the electorate it can be described as a love and hate 
relationship. Since the 1952 revolution, political parties have constantly attempted to 
gain political support by redistributing goods and assets at pre-election rallies, 
basically what can be regarded as clientelist strategies. Indigenous peoples in the rural 
provinces are at the very low end of a vertical patronage network, they were 
‘occasional beneficiaries of state promises, and more rarely of state largesse’ (Albro, 
2007, p. 4). However, since the 1980s political parties began intensifying the provision 
of patronage as a way of pleasing the demands of voters for redistribution (Shakow, 
2011). Patronage can be regarded as conformed of different degrees of distribution. 
At the top of the scale there is full blown patronage which is characterised by full 
investment such as the construction of public roads, schools or any form of non-mobile 
capital investment. At the lower end of the scale there is more of a monetary or mobile 
capital investment, which can be regarded in the form of clientelism, or the exchange 
of favours for a fee (see Theoretical Framework). As Albro (2007) describes, Bolivia’s 
type of patronage distribution fits within the lower end, an exchange of favours for a 
fee. This also can be explained by the populist character of Bolivian politics, which is 
a characteristic which can also be seen across other countries in Latin America during 
the period (in Latin America this form of politics is commonly identified as caudillismo) 
(Mayorga, 2003). In Bolivia, the existence of patronage networks is a characteristic 
that is often seen as detrimental and is stigmatised as referent of the politics originated 
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with the Conquest: the politica criolla (creole politics) (Albro, 2007). Within modern 
Bolivia, it is regarded as a love and hate relationship where it is highly condemned but 
yet highly practiced. It refers to the submission of locals to a patron and the 
characteristic of being willing to please the patron by any possible means, it is so 
embedded in the colloquial relationships that there is even a word in Quechua for it: 
Llunk’u (Albro, 2007, p. 295) . As Albro suggests, llunk’us (clients) are regarded as 
dishonourable. However, despite the public perception or rejection of this type of 
practice, it is widely undertaken90. 
 
Patronage in Bolivia, despite its public condemnation has aided clients to be socially 
mobile (Albro, 2007). It has empowered beneficiaries to achieve better prospects of 
life. How it operates in Bolivia also implies than clients are able to move from patron 
to patron, seeking the greatest benefit offered. Thus, mestizo patrons allude for 
ethnicity but without discrimination across the different indigenous groups: Aymara, 
Quechua and Guaraní. Because of this reason, clients or beneficiaries are kept 
content, both clients and patrons see the relation from a utilitarian perspective. In this 
regard, patronage networks can instead be regarded as an informal network of 
distribution which operates efficiently and that works as a buffer zone to compensate 
for the economic, social and political exclusion of the formal structures. This 
redistribution of assets can be regarded as ephemeral but, that nonetheless, is 
practiced constantly. Because this mechanism is present and patronage is a well-
functioning form of informal redistribution, indigenous communities were able to 
capture crumbs of the informal distribution undertaken by the elites. This allows elites 
in power to purchase political support and peace and for the benefit of the clients, the 
resources are able to reach the lower end of the vertical scale more efficiently.  
 
In Bolivia ethnicity and class are mutually reinforcing cleavages (Selway, 2012) 
(Selway, 2011). According to this theory on crosscutting cleavages and civil conflict, 
leaders (in this case patrons) appealing to ethnicity and other salient cleavage such 
as class, are more likely to be successful at collective action as ethnicity is reinforced 
by the other salient cleavage; in the Bolivia case: class. Thus, given this set of 
                                                      
90 As we will see later in the text, the pinnacle of the condemnation is perhaps the public discrediting of the 
practice made by MAS, Evo’s political party. However, and despite this the MAS also has its patronage and 
clientelistic networks. 
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conditions, because of inter-ethnic patronage conflict did not break out in Bolivia91. 
Mestizo elites campaigned ethnically for the rights and inclusion of indigenous groups 
(see for example CONDEPA below) in their own interest to keep in power, if they were 
able to convince and buy support from the indigenous electorate which they did, then 
they could retain political power. Thus, on the process inadvertently informal 
redistribution took place and therefore, this hidden mechanism accounted for the 
population not willing to rebel despite the reinforcing of cleavages and the great 
degrees of horizontal inequality. Thus, the change in the elites on 2006 comes from 
the realisation of the strength of the civil society and the willingness to take over both 
formal and informal structures. Because the network was inter-ethnic it also implied 
lower levels of trust between patron and client, which eventually led to an easier break 
off of the network in 2006. Bolivian inter-ethnic patronage provided a parallel 
movement between the efficiency of buying peace but also increased the cohesion of 
the civil society.  
 
As patronage practices are highly embedded in the natural course of ‘doing’ politics in 
the country; during the 1980s, it is not a surprise that political parties used these 
strategies to capture political support. The underlying nature of ethnicity has been also 
present since the 1980s. As Guisselquist (2005) points out in her analysis of the ethnic 
identity of political parties; between 1980 and 1993 the appeal to voters in terms of 
class was losing validity given the erosion of the leftist ideas (p.5), in contrast, ethnicity 
was gaining power. In this regard, is possible to infer that the distribution of assets via 
patronage networks, aiming at purchasing votes and political support was being 
migrated from a class angle to an ethnic base in the public discourse. The migration 
to the cities triggered by the implementation of neoliberal policies is also a strong 
variable in this regard, it boosted the ethnic call as it reflected the most common base 
for populism across the cities where the majority of the votes could be more easily 
captured. This thus, substantially changes with the Ley de Participacion Popular 
(popular participation law) which decentralised power and assets to towns and 
municipalities (see below) (Ley de participacion popular, 1994).  
 
                                                      
91 Patronage claims here more importance than formality because the public promises on formality were just 
that, promises (no real formal inclusion was achieved, but informal inclusion was achieved via patronage). A 
variant of the populism seen in Latin America, this time based on ethnicity.  
 212 
Because the strategy to capture political support with ethnic claims has its base on 
class struggles, the purchasing of support via patronage by the mestizo elites did not 
discriminate between the Quechuas, Aymaras or Guaranies. There was no preference 
in the distribution of assets to a particular group but rather a homogeneous distribution 
(see Asset distribution by ethnic group figure below).  For the mestizo elites, votes 
were votes whether they come from Aymaras or Quechuas; mestizo elite strategies 
were purely instrumental to remain in power but no group was benefited over the 
others (Barragan, 2006). This can be described as an inclusionary informal elite 
bargain in which resources were distributed indiscriminately to different groups.  The 
nature of the inclusive informal bargain had an effect in the decision of clients not to 
rebel. 
 
In 1989 the visibility of the ethnic preponderance becomes visible. It serves as 
evidence of the solidification of the ethnic call and how, the base of the political party 
migrated from a class appeal to an ethnic claim. It is with the creation of CONDEPA 
the first self-proclaimed ethnic party with significant visibility and the election of 
Remedios Loza, the first ethnic candidate in congress that ethnicity claims formal 
visibility. 
   




Source: IPUMS international 2001 census data. LAPOP data: 2004, 2008, 2010 online 
on: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/raw-data.php  
*not indigenous population accounts for mestizo and white population. 
**Radio data could not be included due to missing values across datasets.  
 
From Figure 1. Accumulation of assets by indigenous group (%) Automobile, fridge, 
TV, it can be inferred that the difference between ownership of assets is diverse 
amongst groups but follows the same pattern. Ownership of assets is able to reflect 
absorption of patronage because income received via patronage (the type of mobile 
capital patronage) is likely to be spent on assets rather than household structure 
investment (as improving household structural conditions). The graph clearly depicts 
that all the groups, despite different degrees of ownership move along in the same 
pattern. This implies a harmonic distribution of informal assets. Furthermore, by 2008 
the mestizo and white population assets shows no increase as the other groups. This 
can be explained by the co-optation of power by the indigenous Aymara and the 
forthcoming decrease in the distribution of informal assets to mestizo groups.  
 
2. 1989-1994: First instances of formal inclusion and ethnic informal redistribution, 









2001 2004 lapop 2008 2010
asset accumulation by ethnicity (%)
Quechua Aymara Guarani Not indigenous
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CONDEPA (Homeland’s conscience) is a political party created in 1989 by Carlos 
Palenque (Alenda, 2004). Carlos Palenque was initially recognised by the population 
due to his work in Bolivian folklore, he was a performer who attempted to highlight the 
importance of Bolivian  folklore cultural heritage. Since the 1970’s he had a recognised 
track of public solidarity events, by 1985 he buys Radio Television Popular (RTP) a 
telecommunication company which later is set to be privatised (Alenda, 2003) (Alenda, 
2004) (Mayorga, 2003). From RTP he creates several radio and TV programmes in 
which he assisted poor population with judicial and medical advice. (Teran, 2006) He 
also publicly condemned indigenous discrimination by mestizos as they regarded 
people with a basic understanding and pronunciation of Spanish as plebs, the same 
as discrimination toward women who wore the traditional Bolivian dresses: Polleras. 
Remedios Loza, an Aymara woman supports Palenque in his radio programmes by 
translating into Aymara is regarded as a symbol of ethnic salience; her presence also 
legitimises Palenque’s labour.  
 
Thus, in 1988 RTP is closed by the government due to an interview held with a coca 
recognised narco dealer. The closure propelled a series of protests with an ethnic 
base which led to the creation of CONDEPA. In 1989 the party was officially launched, 
in time for the parliamentary and presidential elections to be held that year. Palenque 
ran for the presidential elections, and for a newly created party, CONDEPA was able 
to capture a significant number of votes. Data compiled by the University of Salamanca 
sourced from the Corte Nacional Electoral, shows that CONDEPA got 173,459 votes 
accounting for a total of 12.25% for the presidential election votes (Garcia, 2005). For 
a party competing with traditional parties created circa 1952 as a consequence of the 
revolution, it signified a remarkable win. The parliamentary elections also show 
outstanding results: for the senate, the party was able to win 2 seats accounting for 
7.41% of the votes. The only parties able to win seats at the senate were MIR, MNR 
and ADN. The chamber of representatives depicts a similar result for the 1989 
elections:  CONDEPA won 9 seats representing 6.92% of the votes. The great winners 
once again: MIR, ADN, MNR and IU.   
 
CONDEPA’s successful launch shows proof of the process that was taking effect since 
1985: the migration of the parties calls from a class base to an ethnic base and the 
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increased visibility of the ethnicity issues. In some instances, CONDEPA has not been 
regarded as an ethnic party, mainly because Palenque is not an indigenous himself 
(Guisselquist, 2005). Thus, his proven record of ethnic campaign, elucidated 
personally in his passion for Bolivian folklore and also in his labour during the years of 
RTP as an activist against ethnic discrimination of women in Polleras, shows proof of 
his sympathy towards the ethnic cause. Furthermore and most importantly, 
CONDEPA was the first party with an ethnic Aymara representative in parliament: ‘La 
comadre’ Remedios Loza (Alenda, 2004) (Alenda, 2003) (Guisselquist, 2005) 
(Mayorga, 2003). CONDEPA reflects therefore the first moment in which ethnic 
Aymaras were able to burst into political posts. Thus, Remedios Loza as the pioneer 
of this inclusion was not the only one, upon 1993 bigger winnings were achieved. 
Victor Hugo Cardenas, an indigenous Aymara was vice-president under the 
presidency of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (Alenda, 2004). Thus, he did not belong 
to CONDEPA but to Movimiento Indigena Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MIRTK). 
Despite this movement being a political player before CONDEPA (since 1985) it really 
did not gain any visibility. It was unable to gather more than 1.5% of the votes before 
the 1993 elections (Alenda, 2004). 
 
As mentioned earlier, patrimonialism is highly embedded in Bolivian politics, reason 
why CONDEPA also incurred in informal mechanisms of distribution. As Mayorga 
(2003) points out, CONDEPA’s way of action could be regarded as some sort of 
asisstencialism which came to fill the gap left by the state and its retreat given the 
implementation of the neoliberal policies back in 1985. He also points out to 
CONDEPA pioneering the formal embodiment of social demands claimed from an 
ethnicity perspective. Furthermore, as Alenda (2003) referring to Mayorga (2002) 
points out: ‘political patronage allowed for lessening the major inequalities, mainly 
thanks to complimentary mechanisms of material and symbolic redistribution which 
temporarily deactivated social tensions’ (Alenda, 2004, p. 14). Furthermore, according 
to (Mayorga, 2003) the party successfully combined a mixture of formal and informal 
rules to guarantee the fidelity of the electorate. It is also remarkable to highlight the 
characteristic of charismatic patronage that CONDEPA practised.  
 
Palenque was regarded as the ‘big patron’ or compadre (Alenda, 2003). People who 
were captured under the patronage network of CONDEPA expected to gain from 
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social mobility as well as being guaranteed some sort of economic and social security 
in exchange for providing their support. The pact is mutually bonding and responsibility 
comes from both sides of the bargain (Alenda, 2003). The traditional view of the 
compadre complies with this vision. Thus, it is likely that the clients fulfilled its promises 
as CONDEPA increased it electoral gains by the next election in 1993 and 1997, 
likewise, CONDEPA was also delivering its side of the deal. 
 
In 1993 presidential elections CONDEPA won a total of 235.427 votes, 14.29% of the 
total voting.  In 1997 the subsequent election it reached 373.528 17.16% of the votes. 
From 1993 to 1997 elections it gained almost 3% more electorate. Most importantly, 
in 1993 Palenque reached sufficient votes to go to a second presidential round, thus, 
Sanchez de Lozada from MNR won over him (Political Database of the Americas, 
1999). Furthermore, winnings were not only taken in the Presidential elections. For 
the legislative elections in 1993, CONDEPA came up also in third place capturing 
13.6% of the votes: accounting for 1 seat in the senate and 14 seats in the chamber 
of representatives. This substantial and steady increase in the votes received by 
CONDEPA meant its strategy was working. 
 
Also in line with the effect migration to the cities had on the facilitation of capturing 
votes, during the 1990s CONDEPA captures La Paz, the biggest urban electorate 
(Teran, 2006). During the decade CONDEPA also came to monopolise municipal 
power in La Paz and El Alto, in 1999 Monica Medina a member of the party is elected 
as the major of La Paz the most important regional executive post in the country, this 
win also represents the first time a candidate from non-traditional parties gains this 
position (Mayorga, 2003).  
 
It is undeniable that the inexistence of violent ways of action is also a product of both 
the increased formal visibility of the ethnic cause and the baby steps towards an 
inclusion in terms of political representation for the indigenous groups. Both events 
generate a sense of trust in the population and give a sense of inclusion and value to 
their claims. Thus, this element although important is insufficient to explain why the 
indigenous groups settled for minimum amounts of formal inclusiveness given the high 
degrees of horizontal inequality experienced by these groups.  
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These formal mechanisms of inclusion also fail to explain why, given a higher 
cohesiveness of the discontent across ethnic groups and the increased possibilities of 
collective action product of the migration to cities (and also backed by the strength of 
the civil society organisations) and supported by the reinforcing of cleavages, did not 
end up triggering violent protest or conflict just then. In this regard, informal 
mechanisms of inclusion are considered to have played a fundamental part.  
 
These significant changes brought up the ethnic cause to the core of the political 
debate perhaps no evidently but intrinsically. It is the declaration of the Ley de 
Participacion Popular in 1994 what most clearly illustrates this.  
 
Ley de participación popular 1994 (LPP) 
 
In 1994 the Ley de Participación Popular is approved. The core aim of the law 
is to decentralise political and economic power to municipalities. The congress at time 
of approval was dominated by the MNR, the AP, UCS and CONDEPA (in order of 
number of seats) (Garcia, 2005). The law had been implemented partly to compensate 
for the economic effects of the implementation of neoliberal policies and the increased 
visibility of the discontent of the majority of the population (Sioto, 2010). The 
government did not have any other chance but to address the rising poverty and the 
increasing inequality gap. According to Alenda and based on PNUD figures, from 1999 
to 2002 poverty incidence rate passed from 63% to 64%. (Alenda, 2004, p. 8) 
 
Following this, the design and implementation of the law aimed at increasing political 
participation locally and to guaranteeing civil and political rights by providing autonomy 
to municipalities by decentralising resources (Esposito Guevara, 2008). In essence, it 
promised to: 1. improve the economic and social conditions of the population by 
decentralising resources co-opted via taxation, 2. To create improved mechanisms of 
response between the state and the civil society, 3. To create a social mechanism of 
participation that could integrate the population demands into the planning of policies 
and strategies of action (Esposito Guevara, 2008) (Alenda, 2004). Ultimately, it 
empowered municipalities to intervene in local development. 
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In practice, to deliver on these points, the Law regulated the transfer of 20% of the 
income generated by tax to more than 300 newly created municipalities. Most 
importantly, in terms of the recognition and inclusion of the population’s demands and 
incorporation of the population in decision-making; the law formally recognised two 
institutions which abided by the traditions of the indigenous groups and the peasants: 
the Organizaciones territoriales de base (OTB) and the Comites de Vigilancia (CV) 
(Lucas, 2006) This mechanism of formal inclusion leads to the recognition of 19000 
OTB (Anon., n.d.). 
 
The OTBs are basically the ‘actors’ of popular participation. There are 3 forms of OTB: 
first, the indigenous communities, second, peasant organisations which were 
previously organised in the form of trade unions; and third, neighbour juntas: as a 
group of people who live in the same neighbourhood of a city and are organised to 
improve the delivery and quality of social services such as water, electricity, education 
etc (Supreme Decree 23858, 1994). Locally, not all the indigenous communities were 
happy with the implementation of this law. Most of the organisations opposing the law 
argued against it as being insufficient for providing true autonomy and empowering 
the indigenous communities (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). In fact, the law although 
recognises the OTBs and empowers them with the ability to remark the most urgent 
and needed sectors of investment to ameliorate poverty and inequality; it doesn’t allow 
the OTBs to make decisions. The power of deciding is held by the political parties in 
charge (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). This formalisation of local power came to be 
implemented from a top-down perspective.  
 
In this regard, in comparison to the status that indigenous organisations had before; it 
is true that the LPP and the recognition of OTBs improved the participation and 
inclusion of ethnic communities. It resembles a formal mechanism of inclusion, but 
nonetheless, communities still regarded it as an imposition from above of a set of alien 
institutions (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). As Strobele-Gregor (1999) describes, the 
implementation of the law still faced significant challenges associated with embedded 
characteristics of exclusion and margination. She highlights the fact that the meetings 
were undertaken in Spanish, where the majority of the population speaks other 
indigenous languages. Most importantly, she mentions how indigenous groups were 
faced ‘with a form of administration based on the occidental model, where they had to 
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abide by a set of rules, norms and procedures that were imposed from outside’ (p.8).  
In fact, the main claim of challenging indigenous organisations revolves around the 
need for the state to formally recognise traditional authorities and/or to provide OTBs 
with decision-making power (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). In 2013, Evo Morales reforms 
the LPP replacing it with the Ley de participación y control social. Within the law OTBs 
are replaced with more relaxed forms of organisation and these organisations are 
granted decision-making power. The process of recognition and formalisation of 
traditional authorities in Bolivia follows more of a bottom-up approach.   
 
As mentioned above, the implementation of the LPP for some ethnicities did create a 
sense of inclusion and improved their status. Furthermore, despite the dissatisfaction 
voiced by some of the indigenous communities, the law did plant the seeds for the 
future empowerment of the social movement which brought Evo Morales to power 
(Esposito Guevara, 2008). Thus, initially the law was not implemented out of altruistic 
incentives emanating from the Sanchez de Lozada government, rather it was an 
attempt to strengthen the state but for the benefit of the political parties. (Shakow, 
2011) argues that one of the aims of the law was also to quell patronage by shifting 
responsibility for development to municipalities (Shakow, 2011)  Thus, the political 
parties were the great winners out of the LPP, and patronage instead of being reduced, 
actually solidified. 
 
Political parties were granted a great degree of power in decision-making with the 
implementation of the LPP (Esposito Guevara, 2008). The side effect of this was 
precisely the decentralised control of the patronage networks. In other words, the 
decentralisation policies allowed the political parties to reproduce, keep and more 
efficiently control the redistribution of assets via informal channels. 
 
Because the decentralisation policies increased decision-making power in the 
municipalities for the parties; it also meant that the patronage practices were also 
extended to the allocation of public jobs. Leaders in power increased their offering of 
public servant post in exchange for political fidelity and support (Alenda, 2004) 
(Esposito Guevara, 2008). As Esposito Guevara (2008) highlights, due to increasing 
rates of unemployment, the offering of public jobs became the most attractive offering 
to sustain the loyalties, in this regard the type of patronage used passed from being 
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purely clientelisic around election times, to be more constant and providing a higher 
level of patronage. 
 
  The decentralisation policies also altered the closeness of the patronal relations. 
Patrons were able to organise more rallies or parties held for the purpose of gathering 
support, this in turn, solidified the closeness of the relations and established a stronger 
bond between clients and patrons.  The decentralisation policies ended up 
strengthening the patronage networks. As mentioned earlier, the relationship of the 
indigenous population to the existence of patronage networks is one of love and hate. 
It is highly condemned and repudiated yet people continue to allow the parties to buy 
their political support.   
 
In this regard, the enlargement of the public servant indigenous population product of 
LPP, is not an effect of legal-rational modes of selection conquered by merit, but rather 
by personal relations. This characteristic somehow shifts with the change in the elite 
brought up in 2006 with the rise of Evo Morales, thus the practice and use of patronage 
networks continued to operate.  
 
Figure 2. Employment in public administration by ethnicity (2001) 
 
Source: IPUMS international, Census data 2001 










The love and hate relationship with patronage can’t be more evident than here. 
Despite public condemnation of patronage practices by the decentralisation reformers 
and also, by the Bolivian electorate, it is still emphasised by leaders that redistribution 
could be accomplished through patronage (Shakow, 2011, p. 5). For the indigenous 
organisations, it was clear that they were only receiving the crumps, what comes to 
change with the change in the elites in 2006 is the shift of the patronage leadership to 
indigenous themselves. (Shakow, 2011) demonstrates this with a set of examples 
drawn from Socaba (see below).  
 
3. 1994-2006: Rise of Evo Morales, downgrading in the mestizo elites: taking formal 
and informal channels of distribution. 
 
Bolivia has a history of a strong civil society particularly associated to the indigenous 
movement and the peasant and workers trade unions. Political and economic power 
has historically been in the hands of the mestizo elite. Thus, given the strength of the 
organisations coming from the base, upon the 1980s the mestizo minority has had to 
concede. The indigenous organisations have been successful in pressuring the 
mestizo government by using massive protests as an instrument of demand most 
successfully since early 2000s. Successes have been materialised in firstly the 
promulgation of the LPP and secondly in the rise of Evo Morales to the presidency. 
Since the first concessions or wins on the side of the indigenous movement a sense 
of accomplishment has spread out increasing collective action and boosting 
confidence across the movement. This sense of confidence after initial concessions is 
what explains the movement seeking bigger wins, eventually ending up in a motivation 
and empowerment to dispute the state structures. When the mestizo elites were 
downgraded with the winning of the presidential election by ethnic Aymara Evo 
Morales, this also meant the taking over the pre-established patronage networks.  
 
The practice of politics in Bolivia is highly embedded in patronage so despite the MAS 
deeply condemning patronage it ends up accepting and also using the logic of 
patrimonialism. The party therefore continues to redistribute informally, thus, this time 
solely between the indigenous electorate and not to the mestizo higher class. Thus, 
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the mestizo still remains as a junior partner within public administration, the shift in the 
elites only meant a downgrade for the mestizo.  
 
This significant change in formal politics in 2006 can be argued to be explained by the 
inefficiency of the patronage deals to buy peace and keep the indigenous content only 
with the capture of the informally redistributed crumbs. Thus, the strength of the civil 
society gained by the partial concessions along the way had a significant effect (LPP), 
and also, despite mutually reinforcing cleavages of class and ethnicity and due 
principally to patronage the course of action did not become violent92.  The character 
of inter-ethnic patrimonialism is also another cause in the shift in the elites93. This was 
its weak point. Despite patronage being successful in buying political support for a 
very long period of time (1980s – early 2000s), the gaining of concessions and the 
lack of trust between patron and client which was not ethnic binding became its 
weakest point. In other words, if patrimonialism was to be dispensed by Aymaras or 
Quechuas themselves then trust would be higher and breaking from the network would 
be more costly. In this regard, inter-ethnic patronage provided the ability to buy peace 
and gather political support for the mestizos but is lacked the biding force of ethnicity 
to guarantee the deals in the long run. 
 
In this regard, patronage although successful in keeping peace since democratisation, 
despite political exclusion and great degrees of horizontal inequality it simply was not 
enough to stop the indigenous groups in seeking a place in the formal structures. While 
it works as a political instrument to redistribute, in the case of Bolivia (due to sole 
provision of mobile capital patronage) it does not have the ability to ameliorate 
structural problems such as social inequality94. The implementation of SAPs had a 
profound effect on the indigenous communities and by early 2000s discontent was 
mounting up. Thus, the rise of the indigenous movement was partly due to the 
discontent derived from the SAPs and increasing levels of inequality, but it also was 
due to the changes in the political system (Pachano, 2006) (Albro, 2007). The mestizo 
                                                      
92 This is precisely my main objective to provide explanations as to why it did not become violent rather than 
explaining why there was a downgrading in the elites . 
93 The case of Bolivia is very illustrative in this regard. Amongst the four cases selected from the QCA Bolivia is 
the only one which shows a clear picture of interethnic patronage. 
94 This is partially dependent on the type of patronage that is dispensed. In cases of non mobile capital 
investment such as schools and health facilities it is possible that social inequalities can be partially addressed.  
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only inclusionary deals of the Democracia Pactada generated the will to take over the 
state structures. The success of political parties such as CONDEPA generated a 
sense of achievement across the indigenous communities which later pushes them to 
contest legally for political power.  
 
(Stefanoni, 2006)the Guerra del Gas as the only elements that launched the social 
movement into success (see for example: (Stefanoni, 2006) (Neso, 2013)). In turn, the 
argument here points out towards the rise of the indigenous cause since the 1980s 
(as opposed to the 2000s), the empowerment of the indigenous elites via the LPP and 
the character of an inter-ethnic patronage. The penetration of ethnic groups into formal 
politics was a gradual process. As seen in the previous sections, 1989 marks the first 
moment of infiltration when Remedios Loza was elected as the first Aymara women in 
Congress. Thus, by 2000 the Congress shows significant changes and also reflects 
the uselessness of the agreements between the mestizo elites to dominate legislative 
power. In 2002 in the chamber of representatives the MAS and MIP have 27 and 6 
seats respectively, for the mestizo elites it is NFR with 25, UCS with 5, MNR with 36 
and MIR with 26. For the senate MAS conquered 8 seats, MIR 5 seats, MNR 11 seats, 
NFR 2 and ADN only 1. Although still minority the shift is significant (from only 3 seats 
by CONDEPA 1997-2002, or 1 by CONDEPA from 1993-1997) (Garcia, 2005). This 
changes from 2002 polarised legislative power.  
 
On the executive side the results are no different. In 2002 Sanchez de Lozada was 
reelected. He won with very slim support, the MAS on the other hand contesting him 
on their first elections, showed significant signs of captured electorate. Sanchez de 
Lozada enters a coalition between MNR, MIR, UCS, and NFR. The MAS and MIP 
decided to stay in the opposition and as such polarised the political system. Thus, by 
2003 the coalition that sustained Sanchez de Lozada in power disintegrated and he 
resigned as president (Pachano, 2006). 2003 represents also an important year for 
the civil society organisations. There are a series of public protests which are highly 
repressed by the state (Alenda, 2004), this state repression is its last attempt to hold 
onto power as it realises the strength the social movement had acquired. Thus, the 
effect of the repression was straight forward. The empowered movement now highly 
repressed lost all trust on the government as their only will was to protest peacefully 
and get some concessions on their demands. The response on the government only 
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showed the non-willingness of the government to negotiate and ended up empowering 
even more the movement. As Sanchez de Lozada resigns, his vice president Carlos 
Mesa takes on power, political instability continues to take effect up until 2006 when 
elections are held again and Evo Morales wins the presidency.  
 
Evo Morales is the first ever indigenous president of Bolivia. An ethnic Aymara who 
proudly defends and represents his ethnic background (Salman & Sologuren, 2011) 
he won the presidency for the first time since democratisation with an outstanding 
majority of 54% of the votes (Assies, 2006) (Hicks, et al., n.d.). The success of the 
MAS his political party, in comparison to the other indigenous parties was the ability 
to create a discourse which embraced ethnic salient urban and rural voters (Cardenas, 
et al., 2011). Thus, the borders between ethnicities are blurred and for the MAS the 
idea of a particular ethnic identity becomes harder to establish.  
 
The taking over of power by the indigenous movement in the leadership of Evo also 
affected the pre-established patronage networks. The MAS was now able to undertake 
them and present an alternative to ‘the status quo of traditional patronage’ (Albro, 
2007, p. 5). As mentioned earlier, I believe that the traditional patronage was inter-
ethnic between the mestizo providers or patrons and the indigenous Aymara, 
Quechua and Guaraní as the principal clients. Thus, what changes with the MAS 
overtaking is the creation of a new indigenous-indigenous patronage coalition in 
which, this time the mestizo are not a part of. However, because the rise of Evo and 
the indigenous movement did not represent a complete shift of elites but more of a 
downgrade, mestizo-mestizo patronage still retained.  
 
Anthropological studies of patronage and clientelism in Bolivia such as Albro’s seminal 
work, have pointed out to the public condemnation of the practice during and after the 
mestizo governments. For example, for the MAS patronage was used in the campaign 
to promise to ‘break with vertical politics’ (Albro, 2007), and to promise the end of 
patronage (Shakow, 2011) . Thus, what these studies also highlight is the 
condemnation by word but the love affair in practice. Shakow’s (2011) study in Socaba 
shows how ethnic supporters of the MAS are open in applauding Evo for not offering 
patronage, yet she also presents evidence of how MAS supporters also complain of 
the lack of patronage reaching to themselves. In effect, what this demonstrates is 
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firstly, the love and hate relationship with patronage: condemned yet used because it 
is highly efficient. And secondly, the creation and establishment of new indigenous-
indigenous patronage deals. With the establishment of new networks and the 
overtaking of old ones the networks seem to not favour any particular group (Hicks, et 
al., n.d.).  There is no evidence of economic benefit of one group over the others. 
 
In addition to the creation of new informal patronage deals, the presidency of Evo 
Morales also has introduced major formal changes. The replacement of the LPP by 
the Ley de participación y control social and the changes in the constitution are the 
most significant. The constitutional changes were the most challenging task (Salman 
& Sologuren, 2011). During the political campaign the changing of the constitution was 
one of the party’s electoral promises. When Evo won the presidency an Asamblea 
Constituyente was formed with the aim of starting to discuss the reforms. Thus, since 
the installation of the Asamblea the opposition parties (MNR, MIR, NFR, ADN) ruled 
by the mestizo blocked all the discussions, the process of discussion and 
implementation of changes was highly contested.  
 
The 2009 constitution acknowledges the character of exclusion and undermining of 
the indigenous communities, and it aims at correcting these inequalities. The opening 
page of the constitution reads: 
 
“Históricamente, Bolivia se ha construido a partir de la exclusión de los pueblos 
indígenas. Es por eso que en el marco de las transformaciones profundas y 
democráticas nos hemos propuesto cambiar esta situación injusta. Todos 
quienes nacimos en Bolivia somos originarios de esta tierra; algunos somos 
originarios milenarios y otros son originarios contemporáneos. El problema es 
que los originarios milenarios somos muchos pero pobres y los originarios 
contemporáneos son pocos pero ricos. Me- diante esta Nueva Constitución 
Política queremos que todos los originarios bolivianos seamos iguales. Eso 
estamos buscando, sin racismo, ni discriminación.” (Constitucion Politica del 
Estado Plurinacional, 2009) 
 
Which translates: Historically, Bolivia has been constructed based on the exclusion of 
the indigenous population. This is the reason why, in light of profound democratic 
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transformations we have undertaken the task of changing this unjust situation. All 
persons born in Bolivia are natives to this territory; some of us are millennial natives, 
others are contemporary natives. The problem is that millennial natives are the 
majority and are poor and the contemporary natives are minority and rich. By the 
implementation of this constitution we wish for all native Bolivians to be equal. This is 
what we are seeking for, no racism, no discrimination.  
 
This introduction to the constitution for the first time acknowledges the profound 
unequal divide between mestizos (contemporary natives) and indigenous groups 
(millennial natives). It formally addresses the problem and states its source. The aim 
of equality upgrades the character of being indigenous and remarks on the solution 
being profound changes from the root that empower the indigenous population. It puts 
the ethnic cause at the centre of the debate by introducing a whole chapter on the 
rights of indigenous and peasant groups. Chapter four formally recognises the 
different languages, the right to exercise autochthonous or traditional knowledge in 
terms of traditional medicine and rituals, the right to an educational system with no 
discrimination of language. It provides full autonomy. In regards of the legacy of the 
social movement and its confrontation with the state concerning development projects 
and privatisation of natural resources (water and gas), it established consultation 
processes before the state could decide on the exploitation of resources. These are 
the reasons why the mestizo elites disagreed with the 2009 constitution.  
 
The replacement of the LPP with the Ley de Particiación y control social represents 
another major formal change undertaken by the presidency of Evo Morales. Within 
this law OTBs are replaced by a more relaxed form of organisation composed of three 
actors: Organic actors: which are neighbouring juntas and trade unions which are 
legally recognised by the state; community actors: which are indigenous and farmers 
organisations which are recognised by constitutional mandate by the state, and 
circumstantial actors which are actors which are organised for a particular goal and 
when the goal is achieved cease to exist (Article 5 Ley No. 341, 2013). The pinnacle 




The main criticism Evo Morales had of the LPP was that it failed to empower and give 
a voice to the indigenous communities as well as ultimately benefiting the same old 
politicians (Diario La Razon, 2013). Conversely, this new law stated as right of the 
organisation the participation in the process of decision-making (Article 8). This reform 
formalised traditional authority from a bottom-up perspective.  
 
Despite the LPP being successful in allowing for a greater degree of participation 
amongst indigenous communities, the lack of decision-making power for the 
organisations ultimately was what truncated its success. FES-ILDIS (2004) presents 
a study based on interviews to the people involved in the implementation and design 
of the Law. Mario Galindo’s opinion on the failure of the law relies on trust. He points 
out that when the LPP training workshops took place only a handful of people 
attended, the reason for this was that people did not believe their voices were actually 
going to be influential in decision-making. Ultimately, it was a waste of time for them 
to participate if the result was not going to change (Galindo, 2004). Furthermore, 
another interviewee Javier Medina states that the recognition of Bolivia as a multi-
ethnic state was nothing more than ‘preach to the flag’ (Medina, 2004). The root 
problem of the law addressed by Evo Morales is thought to allow for a better 
incorporation and actual recognition of traditional authorities and traditional leadership, 





The selection of Bolivia as a case study stems from the QCA results which highlight it 
as a least likely case of peace given its structural conditions of political exclusion and 
horizontal inequality. It makes a good case study for highlighting potential explanatory 
problems drawn from quantitative conclusions. Most research on conflict studies and 
the very slim research on peaceful trajectories fails to recognise the relevance of 
informal institutions as drivers or controlling mechanisms. As Bolivia depicts, the lack 
of violent conflict despite the perpetual exclusion of indigenous groups which conform 
the majority of the population and the increasing degrees of social, political and 




Patronage represents an embedded characteristic of Bolivian politics, since the 1952 
revolution it has been used as a strategy to capture votes. During the 1980s the 
dominant political parties representing the mestizo elite have used populist promises 
based on class to buy political support, their strategies have been successful as the 
electorate has supported the parties despite their condition of exclusion and 
undermining. Voting has been used as an instrumental activity which has benefited 
both mestizo elites by keeping them in power and has benefited the indigenous groups 
as it has provided them with informal assets, as pointed out earlier in some cases 
providing even social mobility.  The persuading discourse of the mestizo elites 
appealed to class but due to various reasons including the discredit of the leftist 
political parties and the increased visibility of the ethnic cause, party discourse 
migrated to ethnicity as the vehicle for capturing votes. Patronage was dispensed 
based on ethnicity, but because of the lack of indigenous people in positions of power 
the patronage took the form of inter-ethnic patronage.  
 
Bolivian civil society has been historically strong, the increase on ethnic salience 
evidenced in the creation and success of CONDEPA, and the forthcoming capture of 
the vice-presidency by an ethnic Aymara increased the cohesion of the movement and 
brought on forward the ideas of rejection of discrimination. The electoral results of 
CONDEPA had a profound effect in the motivation of the ethnic movement, motivation 
for capturing power started to spread across. Furthermore, the character of the inter-
ethnic patronage meant that it was easier to break off the patronage network. Early 
2000s shows proof of this course of actions. An empowered movement motivated on 
previous winnings and patronage promises which were broken on the side of the 
clients due precisely to the non-binding ethnic character of the deal. The empowering 
of the movement has its pinnacle with the repression measures implemented by the 
state to hold to power during the 2003 mass protests.  
 
With the rise of Evo a take over the formal and informal channels of distribution takes 
place. Despite the MAS and Evo highly condemning patronage and stating that it only 
reproduced practices from the colonial era, patronage did not cease to be practiced in 
fact new indigenous-indigenous patronage networks were created. The old mestizo-
indigenous networks were still operating as the change in the elites was not a complete 
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shift but more of a downgrading. This illustrates the love and hate relationship Bolivian 
politics has with patronage and how patronage comes to play a significant role in the 























Conclusions and Discussion 
 
 
Research on civil conflict has remained elusive in producing substantial conclusions. 
Most of the research has focused on producing correlations via quantitative methods. 
From the four main groups of explanations highlighted in the literature review, a series 
of conclusions have been achieved and can be recognised as the most robust 
assumptions from the whole research programme. However, we still fail to thoroughly 
understand these events and there appears to be a disconnection between the policy 
and the academic world. In this regard, it is imperative to contribute to the debate by 
providing alternative understandings of conflicts which aim at explaining why and how 
these events happen.  
 
My particular interest sets on the effect of regime type in the triggering of conflicts. As 
highlighted in the literature review and across the different chapters, illiberal 
democracies are thought to significantly affect the possibility of conflict onset. Thus, I 
find that contemporary research has failed to acknowledge the relevance of informal 
institutions such as patronage networks within these societies. Ignoring the effect of 
patronage networks leaves behind much of what drives political behaviour and also 
disregards the reality of how politics is conducted in illiberal democratic regimes. 
Patronage networks therefore, represent a fundamental part of the political spectrum 
and their functioning can affect conflict or peace. 
 
In this vein, within this dissertation I aimed to find out: why do some illiberal 
democracies fall into conflict while others do not? Furthermore, what is it about these 
regimes which avoided civil wars that can be identified as common across cases and 
might point towards plausible ways of preventing conflict from erupting?  
 
I have attempted to solve this question by providing a multi-layered answer. I believe 
that an outcome such as a civil war is a product of both structural and agency causes 
which can be also understood as distant and proximate causes.  Structures as the 
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rules of the game represent both formal and informal institutions and agency causes 
understand conflict as a product of a bargain failure. Elites constantly bargain for the 
redistribution of assets, privileges and rights and they do so within the state and its 
formal institutions and also through informal institutions as patronage networks. 
Bargains fail in the presence of non-credible commitments and information 
asymmetries, furthermore, structures as a cause, affect conflict when distribution is 
inefficient across groups. This reveals a set of structural overall hypotheses as 
answers to the research question:  
 
Structural Hypothesis: 
H1. When there is inefficiency in the redistribution of assets, privileges and rights to 
different ethnic groups via formal or informal institutions, conflict is more likely to 
happen.   
H2. Exclusionary and inefficient redistribution through patronage networks can 
increase the possibility of conflict onset. 
 
 
I aimed at testing these overall hypotheses by using a mixed-method approach. fsQCA 
was selected based on the understanding of civil conflicts as complex multi-layered 
events commanded by conjunctural causation.  fsQCA allows for the analysis of 
different causes. It also remains on the qualitative side and gives room for a modest 
generalization. The purpose of conducting fsQCA analysis is to test the theory and to 
investigate whether the conditions are present in the selected cases and how strong 
they are in predicting the outcome. The hypotheses were therefore put to the test. 
Subsequently, the mechanism of interest: informal distribution in the form of patronage 
networks is further tested in two settings: where the outcome Y is a conflict and where 
the outcome Y is a peaceful trajectory. Following most dissimilar system design each 
setting is composed of a comparison of a most likely and a least likely case. 
 
The hypotheses tested in the QCA analysis are confirmed. Furthermore, some insights 
into processes are also revealed.  As has been shown in the previous chapters, 
inequality in the distribution of political participation, social services and economic 
assets can be captured within informal channels of distribution like patronage 
networks. The QCA analysis has shown that exclusion as a political dimension of 
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horizontal inequality works as an INUS95 condition in the conjunctural causality that 
leads to conflict onset. Distribution is not only relevant through formal channels like 
the state, but also through informal transactions in the form of neopatrimonial relations. 
These findings add to the debate of the relevance, impact and usefulness of informal 
institutions in preventing or triggering conflict. Furthermore, agency conditions come 
to play a significant role. As a matter of fact, structures are the product of decision-
making at the level of the elites and as such is what builds up structures for the future. 
Decision-making is a product of bargains between different elite groups with different 
interests and asymmetrical power. There is significant agreement that credible 
commitments and information asymmetries represent factors which explain a bargain 
failure, the QCA analysis further confirms that and also presents evidence for their 
relevance within informal contexts. 
 
The fsQCA results in a comparison of 21 cases of illiberal democracy across 1980-
2012 showed that these agency mechanisms have explanatory power in elucidating 
the degree of inclusion and redistribution in the structures and also the possibility of 
triggering conflict. Furthermore, it reveals that these mechanisms also play differently 
in formal or informal contexts. In terms of credibility of the commitments, while both 
sources of credible promises are relevant in affecting exclusion, formal distribution and 
in turn conflict; for an informal context only credibility coming from the elites seems to 
have an impact. As formal distribution is in itself visible and more transaction costs are 
associated with its use it is likely that both sources of credibility have to be optimal in 
order to produce the desired effect of redistribution. Thus, on the side of informality, 
and given the differentiated factor of the nature of the transaction, only credibility of 
the leaders has an impact. Accordingly, leaders sustain loyalty by providing personal 
and private benefits. If the coalition is exclusionary then aggrieved groups will remain 
excluded, isolated; for those included this is beneficial as the slices of the pie will 
remain the same. Excluded patrons therefore are likely to sustain a relationship of 
mistrust and their lack of affinity with those in power will further curtail their possibility 
of receiving patronage distribution. 
 
                                                      
95 Insufficient but necessary part of a configuration which is in itself unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome 
to happen. 
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In terms of information asymmetries, only asymmetries coming from the group in the 
form of their true will to fight and their capacity to do so was evaluated as data 
availability in the quality of communication channels was not found or could be 
constructed. However, despite this difficulty and incompleteness, asymmetries as 
coming from the group also revealed differential impact depending on the context of 
the transaction. Whilst for formal distribution no impact was identified, for the informal 
context asymmetries as coming from the group do affect informality or exclusion. In 
this regard, the presence of information asymmetries as coming from the patrons and 
perceived by the elites is thought to have a greater impact in bargains for informal 
redistribution because the resources that come to be redistributed informally pose a 
greater threat, in other words, informally redistributed assets could be used against 
those in power.  
   
The fsQCA analysis in this regard, helped to identify the conditions which are relevant 
in facilitating conflict, also, negating the outcomes allowed for an analysis into the 
relevance of mechanisms for the cases of non-conflict. In this regard, and having 
identified relevant mechanisms, 4 cases were further studied. A least likely case and 
a most likely case of conflict and of conflict avoidance. The comparative case analysis 
further explains how the mechanisms operated in the selected cases. 
 
For the cases of conflict, inefficient distribution through patronage networks is found 
in the most likely case (Thailand) and it plays a strong role in producing the outcome. 
Thus, for the least likely case (India Bodo) it is present, but its effect is not as strong. 
Likewise, for the cases of a peaceful trajectory, the mechanism is found in both cases: 
Namibia and Bolivia. These results significantly update the confidence in informal 
redistribution being a key factor in producing a peaceful trajectory in conflict prone 
countries.  
 
Following this point, for the case of Thailand there was significant confidence that the 
mechanism of interest was operating; in essence, that patronage networks were non-
redistributive and that in turn they were stimulating the use of violence. Results from 
Thailand therefore, update the confidence in the mechanism of interest. In particular, 
it allows one to infer with greater confidence that it played a role in facilitating or 
producing conflict onset. Thus, as for the case of India Bodo conflict as a least likely 
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case, the mechanism was present but played a much lower significant role in affecting 
the outcome. In this regard, results from India show that it is not possible to make a 
strong cross-case inference of patronage being a significant factor across the 
population of comparable cases.  In sum, the mechanism is present but the strength 
as to what it implies is not enforcing for conflict cases. 
 
The India case seems to be better explained by the formal mechanisms of distribution. 
In other words, the Bodo conflict is reflected more through the nature of inefficient 
redistribution within the formal state structures. However, constraints associated with 
resources and language can also affect the results. In other words, it could be the case 
that the lack of significance of informality is a product of lack of information (accessible 
sources) pertaining patronage networks for the Bodo Assam case or simply, a product 
of the inability to dig further into microdata or interviews.  
 
In regards of the non-conflict cases, the mechanism of interest was present in both 
cases. Namibia the most likely case, updated the confidence of patronage distribution 
being a key factor in affecting a trajectory of peace. Moreover, Bolivia being a least 
likely case can assertively update the confidence in redistributive patronage networks 
being a key factor in cases of conflict avoidance. As the methodology suggest, if 
patronage operated effectively in facilitating trajectories of peace in a least likely case 
such as Bolivia then it is possible to cross-case infer that it will likely be a key factor in 
the rest of the comparable cases. These results lead me to conclude that patronage, 
for the selected cases provides a stronger impact as a mechanism for achieving 
peaceful resolution of disputes across different groups rather than as a mechanism 
that when non-redistributive is likely to promote conflict.  
 
Within the remaining of this concluding chapter I will discuss the specific results for 
each case study along with some comparative salient conclusions and I will close by 
pointing towards future areas of research.   
 
 




The trajectory of conflict in the southern provinces of Thailand revealed an interesting 
pattern. The evidence on violent attacks suggests that during the Prem government 
violence was controlled in comparison to the instability that came upon 1997 and 
culminated with Thaksin Shinawatra’s rise to power. The highlight in the literature 
studying the Thai conflict points out towards the relevance formal institutions such as 
the SBPAC and the CMP-43 had on the decreasing use of violence.  Thus, the informal 
aspects of the bargain are severely under-appreciated. As recognised by various 
scholars of Thai politics, patronage is a fundamental part of how politics is conducted, 
the hidden transactions are a common way in which the functions of the state also 
operate. The type of patronage dispensed in Thailand is likely to be on the side of 
public job provision and provision of private licenses as the evidence suggests. The 
effect of patronage networks as an informal distribution channel is undoubtedly 
relevant in explaining the controlled violence during Prem’s government and the 
subsequent destabilisation during the Thaksin Shinawatra period. What the Thai case 
displays is also the difference of bargains within two PM periods, a minor elite shift 
across periods within the Southern provinces.    
  
The Prem era also showed signs of willingness to integrate by opening the 
opportunities to the Malays to become members of the bureaucracy. The SBPAC and 
the increase in Malay bureaucratic posts empowered the local elites. However, 
because the violence coming from the Malay groups ceased to exist immediately it is 
unlikely that a formal mechanism of redistribution and integration can account for the 
pacifying effect. A formal mechanism, given the grievances associated with the Malay 
movement and the nature of the violent movement simply do not provide enough 
explanatory power to justify the sudden stop in violence within the south, furthermore 
formal mechanisms take longer to provide results as opposed to informal ones. This 
shows that there must be another mechanism operating which has not been 
acknowledged. Given the relevance of patronage networks within Thailand it is 
thought that it is precisely the informal deals that were forged through the SBPAC that 
can explain the sudden stop in violence as a strategy. Informal distribution is efficient, 
and its effect is thought to be immediate. These transactions are founded on trust and 
personal bonds. As opposed, formal distribution takes longer to produce results 
because it involves more transaction costs. Furthermore, the new patronage deals 
also allowed for distribution to reach the lower ends of the vertical line in a more 
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efficient way than a formal institution could achieve, allowing therefore for a peripheral 
integration. 
 
The material aspect of the Malay grievances was given priority over the cultural 
aspect. The SBPAC failed to correctly address the cultural grievances despite 
attempting to, thus, on the material aspect the grievances were partially covered 
during Prem’s era via the formal inclusion (rise of 10% in Malay bureaucrats) and the 
informal distribution achieved. Thus, in comparison to the India Bodo case, the neglect 
of the cultural aspect did not produce any significant impact in the movement, the 
SBPAC failed to enforce the recognition and differentiation of cultural aspects. For the 
Bodos in turn, the material aspect came secondary to the cultural one as the struggle 
for worth for them was more focused on cultural recognition rather than on material 
distribution.  
 
Salient comparative characteristics to the case of India Bodo conflict:  
 
 India’s background and point of departure significantly differs from Thailand. 
Firstly, it depicts a three-way elite bargain between Bodos and Assamese in the state 
of Assam, Bodos and Indian national elite, and Bodos and non Bodos locally. This 
main difference brings to light a remarkable point of argument across the four cases: 
the relevance of decentralisation policies for the informal distribution of assets and 
rights.  
 
Allen (1995)(1999) studying patronage in Africa has pointed out towards the benefit of 
a centralised patronage network as opposed to a decentralised one. In his analysis of 
patronage networks, he argues that those in which the government is centralised are 
more efficient in controlling the distribution of assets, therefore also more effective. 
Allen only studies patronage, democracy and decentralisation in African politics. Thus, 
as highlighted in the theoretical framework informal institutions in the form of 
patronage networks are a salient characteristic of illiberal democracies. Extending the 
argument to illiberal democracies and following the evidence of the case studies, it is 
stressed that decentralised patronage networks seem to be more effective than 
centralised ones.  
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Decentralisation provides a four-way comparison across cases. Reflecting firstly on 
the negative cases, Thailand for example only was able to control violence when the 
patronage network was decentralised and patronage was being dispensed from the 
SBPAC and the CMP-43 particularly96 in both the form of jobs, assets and intelligence 
information. A centralised patronage network only benefited the Thai elites as total 
control was in their hands with a nucleus in Bangkok, where no Malay Muslims are 
part of the bureaucracy or occupy any positions of power.  
 
In the case of India, decentralisation has been implemented as a necessity since 
decolonisation. The great degree of ethnic heterogeneity and the vastness of the 
territory have protracted decentralisation as a need. Within the State of Assam as in 
the rest of the country local Panchayats have been implemented as a tool of 
decentralisation. Although the informal mechanism failed to play a significant role in 
the case of the Bodo conflict it is plausible to assure it was present. As highlighted in 
the chapter, for the Bodos the patronage network did not produce any benefit as the 
Bodos did not have any chance of reaching informal or formal distribution via 
decentralised decision-making. The positive effects of processes of formalisation as 
local Panchayats did not achieve any material or cultural benefits for the Bodo 
community. This is also reflected in the decision-making processes at the three-tier 
level in the Panchayats. The Bodos did not have the opportunity to interfere in 
decision-making at the upper tier, this explains why the decentralisation policies failed 
to benefit the Bodos and also why the recognition of Traditional Authority in the form 
of formalisation of local Panchayats also did not produce much advantage for the 
Bodos. 
 
Extending the argument to both Namibia and Bolivia, the decentralisation policies 
actually empowered the local elites and in turn solidified the patronage networks. For 
the case of Namibia, SWAPO’s incentive to decentralise via the incorporation of 
Traditional Authorities empowered the local elites and gave decision-making power to 
the different ethnic communities from the base. In terms of formalisation the 
recognition of traditional leadership and the decentralisation policies which recognised 
                                                      
96 SBPAC and CMP-43 were autonomous institutions. Full political decentralisation was only implemented in 
1999.  
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this local authority power produced a hybrid (formal / informal) political system which 
contributed to the peaceful trajectory witnessed in the country. As for Bolivia, the Ley 
de Participación Popular LPP which also recognised traditional authority and also 
decentralised political power helped to empower the local communities. Thus, initially 
benefiting the political parties, it soon came to benefit the communities as the parties 
where migrating from a left/right political base to an ethnic base. With the rise of Evo 
Morales to power the formalisation of traditional authority plus the effectiveness of the 
patronage network empowered by the decentralisation policies reached a peak point, 
the formal inclusion of indigenous population regionally also permitted the creation of 
indigenous-indigenous patronage networks which in turn strengthen the informal 
deals.  
 
In this regard, in terms of decentralisation the evidence seems to be compelling, a 
decentralised patronage network seems to have an impact in the possibility for 
reducing conflict onset if decision-making power can be accessed by the aggrieved 
group. Decentralised networks allow for a more efficient and effective redistribution 
which is able to reach the lower ends of the vertical scale. However, more research is 
needed to evaluate the plausibility of this statements for the broader context. For 
example, evaluation on whether the patronage network is operating in conflicting 
direction to formal institutions.  
 
Focusing back on India and the case of Bodo conflict, another salient point of 
comparison concerns the degree of violence. India’s case is significantly more violent 
than Thailand. The extent of the failure of the mechanisms in comparison is a plausible 
answer, thus, the difference in the conflict is also to be highlighted. For example, for 
the Bodos, there was a previous organisation of the civil society: like the BSS the 
ABSU and the PTCA. For the PTCA, the partial inclusion in this case (Charan Narzary) 
also shows how events like this can likely cause problems such as the splintering 
between hard-liners and soft-liners. In this regard, a mild inclusion not bargained 
collectively might create bigger problems. In contrast, the Malay Muslim movement in 
Thailand lacked any form of organisation or cohesion, it represented more of a 
sporadic unorganised violence pattern which resembles more a terrorist type than an 
organised political violence act; as such, for the case of Thailand it represented less 
of a challenge. Furthermore, the Bodos also suffered from moral hazard whereas the 
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Thais did not have point of comparison to other ethnicities in detriment. For the Bodos, 
as remarked in the chapter, part of the motivation to fight was the moral hazard felt 
upon the recognition of rights for the Nagas. In this regard, the extent of the failure of 
the mechanisms could explain the intensity of the violence but also considering these 
other features mentioned.   
 
In terms of horizontal inequalities, the cultural aspect was more important than the 
economic for the Bodos as opposed to the Malay Muslims. Highlighting the 
differentiation between the impact or relevance of the different dimensions of 
horizontal inequality can also produce interesting comparative results. Some 
quantitative studies remark on the relevance of the different dimensions but yet fail to 
measure them correctly. Some other studies also highlight the relevance of one 
dimension over the others, however I believe more research is needed in this area, 
particularly more comparative research (see: Gisselquist & Narvaez Rodriguez, 
forthcoming). 
 
More than formal institutions? Namibian and Bolivian effect of patronage networks on 
redistribution and processes of formalisation. 
 
Namibia and Bolivia both present cases of successful effect of patronage 
networks yet in very different ways. Both cases are also substantially different in their 
nature. Digging deep in the processes through which bargains were successful and 
how the different groups were kept content leads us to analyse more than just formal 
institutions. For Namibia, the fact that SWAPO is majorly Ovambo and that there is 
discontent with the party and how groups are treated unequally, indicates that another 
mechanism can be keeping the society content. Moreover, the process of recognition 
of traditional leadership lead to the creation and acknowledgement of a hybrid system 
of formal and informal authority; the patronage undertaken informally remained 
informal as well as the institution of traditional leadership. The process of formalisation, 
which co-opted patrons and/or traditional leaders, increased the trust between the 
bargaining groups and the recognition of their legitimate power kept the different 
groups satisfied, avoiding the possibility for the use of force.  
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Therefore, another key finding in this regard is the impact of processes of 
formalisation. The evidence drawn from the case study analysis has suggested that 
instances in which traditional authority is recognised and subsequently formalised 
allows for better processes of material, cultural and political distribution between 
different ethnic communities. Both the peace trajectory cases: Bolivia and Namibia 
recognised the power, legitimacy and effectiveness of traditional leaders and in doing 
so, incorporated the customary ancient forms of organisation into the state. For the 
case of Namibia in particular this allowed for the state to extend its arm to the rural 
communities where before there was no state presence at all. The recognition 
presented difficulties as much of the customary law goes in contradiction to formal 
laws; thus, the hybridity of the system allowed the state to, indirectly, enforce its 
presence and authority. At the same time, this recognition increased the trust between 
the parties and for the traditional leaders it also implied an acknowledgement of their 
ancestral authority.  In the case of Bolivia, the recognition of both peasant and 
indigenous organisations also incorporated traditional leadership into the formal 
structures of the state. For Bolivia, initially the LPP did not provide decision-making 
power to the leaders, it represented a first step towards recognition and formalisation 
but it remained operating solely as a pure formality (de jure). Thus, with the rise of Evo 
Morales and legal reform: the Ley de Participación y Control Social granted decision-
making power to the organisations as well as allowing for a broader recognition of 
organisations. Both of these processes in Bolivia and Namibia helped to improve the 
relationships between the groups and enforced a link between ancestral and modern 
ways of administration. 
 
As mentioned above, India also formalised through the recognition of Panchayats. 
Thus, for the Bodos this recognition was not effective as, as opposed to Namibia and 
Bolivia the Bodos did not acquire decision-making power and the base of recognition 
was not based on ethnic ancestral differences. In India, the ethnic aspect of the 
Panchayats is recognised via the ST/SC quotas as affirmative action programmes but 
not as a formal identification of the different rules of different ethnicities. In fact, the 
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recognition can only be achieved if the group is officially recognised as an ST/SC in 
the first place, for which the Bodos were not recognised until late in the period97.  
 
As the cases suggest, the impact of formalisation seems to provide meaningful 
answers to the research question. However, these processes are in need of further 
research. It would be imperative to find out some other cases of formalisation, how 
where they achieved and whether or not they have any significant impact in bringing 
peace to conflict prone countries. Also, some other aspects of formalisation processes 
could be studied in depth, for example, whether the formalising process had an ethnic 
aspect or not, whether it produced a hybrid system as in Namibia or it became to be 
fully formally institutionalised in other words, completely absorbed. What were the 
conflicts of interest in this process? And furthermore, whether the relationships 
between different societal groups were improved or whether it created more conflicts 
across groups. Florian Kern (2016) provides a comprehensive literature review 
pertaining this topic in what he calls dual governance, he further reviews research 
conclusions on consequences and advantages of dual governance on democracy, 
conflict and peace and development. I strongly agree with his conclusion on the lack 
of a general theory and the need of more analysis pertaining the effect of integration 
of traditional leadership into formal institutions. Perhaps the strongest area of research 
in regards of formalisation is land and property rights (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2002) 
(Sjaadstad & Cousins, 2009) (Bromley, 2009) (Toulmin, 2009) (Benjaminsen, et al., 
2009)).  
 
 Another key finding drawn from the positive cases pertains to the idea of 
whether it makes any difference if the patrons are part of the bureaucracy or not. 
Following this point, the operation of patronage is more effective when the patrons are 
‘inside’ the state structures; thus, the case of Bolivia shows that they can also be 
‘outside’ and that the patronage line would also operate effectively. This further reveals 
two points: firstly, that inclusion per se is not a mandatory point of action to achieve 
credible commitments and in turn successful bargains; and secondly, that patronage 
can also be inter-ethnic.  
                                                      




In regards of the first point, one of the main doubts when beginning the process of 
study of the different cases was in fact whether the patrons needed to be co-opted 
into state structures in order to be able to provide patronage. In other words, whether 
political inclusion was a pre-condition of patronage distribution, as the patrons were 
given access to assets and political power previous to their ability to redistribute 
informally. This was suspected initially given research conclusions on ethnicity that, 
patrons are likely to distribute primarily to their ethnic lineage assuming they have 
access to assets to redistribute98. Thus, for the QCA analysis both of the dubious 
statements were assumed (patrons ‘outside’ and inter-ethnic distribution) in an attempt 
to evaluate them. In this regard, what the evidence of Bolivia thoroughly illustrates is 
that political inclusion is not a pre-condition of distribution via patronage and that what 
political inclusion does affect is not informal distribution per se but the degree and the 
type of distribution that can be achieved. The cases analysed and included in the QCA 
fall within this classification. When patrons are ‘inside’ the state it means they have 
political power or decision-making access over legally transferred funds, in turn, 
allowing for more sophisticated forms of patronage to be distributed as public good 
provision or licenses. Thus, on the opposite side, when patrons are ‘outside’, decision-
making power is less straight forward or subject to more formal barriers; therefore, 
patronage is likely to be more predominant on the type of job provision (non-political 
power jobs) and clientelist practices. These are all theorising statements or 
speculations as there is not enough evidence to produce claims. Thus, it is imperative 
to provide more research into how and why different types of patronage are dispensed 
and achieved and if they do actually have any significant impact.  
 
In terms of inter-ethnicity, Bolivia brings to light the idea that patronage can also be 
inter-ethnic. Thus, interethnic patronage networks are easier to break as the binding 
agent is purely instrumental. Before the rise of Evo Morales, mestizo elites needed the 
support of Aymaras, Quechuas and Guaraníes to stay in power. The provision of 
patronage for this aim was purely instrumental. Thus, the inter-ethnic patronage 
networks of the clientelist type redistributed assets to the lower ends of the vertical 
                                                      
98 Focusing on the big men. It can also be the case of a three-tier relation in which there is another step in the 
relation connecting the big men with an intermediary. But this would be much more difficult to establish and 
capture.  
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scale, keeping content the population and preventing them from rebelling violently. 
The rise of Evo Morales to power allowed for the creation of indigenous-indigenous 
networks, likewise some of the old inter-ethnic networks, mestizo-indigenous 
remained active. It is likely that the patronage dispensed since the establishment of 
indigenous-indigenous patronage lines and in general since the rise of Evo Morales to 
power also allowed for other types of patronage to be distributed such as licenses and 
provision of public goods99.  
 
The effect of patronage networks in Bolivia is particularly illustrative. It provides 
compelling evidence in regards of the importance of this mechanism. Within illiberal 
democratic regimes it also highlights the importance of informality as valid and even 
more relevant channel of distribution. Bolivia represents a case in which there is no 
political inclusion of indigenous population, and where cleavages are mutually 
reinforced. Thus, despite these characteristics the country managed to avoid violent 
conflict. Bolivia should reflect a case of conflict onset as it provides favourable 
conditions for conflict, thus, exploring the informal side of the bargains provides 




Highlighted here has been the need for more research into formalisation processes as 
recognition of traditional leadership. Decentralisation policies also are highlighted as 
an interesting path in the quest of understanding how patronage operates more 
effectively. Both of these areas of research would provide a clearer picture on how 
patronage operates. Additionally, questions remain as if the type of patronage 
provided can be affected with the position of the patron being ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ state 
structures. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of informal institutions within illiberal democratic regimes, it has 
been theorised that a balance between institutions must be in place. Informality is 
thought to penetrate the state in different proportions, meaning that in some cases 
informality will be dominant in terms of (re)distribution transactions and in other cases 
                                                      
99 Thus, in any given case it is likely that patronage is a combination of different types.  
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it the balance would turn to formal institutions meaning that transaction are mainly 
taken through the state itself. There are also cases in which both institutional 
frameworks are in equllibrium, it would be interesting to find out whether this 
equillibrium is likely to trigger conflict if the institutional frameworks are in competition.  
 
In general terms however, the starting point is to find out whether it is possible to find 
this balance in different regimes, why certain regimes lean more towards one 
institutional framework or the other and how does this balance affects the quality of 
the democracy if at all. This will help to further solidify knowledge on the real way 
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